


U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

(Established : 1870)



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JULY-SEPTEMBER 1989

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NOTE

"The views expressed in the Journal are in no sense official and the opinions of contributors and the Editor in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of Institution"

Higher Defence Management

National security means safeguarding the acquired values of a State. This term has both domestic and external connotations. Externally, it implies that it is the primary responsibility of a State to protect the territorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty of a nation. Internally, it would be the state policy to defend the nation from all forms of non-military threats arising from fragmentation politics, balkanization, subversion, secession, religious fundamentalism, ethnic and sectarian activities which would destabilize a nation from within.

These military and non-military threats to a nation have assumed a new significance with the quantum jump in science and military technology which provide repressive weapon systems. Electronic Warfare, communications, covert intelligence and other forms of military operations have acquired immense capabilities for causing enormous harm to the adversary. Some of these covert threats could be in the form of ideological and psychological warfare against nations whose societies comprise ethnic, religious and social diversities.

In this new security paradigm, with its vast internal and external manifestations, there is an urgent need to examine the entire framework of security management as it exists today and to check if it is adequately structured to meet the needs of the 1990s and beyond.

The current issue of our Journal carries a very perceptive article by our former Minister of State for Defence, Mr. Arun Singh, pertaining to defence management at higher levels, which is not only very timely but also very illuminating. We would, indeed, look forward to the reactions of our readers on this vital issue of national security.

I P K F in Sri Lanka *

J N DIXIT, IFS

I am slightly awed by the audience because I see people sitting in front of me whom I viewed from the lower and middle levels of the bureaucracy like General Candeth and I see a number of colleagues with whom I have been associated during my assignment in Bangladesh & now Sri Lanka. I have not brought a written text but had I known that it would be such an august audience, I would have been prepared for a more structured presentation.

I will try to structure my presentation to the extent possible, and I am hopeful that my presentation would be brief enough and I would react to questions. Because, questions would, perhaps, be more appropriate in comprehending the very complex situation in which we are involved in Sri Lanka.

I would like to divide my presentation in four sections. The first section is why we went into Sri Lanka; what was the nature of our involvement in the Island and why. Secondly, what were the internal factors which necessitated our involvement? Thirdly, since I am speaking to the members of the United Service Institution, my perception of how the IPKF has performed in its very crucial role, perhaps, the first of this kind, entrusted to the Armed Forces by the people, and the Government of India, and fourth section of the presentation would be a prognosis on the basis of political developments in Sri Lanka over the last six to eight months after the elections.

To begin with, I presume that you know the history of the origins, causation of Tamil Militancy in Sri Lanka. I will just put it in one sentence, that the rise of Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka, was the result of a systematic, orchestrated and deliberate, discrimination against the minority in Sri Lankan Society by its majority. You must not forget that Tamil speaking people of Sri Lanka constitute 18% of the population. They also have a higher literacy rate and a greater capacity for economic performance. These very factors which gave them advantageous position during British and Pre-British Colonial regimes in Sri Lanka, resulted in a backlash from part of the majority against the Tamils and from 1948, when Sri Lanka became Independent, there was a consistent policy of discrimination against the Tamils which

* Text of a talk given by Mr JN Dixit former High Commissioner of India in Sri Lanka and presently Indian Ambassador in Pakistan, to the members of the USI on 10 March, 1989.

ultimately resulted in a caste like war situation. Every Tamil thought that there was no other way out except to resort to violence to fulfil their aspirations. It is in this context that we have to judge or assess how we got involved.

On the outset, I will give a simple sort of diagnosis; there are many facets, many nuances; we can discuss them when we have the time. But very simply, by 1978, the politically aware Tamils had come to the conclusion that their future lies only on the creation of a separate State, which can be carved out of Sri Lanka, where they can have Tamil as a language and Hinduism as a religion. Tamils have a principle of individualism, and a linguistic identity on which they wanted to create a theory of a new nation state, not so new to us, because, we went through the trauma of the same doctrine being applied to our country in 1945-46, as a result of which we were partitioned. Since then, our effort and experiment has been to build a society which rejected the theory that the territorial nation state does always have to depend on language and religion. That thesis we have rejected. We, in India, have been trying to build a polity based on terms of reference which say that despite its multi-lingual, multi-religious, multi-ethnic nature, an integrated nation can be created; based on principles of secularism and rational precepts of political and social organisations and the creation of an infra-structure based on non-religious framework - this does not mean rejecting religion but separating religion from the process of politics.

So the first reason why we went into Sri Lanka was the interest to preserve our own unity; to ensure the success of a very difficult experiment that we have been carrying out ourselves. We claim to be the largest functioning democracy in the world. Despite what people like Galbraith say that India was the largest functioning anarchy in the world, we have succeeded in some measure. And what the Tamils in Sri Lanka were being compelled to follow, in terms of their life, which would have affected our polity. Because let us not forget that the first voice of secessionism in Indian Republic was raised in Tamil Nadu in the mid-sixties. This was exactly the same principle of Tamil ethnicity, Tamil language. So, in a manner, our interest in the Tamil issue in Sri Lanka, Tamil aspirations in Sri Lanka was based on maintaining our own unity, our own integrity, our own identity in the manner in which we have been trying to build our society.

The second reason, why we went in was to counter the Sri Lankan Government about its legitimate reactions to the rising Tamil militancy, since 1972. Most of us, look at the 1983 riots as a watershed; from then some sort of explosion did arrive. Tamils resorted to violence from 1972 onwards and it went on escalating, it became manifest after the 1983 riots, and when the

Sinhalese dominated Central Government in Colombo realised that it cannot contain the Tamil militancy on the basis of the means available to it internally, and since they could not look to India for help; because our compulsions were respecting the sentiments of 50 million of our own Tamil citizens which was quite legitimate from our own point of view. So then, Sri Lankan government, or I should be more appropriate, Sinhalese Government therefore, started looking for external support to counter Tamil militancy, Tamil insurgency, which had security implications for us.

In the period, between 1978 and 1986, the strength of the Sri Lankan Army was raised from approximately 12,000 to 35,000. The overall strength of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and para-military forces rose approximately from 15,000 to 17,000, if we include the homeguards and paramilitary units. Sri Lanka signed informal, confidential agreements with the governments of United States and United Kingdom to bring their warships into Colombo, Trincomalee and the Gulf. The frequency of visits by the navies of these countries showed a quantum jump between 1982-83 and 1987. Sri Lanka invited British mercenaries (Keeney-Weeney Services) into its Intelligence services. Sri Lanka invited Shen-bet and Mossad, the two most effective and influential intelligence agencies of Israel. Sri Lanka sought assistance from Pakistan to train its Home Guards, and its Navy; Sri Lanka offered broadcasting facilities to the Voice of America, which would have enabled the United States to install highly sophisticated monitoring equipment on Sri Lankan Soil which could have affected our security in terms of their capacity to monitor our sensitive information for their own interests. Sri Lanka bought arms from countries with whom our relations have been difficult. So, the second reason, why we had to be actively involved in Sri Lanka was to counter to the extent possible, this trend. The third reason, why we went into Sri Lanka was an important domestic political factor, and here I would preface what I am going to say by articulating a premise that while morality and absolute norms should govern politics, in actuality it is not so. It cannot so happen, because human conditions remain imperfect. The Chemistry of power, the motivations which affect the interplay of power between societies are not governed by absolute morality. Of course, Lord Buddha, Mahatma Gandhi, who, once in a while come in to enthuse this, and make a very tremendous impact on societies and people. But normally it is not.

Having said that, I would like to elaborate that we have to respect also the rationale, however acceptable it may be in terms of objectives. We had to respect the sentiments of the 50 million Tamil citizens of India. They felt that if we did not rise, in support of the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka, we are not standing by our own Tamils; and if that is so, then in the Tamil psyche, Tamil sub-conscious the question arose; is there any relevance or validity of

our being part of a larger Indian political identity, if our very deeply felt sentiments are not respected? So, it was a compulsion. It was not a rationalised motivation, but it was a compulsion which could not be avoided by any elected Government in this country. So, that was a third reason.

So, in the first section of our presentation we have found, in terms of domestic politics, in terms of our security interests and over and above, in terms of domestic politics, and over and above, in terms of maintaining our own unity and integrity, to be involved in the crisis of Sri Lanka. Had Sri Lanka been 15,000 miles away with seas in between, like Fiji is, perhaps our involvement could have been less, but it is not. There is just 18 miles of water between us and that is also very shallow.

The second aspect of the presentation was how far Tamil aspirations would be fulfilled because of what we did, and I am only going to speak about the political aspects. The Tamils have four demands: that the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka consisting of the districts of Jaffna peninsula, Vavuniya, Batticaloa, Amparai, Mannar, Trincomalee, these areas should be declared the traditional areas of habitation and home land of Tamil people. Second, that these areas should be merged in one province; third that these areas should be governed by a Tamil Government with sufficient devolution of power and autonomy so that Tamils have a sense of security about their own future, in terms of development, culture and all that constitutes functioning of a government for the welfare of its people. The third demand also included equal status for Tamil as a language with Sinhalese in Sri Lanka instead of being relegated to non-existent situation as it was after the 1956 Language Act. The fourth, they wanted sufficient devolution of power on significant subjects like finance, land and land settlement, law and order. The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement signed on the 29th of July, 1987 meets all these basic aspirations. It provided for fulfilling these demands to the maximum extent possible. Secondly, with maximum possible speed, the Sri Lankan Government between September, 1987 and January 1988 passed all the basic legislation needed to transmute what is committed in the Agreement into Governmental policy and action in Sri Lanka.

Third, the package of concessions which is envisaged in the Agreement and which is being granted gradually is better than any package which the Tamils extracted from the Sri Lankan Sinhalese side over the last 50 years. There were three major agreements signed between the Tamil political parties and the Sri Lankan Government between 1948 and 1978. Each one of them was between the extant government of Sri Lanka and majority Tamil political party whether it was a provincial party of Tamils or TULF. Each time an

agreement was signed and each time it was scuttled. Whereas the difference this time is that the Agreement is guaranteed by us. The Agreement is underwritten by India, so that the fall-out of their internal chicanery may not be on us, and that guarantee along with a package of concessions which is better than any that they have got, is something which we should take note of. Tamil aspirations are in the process of getting fulfilled. As envisaged in the 13th Amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution following the signing of the Agreement, as envisaged in the Provincial Councils Act passed by the Sri Lanka Parliament in October/November, 1987, as envisaged in the law passed by Sri Lankan Parliament in January 1989, all these four demands, about language, devolutions, merger, and homeland have been met. There is an elected Tamil Government existent in the North and Eastern Tamil speaking areas. Because the power had to go to them we have to help them to get it out of the Central Government. Tamil Government exists in the north-eastern provinces for the first time in the contemporary history of Sri Lanka.

Secondly, there are, between 23 and 25 Tamil members of Parliament who will be sitting in Parliament, or rather some of whom have already sat there day before yesterday. For the first time, there is a substantive Tamil representation based on rising political groups. So both in the Central Government in Colombo and in the Tamil provinces, there is a Tamil presence in Parliament. It is not perfect. A devolution which has been already sanctioned under law, has to be made a reality on the ground. Apart from that, the devolution needed by the Tamils, demanded by the Tamils, required by the Tamils has to be improved in the field of finance, law and order, control over land and land settlement and so on. But the fact remains, that the terms of reference are in place, the institutions are in place, even the people are in place, and to that extent, I think, the Agreement, apart from resolving some of our concerns, has concentrated and eradicated the basic reason why this crisis came into being.

In the third section of my presentation about the IPKF, I begin by saying that one undercurrent, which I noticed among my colleagues in the Armed Forces, especially in the middle and younger levels; there was no question of loyalty to the task assigned and the discipline and efficacy with which they have functioned and on which they are functioning. But in the moments of introspection, they were always wondering. This is not China, this is not Pakistan, why are we in Sri Lanka? We were originally supposed to come and protect the Tamils. Why is it that the situation has arisen, when they are shooting at some of the Tamils? Legitimate questions ! And I would like to tackle them frontly.

I have partially answered why we are in Sri Lanka. There can be a debate about it. But I have stated what I perceived as a valid approach at that

time. Certainly, it is not a perceived, tangible and quantitatively or qualitatively challenging enemy, a potential enemy like China and Pakistan - which are part of our post-independence psyche and security perceptions. But let us not forget that, since, 1498, the external intrusions into India, the disruptions of the Indian power structure have not been through the Khyber Pass as much as through the southern coasts of India. This is something which we must not forget. With the rise of sea power, with the rise of Air power, with the increase in capacity for communications, free of limitations of land, our strategic thinking has to take into account potential danger which a country can face. It need not necessarily be a direct military invasion, it need not be a direct military intervention, it can be a creation of circumstances in neighbouring countries generating political, social trends in those countries which can have a ripple effect on our polity and disintegrate us. That is why I think, the IPKF is in Sri Lanka.

The second question is little more difficult to answer. We were supposed to protect the Tamil interests in Sri Lanka. Why we are in a situation, where we are shooting at the Tamils? The answer simply lies in the fact, that when we interacted with the Tamils, we believed that the LTTE was an organisation which had a sense of honour, and a sense or commitment to peace and welfare of the Tamil people. I must emphasise, that in my view, the IPKF is not fighting the Tamils at all, IPKF is fighting only a small group of perhaps motivated, perhaps intensely trained and disciplined, but a group of insurgents, who are finding it difficult to make the transition from a guerrilla force to a political force. The IPKF has got involved in this kind of an operation against a Tamil group, because IPKF is trying to sustain the momentum of institutional democracy and the right of voting of the Tamil people of Sri Lanka. The IPKF is trying to ensure the stability of Tamil society in Sri Lanka while fulfilling their articulated aspirations as articulated to us over the last six years. The people whom we are fighting are the people who are not concerned with those aspirations.

In my judgement, as one of the few Indian citizens who have interacted directly with Prabhakaran, for over three years, I am finally of the conclusion that he is a very self-centred fascist leader; any man who tells me across the table that I believe in one party and in one leader, that is in me; any man who tells me that I want to live even if no other Tamil is alive, does not have Tamil welfare at his heart. It is essentially a case of Megalomania. I am being very harsh in my judgement. But that is my judgement. You are dealing with such a man with your hands tied behind your back. You are dealing with such a man and his group which, you must objectively acknowledge, has emotional roots in the Jaffna population. And I am deliberately saying, only the Jaffna population, not the population of Trincomalee, Batticaloa or Amparai or the

Tamil population of Central Island of Sri Lanka. So, conceptually, saying that we are supposed to protect the Tamils but we are fighting the Tamils is a wrong concept. We are fighting only with a group of somewhat obstinate Tamil youngmen who had the advantage of local knowledge of terrain and who had the advantage of not having any constraints in terms of political and social value systems. If it was not so I don't think the IPKF would have been successful, and so brilliantly successful in organising not one, but three elections in Sri Lanka: the Provincial council elections in the Eastern portion of the north-eastern Province, the Parliamentary elections and the Presidential elections. In the latter two elections, the IPKF not only ensured the safety and electoral freedom of Tamil candidates but also Sinhalese candidates, which was a very volatile exercise. And that the common people of the areas where the IPKF was deployed for this electoral purpose did not thwart the exercise; this to my mind proves that whatever people may say in terms of comments or criticisms, the basic undercurrent is that you are not fighting the Tamils, you are fighting only a group which has its own point of view.

Then, again, I don't know, how many of us are conscious of the type of role which the IPKF is playing in Sri Lanka. Our armed forces in our history of post-independence India have been abroad several times. We have been to Congo and we have been to Gaza; we have been to Lebanon; we have been to Cyprus; we have been to Korea; We have been to Bangladesh. But what the IPKF is involved in Sri Lanka is much more multi-dimensional and complex. Our previous external projections of our armed forces were either a straight forward military projection in a military situation or we were invited to project ourselves in classic terms of reference of a peace-keeping force. But this is the first time, that I think the IPKF is several things in Sri Lanka. It is an affirmation of our commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of a small neighbouring country. It is an external projection of our influence to tell our neighbours that if, because of your compulsions or your aberrations, you pose a threat to us, we are capable of, or we have a political will to project ourselves within your territorial jurisdiction for the limited purpose of bringing you back. Sounds slightly arrogant! It is not arrogant. It is real-politic, and it brings you back to the path of detachment and non-alignment where you don't endanger our security.

The IPKF has been a catalyst for reviving democratic institutions in Sri Lanka after a gap of eleven years. Very few people remember that the last series of general elections were held in Sri Lanka in 1977. And what triggered off Elections, which were held between November, '88 and January, 89, was the successful management of the elections to the Eastern Province by the IPKF. The credit entirely goes to our armed forces.

We have projected our Armed forces, therefore, not only in a peace-keeping role, but in a political role. Secondly, we are undoubtedly a factor against insurgency and mayhem in Sri Lanka. The worst critic of the IPKF in Jaffna, if asked, shall we withdraw immediately, says no, for God's sake, don't. Please don't. And what is interesting is, now that view is shared by the foreign Minister and the new President of Sri Lanka, which gives us perhaps the capacity to negotiate from the position of strength and detachment because, I know that Indian Public opinion and our own good sense, impels us to say that you must not be in a foreign country for a very long time. We must move out. And, I think that is because it is a good approach and that is my view too. But the fact that despite performing a highly complex and at times unpalatable role, IPKF is being considered a necessity in a foreign country where there are so many complexes against India is a symptom of two things. First, that you are a factor of stability. Second, that whatever tasks have been assigned to us, we have done them with a sense of fair play and detachment regardless of minor criticisms here or there.

Having enumerated these roles of the IPKF, let me add that they are doing more. The IPKF has been the principal conduit for providing relief and reconstruction work. All the three branches of our armed forces, have played a very vital role in reviving life in the north and the east. You have to remember that this is being done in a wild ravaged territory which suffered, which yielded under discriminatory violence by the Sinhalese forces continuously for five years; which came to a climax between the period December, '86 and May '87 which led to our first military projection into Sri Lanka short of actual violence. It is interesting that our first military projection was air dropping of relief supplies; the Indian Navy escorting relief supplies to the ports of Sri Lanka, including northern-eastern Province. The IPKF is not only distributing food, but they have been building schools and repairing temples and churches, and offering medical assistance.

I must also mention that, I was profoundly proud when six months ago, I went to Trincomalee, and from Divisional Headquarters, I flew north west and landed in a small hamlet. I saw a Second Lieutenant, a lady of the Indian Army Medical Corps. She was the only person in uniform. She was attending to about eight villages alone. She was professionally a surgeon, but was doubling up as a physician. The impact of that one person in these villages was something which you had to see to believe. This is how one has to assess what we are doing.

Apart from relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, the IPKF has created the necessary political environment for the Tamils to get their acts together, if they choose to. The IPKF is not a political honest broker. The Indian

Armed forces are not political but our troops have created an environment where these warring groups, if they have any sense of wisdom and vision about their own destiny and future can get together and evolve a cohesive institutional framework for Tamil politics for the future. So this is how I view what the IPKF has been doing and is doing and this mind you in the face of adverse publicity from the Sinhalese Press and constant needling by the Western Press and our own introspective investigative Journalism.

I am not jingoistic about the Indian Armed forces, but I have had the unique privilege of functionally interacting with the Indian Armed forces in every war and conflict that we have been involved in, except the Kashmir war. So, I have a great sense of chronological continuity when I make this assessment. I think, there is every reason for Indians to be very proud, and I am not saying this because I am speaking to this audience: I have said this to earlier audiences too, much more critical audiences.

Lastly, the elections in Sri Lanka and what do they auger for us? Some of it I have already explained. The revival of democracy after eleven years, is something which neutralises extremist forces and their capacity to claim that the existing power structure is not in favour of elections, so our violence is justified. That rationale has been destroyed by these three elections. When I say this I do not mean that extremism has disappeared. Extremism of the Sinhalese typed led by the JVP and extremism of the Tamil type, led by the LTTE continues. But if the trends which we have set in motion are sustained, I will go into detail, then the process of marginalisation of such extremist forces, I think, will be accomplished, but it is subject to this being sustained. But what this sustaining means, and what they sustain - what does that mean? As far as the Government of Sri Lanka is concerned, Mr. Premadasa, I think, should be responsive to the Tamil demands. We must not, repeat, 'not' indulge in the osmosis and ambivalence of President Jaywardene which characterised his policies towards Tamils between 1977 and right upto 1986: like offering district Council and not giving them money; telling the TULF to become an electoral alliance and expelling them from Parliament; discussing the devolution of power with Prime Minister of India in June, 1985, and agreeing to hold Thimpo talks and then coming up with proposals which have nothing to do with Tamil aspirations. That kind of a thing will land Mr Premadasa back to square one and would land us there too. But we will now negotiate from a position of strength if that happens but I hope it does not.

Mr Premadasa should, first of all, actually grant devolution of power which is already stipulated in his own laws, fully, unhesitatingly, without letting his bureaucracy and politicians to pull back or interfere in the processes. The Tamil groups which are in the power structure instead of standing

aside and making demands, as pre-conditions, should join the institutional framework and work through it to fulfil their aspirations. We, India, should continue to generate political and diplomatic pressure on the government of Sri Lanka to see that Tamil aspirations are met and that there is no pulling back. At the same time we should send signals to Mr. Premadasa that we will not be destabilising him and that we will not endanger his remaining in power as long as he is delivering on his own promises, and the promises made by his own party before he came into power.

Another interesting aspect which we should take into account is that the Sinhalese voter has voted for the UNP and the SLFP both moderate middle of the road parties and for the existing democratic institutions as defined in the Sri Lankan Constitution of 1978. They have rejected the extremists whether they are leftist or Sinhalese Buddhist chauvinists, whether it is the JVP or some elements of United Socialists Alliance. Similarly, the fact that nearly 63% of the Tamil voters voted for Parliamentary and Presidential elections in which they chose candidates other than those belonging to the LTTE, is a rejection of the LTTE's "all or nothing" approach towards politics, this nuance we should take note of.

While the Sinhalese have ideologically voted for the middle of the road moderate democratic political forces there has been a radicalisation of Tamil politics. The Tamils have voted for the left of the Centre parties; young Tamil groups by rejecting the traditional TULF, the old school political leadership of Tamils, totally rejecting TULF. So they have rejected radical extremism as well as moderate constitutional forces and they have chosen the radical youth to man the power structure who would not lose sight of Tamils aspirations with a populist leftist orientation. There is an emerging future trend in Sri Lankan Politics, which would affect development.

As far as bilateral relations go, my assessment is that regardless of the pre-election rhetoric President Premadasa will not rock the boat as long as he feels that we will not insist on things, which he thinks would create concern in our minds and in our policies, but at the same time he will expect us to ensure that Tamil militancy does not cross threshold where his stability is threatened. So, it will have to be an extremely deliberate exercise in reciprocity, and if we can maintain that balance, I think that our relations can grow slowly, advisably slowly, on positive lines.

Having said that, I must underline that I am predicating all this on certain positive premises of attitudes, but we must be prepared for contingencies. JVP pressure on Premadasa, Sinhalese backlash to the economic pressure, inflation, incapacity of the Tamils to hold together whatever they have achieved so far and the rise of Tamil militancy.

So the prospects are of uncertainty. But with the safeguard now which we did not have in 1983, of a framework within which we can implement a coherent policy with diplomatic and defence policies where we can preserve our interests and at the same time ensure that we are not accused of breaking up of a neighbouring country. I think I will end on this note and I thank you all for giving me a patient hearing and if I have left out some aspects, I will be happy to answer questions and I thank you again for honouring me with your presence.

Question:

Parliament during President Jaywardene's time passed the 13th Amendment. It does not seem to give anything to Provincial councils. It seems to say that the Governor can overwrite anything which Provincial councils may pass, that Parliament in Colombo can overwrite anything that Provincial Councils may say. It does not give them any control over land and land cases that you have mentioned, it does not even give them the authority to run the law and order organisation. Now, this was passed when Mr Jaywardene had two-thirds majority in Parliament. How is Mr. Premadasa going to achieve any devolution package if it has to go through Parliament.

Answer:

Well, the 13th Amendment certainly is not all that the Tamils want. But, if you read it carefully, it is exactly patterned on the clauses of the Indian Constitution in relation to the Union territory. You must remember that they are dealing with a very small polity just 15 million people, equal to the size of the State of Kerala, afflicted by a tremendous Sinhalese Complex. I do not disagree with you when you say that this is not enough but it was an improvement on anything that was offered before.

Secondly, you have to read the 13th Amendment alongwith the provisions of the Provincial Councils Act. the 13th Amendment does not give you the distribution of the jurisdiction between the Centre and Provinces. But Provincial Council Act does, and a very long list of subjects which has been devolved.

I am not questioning your thesis, that enough has not been devolved in terms of law and order or control over land and land procurement. But the point is that government of Sri Lanka has agreed to the creation of Provincial Police force in which officers upto the rank of Superintendent of Police shall be from the very same area, that they will function under control of the Provincial Chief Minister. Only officers in the rank of Superintendent of Police and above will be nominees of the Central Government. It is exactly as it is in India. IPS Vs State Police Services.

As far as land and land settlement goes what the Tamils want, is the total control over land and land allocation, whereas the devolution says that all land except those required for the national purposes will fall under the jurisdiction of the Provincial Government plus land which is under national irrigation and agricultural Projects and this is related to a specific problem and issue, the Greater Mahabali Development Project of Sri Lanka, under which about 980,000 hectares of land is going to be brought under cultivation. Most of it West and North - West of Trincomalee province. Sinhalese want that land to be available to them, because there is tremendous demographic pressure on the southern portions of the Island. So, this is the land which is not occupied and even if the Tamils wish to occupy, in terms of population, they cannot take over that land for another 25 years, because they just do not have that manpower. But the Tamils have these emotional desires.

So I have no basic disagreement with you when you say that it is not total decentralisation of power. But I am saying that politics is the art of the possible and within those possibilities, I think, a beginning has been made and the thing is to push it forward through Institutional arrangements instead of at the point of a gun because at the point of a gun, it will enmesh us indefinitely in the area and that is not in our interest.

Question:

Keeping in mind the situation and events that we have come across now in Sri Lanka, what lessons can we draw? Particularly, with reference to Mauritius, Maldives, and other Islands with whom we may have interests?

Answer:

Well, we can draw the following lessons from our experience in Sri Lanka:

- (1) That nation states or polities which are multilingual multi-ethnic, multi-religious - it should be the primary concern of the decision making elite of that Society not to alienate the minority.
- (2) That discrimination backed up by force will only result in, first militancy and terrorism, and then separatism.
- (3) The Third lesson, we should learn is that if we or any society does alienate a group of its citizen of its own society in this manner, that minority is bound to seek assistance from foreign sources, who are inimical to your country and there are enough foreign sources and foreign agencies who would be responsive to such an overture, because of their animosity, their capacity to do so, or their willingness to disrupt.

(4) The fourth lesson, that we must learn is that if we do not avoid these mistakes, we would be subject to external intervention of different categories, depending on the size and nature of your society and geographical location, but it is an open invitation to external interference, if we do not structure our own society on principles of fair play and justice to the minority.

(5) The fifth lesson is that howsoever disciplined, efficient and fair minded in its operation an Armed force may be, it essentially is a no-win situation if it gets into a foreign country. If you perform well, it is the imperialist efficiency of a big power. If you do not perform well, the fourth largest Army in the world has not got hold of Prabhakaran. Whereas the fact of the matter is that the fourth largest army is not deployed in Sri Lanka. It is a fraction of a fraction of the Indian Army which is doing a limited operation in Sri Lanka. we can discuss this clinically not in terms of broad generalisation. But the basic lesson is that the Armed forces of one country are going to another country for performing a legitimate role. They will be subject to extraordinary political and emotional pressures and we must have inner strength to face such criticism even within our own country and abroad if we have consciously taken a decision to project our interest and our influence through the ultimate sanction which any society has, which are the armed forces. These briefly are the lessons.

Question :

Since you say that we are not fighting the Tamils, only fighting a small fraction, where you have a self-centred fascist leader; and since the elections have already been held successfully, certain aspects of the agreements have already been achieved, is it not the right time now that the remainder part is tackled by para-military forces? Because by using the army, do you really believe, that you will be able to persuade Mr. Prabhakaran by inflicting casualties on his men or would it be a different process which would perhaps involve a more intimate approach?

Answer :

Well, I think your thoughts are shared by the Indian Army high Command. So, I really don't have to answer your question. The general thinking is that we have reached the watershed. We are creating a civilian volunteer force of Tamils in Sri Lanka. We are training them, we are ensuring that they are properly armed and trained and by the passage of time, the thinking seems to be that we should thin out, and your approach is shared by those who are operationally incharge of what we are doing in Sri Lanka.

Question:

Elsewhere, wherever there has been intervention, benign or hostile, over a longer period there has been a backlash. Examples are numerous. Under these circumstances do you think that there is going to be a backlash, even with the creation of this small nucleus of force which would man the internal security contingent.

Answer :

In my assessment the IPKF has gone through the worst period of the backlash. I think, the IPKF was subjected to the most vitriolic criticisms between the period March 1988 and November, 1988. That was the worst period. I don't think that you will have a backlash from the Tamils, or the Sinhalese, as bad as we had. The Sinhalese backlash began some time immediately after the signing of the agreement, and it continued with rising crescendo. Whereas the Tamil backlash was after we started our operations against the LTTE. In the process, we did affect some civilians, when it also reached a high point of bitterness. But my perception is that the present feeling is that yes, these people did have to do things which are not acceptable and unpalatable but basically, they are a fair force, and they are a protective force. They don't mean any harm to our long term stability; in fact, if they go away we will be subjected to all sorts of pressures and violence.

So, when I say that the backlash is over and we may not face the kind of a situation other armies have faced depends on how long we stay there. And I am presuming that once the tasks assigned to the IPKF in the agreement are over, we will thin out and the timeframe is reasonable and I don't think that we should apprehend the backlash, particularly, since like the Soviet Union, we are not going to stay for 9 years or like Americans for 11 years. That is something different and I hope it does not happen here. I will not specify a timeframe because, I don't think it will be correct to do that. But I have my views on the subject.

Question :

I think, IPKF is gaining credibility with the population in the North-East; Tamil Sinhalese and the Muslims probably constitutes the key for the future stability in Sri Lanka, and also the success of the Accord. However, keeping in mind, that it is almost 10 months since the 1st Provincial Council elections were held in Sri Lanka, the aspects of devolution of power has really not gone ahead and the Sri Lankan Government still appears to be dragging its feet. Do you think firstly, that it is mistake by us to try and impose a system which is totally alien to Sri Lanka though familiar to us, in the form of Provincial Councils and secondly, what safeguards are we planning on politically once the IPKF comes out to ensure that Sri Lankan Government does not renege on the agreements that have been made so far in terms of the functioning of the Provincial Councils?

Answer :

You are factually right when you say that the Provincial Councils came into being nearly 10 months ago. But politically, the first Provincial Council which really had devolutions, has been in existence for only four months. However, the first three months were taken up with other elections. The Sinhalese provincial councils were not terribly interested in getting the actual devolution, as the Tamil provincial council Governments. Devolution of powers have taken place in the field of health, education, transport, communications, rural and industrial development and even to some extent the police powers. So it would not be factually right to say that nothing has happened. I am not disagreeing with your thesis that, Sri Lankan Government is dragging its feet.

There is a reaction at two levels. At the political level, I think, they have to do certain things, but they are dealing with an entrenched bureaucracy and long standing psychological emotional approach towards the Tamils. So that is the situation, and we have to see how we can proceed. The answer to your question-were we right in imposing a system? Well, my answer is that the alternative was a direct invasion and breaking up of that country. So we chose the latter evil in Sri Lanka. If we had not intervened in the manner in which we have, I mean certain agreement, I mean the invitation, had we allowed the Sri Lankan Armed forces to continue, what they called operation liberation which started some time in the beginning of May, 1987, their National Security Council had defined the acceptable casualty level of 12,000 civilians in Jaffna peninsula, and had 12,000 Tamil civilians been killed by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, I don't think Government of India could have remained inactive. So, in a sort of difficult ambience we had limited options, in which we chose the least harmful one. So, that is my answer.

As far as the second question goes, we are building up para-military forces, police forces and, if they become effective, I think, we can overcome the difficulties which you have visualised. However, their effectiveness depends on our capacity to sustain them in the first period say by the end of this year, and the Sri Lankan Government's capacity to be responsive and take really in-depth and long term measures.

Postscript: President Ranasinghe Premadasa, since June 1989, has been persistently calling for the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka under pressure from Janatha Vimukthi Paramuna(JVP). Leading a coalition Buddhist monks and students, the JVP had launched a nationwide agitation against the IPKF and against the government. President Premadasa's demands for the IPKF withdrawal appears to be a move to placate the JVP and LTTE.

--Ed.

The Management of Defence

Some ideas in the Indian context

ARUN SINGH*

BACKGROUND

The Ministry of Defence has undergone some very substantial expansion in all its component parts since the 1950's when it took its existing shape and structure. It is now one of the largest spenders, employers, industrial complexes, and, scientific establishments in the world. The MOD also owns huge tracts of urban and rural land and is responsible for the welfare of one of the largest retired pensionary populations. In short, this Ministry has become an extremely complicated and complex management structure.

Simultaneously, and somewhat paradoxically, although the numbers and 'rank' of the people involved have also expanded, there has not been any really innovative or even significant change in the way that problems are analysed or handled and the concept of 'tradition' has been used to circumvent the obvious need for change with the honourable exception of the DRDO which is now beginning to have a meaningful impact.

This paper attempts to put forward some ideas for change- not by any means as a postulated 'final solution' but more in the nature of stimulating discussion among those who have been and are closely involved in this most vital aspect of national endeavour. Some attempt will be made to examine different aspects of the MOD's working but this does not purport to be a completely exhaustive analysis and 'E & OE' applies.

RESTRUCTURING PROPOSALS

At the Apex there is a clear need to formalise a 'National Defence Committee' (NDC) to be chaired by the Raksha Mantri with the three Service Chiefs and the Defence Secretary as permanent members and the option of including the junior Ministers and Secretaries DRDO and DP as members. This would formalise the present 'Monday Meeting'. Consequent upon this formalisation, and as a vital component of it, the NDC should be provided with a standing staff. The ideal body to provide this staff support, without which the NDC would serve no meaningful purpose, would be a reorganised and expanded Defence Planning Staff (DPS). The DG-DPS

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should be an officer of the rank of Army Commander who will report directly to RM and the post can be held by rotation among the three services. DPS will be tasked to examine specific problems and papers presented by them can be circulated in advance among members of the NDC who can prepare their own views using their own staffs for the purpose. Where necessary the RM can direct DPS to obtain the views of other Ministries or Departments outside the MOD and representatives of those bodies can be invited to the relevant NDC meet.

In order to fulfil this role optimally, DPS should be revitalised both in quality and quantity. Great care must be taken to ensure that personnel selected should come from a wide variety of backgrounds- the three services, IAS, IFS, IA&AS, R&D, IPS etc- and should have proven intellectual potential and experience in analysis and problem solving. The intermingling of military and civilian personnel will provide a sound base for a more comprehensive analysis of Defence related problems.

Once the NDC has studied a problem and arrived at a considered view, the RM can submit that view to the National leadership in the form of the CCPA or any such group. This view' will thus represent the distilled perceptions after taking note of all sections of the Ministry - political, military, civilian and scientific - and the views of others who may be involved in that particular problem.

THE SERVICES

Headquarters: The three Services have a clear hierarchical structure, but, to a considerable extent, the reporting systems and management approaches continue to follow the concepts laid down in the early post - Independence days. Taking account of the very substantial changes that have taken place in the internal and external environments, in the force mix and in the tasks assigned, it is necessary to review existing organisations. While doing so one must bear in mind the traditions that form the backbone of our Services and the known deficiencies of other 'integration models' that have been applied elsewhere.

The three Chiefs in committee form the primary means of achieving inter - Service coordination. While there are many arguments for and against this rather 'loose' structural approach, for the present it can be made to function far more efficiently. One way of achieving such an improvement would be to provide the COSC with more adequate staff support in the following specific areas.

- *Intelligence*: The present Intelligence structure of the three Services is grossly inadequate when a holistic approach to this vital component is essential. A Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) should be created under a three - Star officer. The DIA will be responsible for the collation and analysis of all Defence related Intelligence emanating from whatever source and the DG will be responsible both for tasking the individual Service Directorates and for presenting a comprehensive analysis to the COSC.

- *Operations*: There is plenty of evidence both from within and outside to suggest that individual Service interests sometimes take priority over the 'common good' in Operations Planning. In many cases a solution of this has been attempted by integrating command structures. An alternative approach may be to integrate the staff function through the creation of a Joint Operations Staff (JOS). The JOS would not take over the detailed Ops Planning process of each Service but would serve as the 'eyes & ears' of the COSC so ensuring that inter - Service difference in perceptions and approaches are brought and aired before the COSC for resolution. The JOS can be a small and select body composed of officers with adequate command and staff experience.

- *Communications*: Massive foul ups have been known to take place even in the most 'advanced' military operations because of the lack of a common approach to COMTECH. Since this is a field in which we are in the process of making significant technological advances, now is the time to set up a Defence Communications Agency (DCA) which will take the responsibility for ensuring standardisation and integration of Milcom with the civil network.

- *Combat Support*: Another fast developing field where the benefits of integration will have a force multiplier effect relates to the entire gamut of Recovery and secure traversing system for helicopters (RAST) and EW. A Defence Combat Support Agency (DCSA) can be created to deal with this.

- *Logistics*: Enormous sums of money are being spent (and often wasted) on maintaining individual logistics support in 'common' items among the three Services and also in developing management approaches (including computerisation). A Defence Logistics Support Agency could be set up to standardise and integrate to the extent feasible.

The five DG's will report to the Chairman COSC and there will be a large number of consequential changes in the individual HQ's. A great degree of fairly ruthless streamlining and cutting down of staff is possible in each HQ and this should be taken on as a priority task by the COSC.

Field Commands: Some of our 'senior citizens' will be more in the picture about the reasons underlying the change of designation for the Chiefs in the '50's from C's in C to COS. To my mind, the latter is a misnomer for the Chiefs are and have always been line commanders. I would like to see a reversion to the original designation with the present Vice Chiefs being redesignated as COS. Given this or even continuing with the present designations, some proposals for restructuring Field Commands are as follows:

a) *The Army:* The COAS has far too wide a span of control in terms of officers reporting directly to him. In these circumstances he cannot participate adequately in the COSC coordination and given the massive environmental changes in strategic terms, with the likely nuclearisation of our immediate environment, he cannot be an adequate 'military adviser' to the civilian Government. I therefore recommend that the field commands be restructured as follows. One Theatre Commander (Army) each for the Western and Eastern Theatres. The former would be responsible for all activities from Indira Col to Kutch and the latter from the Karakoram Pass to Calcutta along the land borders. These two men would be four star officers and would be Army Group Commanders. the present Central Command would be abolished and Southern Command altered to look after Peninsular India, the island territories and new commitments in Sri Lanka, the Maldives etc. This Command would continue under a three star officer. The Vice Chief would also be a four star officer and all HQ personnel would report through him including the PSO's). The present Army HQ reserve formations would be re-allocated with many being redesignated as Theatre Reserves. The COAS (CinC) would have the right to switch formations from one theatre to another.

b) *The Air Force:* The same comments hold good for CAS and recommendations in respect of Theatre Commanders are identical. I believe the CAS should continue to be directly in command of Training Command with an AOC in C to assist him but Maintenance Command could report through the four-star Vice Chief. The question of reserve formations is more tricky since air assets are far more flexible in deployment potential and this would need a careful examination. It is also time the IAF started thinking about an Aerospace Command given the 'Agni' capability.

c) *The Navy:* The smallest albeit 'senior' service is a step ahead of the others having designated one officer each for the Western and Eastern seaboard respectively. These two and VCNS should be given the same status as their counterparts and Southern Command, which is also

responsible for all training, would continue to report to CNS through a three-star officer.

These changes will naturally have a significant impact on the present structures and this can provide a fine opportunity for 'fat trimming' particularly in HQ's. I strongly believe that the Services should use this opportunity to undo some of the wildly extravagant and often ludicrous impacts of the notorious 2nd Cadre Review including the voluntary surrender of some posts particularly at the more senior levels.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

The DOD is a vital component of the Defence structure providing an alternative 'civilian' viewpoint to the political authority. Both in concept and in practice this system of checks and balances is a necessity in a Parliamentary Democracy. However, having said that, the passage of time has seen a growing tendency for the 'checks' to overwhelm the balances. Much of the workload in DOD, given the rather anomalous 'single file' idea now involves duplicating entire thinking processes. Thus a very fine set of intellects and experience in the form of middle and senior civil servants are spending an inordinate amount of time in relatively wasteful activity. The DOD has some vital functions to perform:

- to control financial outlays and to minimise waste
- to handle the civil - military interface in respect of both Central and State Govts including the work involved in land acquisitions, Cantonments, pensions and other ex-Servicemen benefits et al.
- to provide the interface between the Ministry and Parliament in respect of areas under the Department.
- to provide the Raksha Mantri with an experienced 'alternative' viewpoint taking note of the civilian structure of the State and such tricky questions as the ubiquitous 'relativity'. Since the financial and budgetary control mechanisms are becoming more important by the day the DOD should consider shifting from the present budgetary mechanisms to a system of pre-Budget scrutiny whereby a proposed expenditure is scrutinised before it is included as a budget proposal and where after the actual 'right to spend' is delegated to the concerned entity with specific authority to shift between budget heads etc. This concept of pre-budget scrutiny would also necessitate the shifting to a 'project management and control' system in which individual DOD officers would be responsible for individual projects. This should lead to meaningful delegation, faster decision making and less acrimony all round. Services

personnel should be attached to the project teams and it will not be necessary to mix civilian and defence personnel in the DOD because the cultures are so very different that such mixing will probably prove negative. Nonetheless, all civil servants including Finance officers, particularly at Director level and above should be selected from among those who have attended DSSC or NDC courses. The FA-DS should be appointed as Secy Def Ex and should have full control over the Ministry's expenditure with Ministry of Finance being an independent second check where necessary.

In making these proposals I have considered only the political, military and civil components of the Department of Defence, ignoring the Departments of Defence Research and Defence Production. Similar evaluations of the interaction between these entities and the Ministry as a whole is also a crying need.

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Navy's Blue Water Obsession

(The Aircraft Carrier Syndrome)

BRIG N B GRANT AVSM (RETD)

Welcoming the Prime Minister on the deck of INS Viraat, India's second aircraft carrier, when it joined the fleet on 22 Aug last year, the then Chief of the Naval Staff declared that, this marked the beginning of a true blue - water capability of the Navy, keeping with its new doctrine of sea control as opposed to the existing concept of sea denial. He went on to state that, plans were afloat to acquire yet a third carrier through indigenous sources. The massive naval expansion was justified on the grounds that, it will compliment, the growth that the army and air force have already undergone. This gives an impression that, for effective defence security, all the three Services must be 'balanced' in respect of numbers and cost. The question is, how to make every rupee of this increase count towards the strategic effectiveness of our overall defence effort.

The Ministry of Finance had recently hinted that, owing to the resources crunch, the Defence Ministry was unlikely to get any substantial increase in its budget for 1989-90. The Services reaction to this was that, this will hit, not only their modernisation plan, but even routine maintenance of existing equipment. In view of this, it therefore seems strange that, the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Naval Command, addressing a press conference on Jan 30, (called to announce details of the biannual review of the Indian Navy by the President on Feb 15) stated that, a contract has been signed with a French firm for a fourth aircraft carrier, as a replacement for the ageing Vikrant, which was a necessity for a 'blue water' navy of India's dimensions.

Although in the past there have been articles in Service journals, including the latest one by Adml Tahiliani (Retd) in the IDR, advocating a multi-carrier Indian Navy, this is the first time that, a senior naval retired officer, Vice Adml S Mookerjee, has dared to oppose the official naval doctrine in his paper 'Indian Naval Development - Need for a Review', published in the USI Journal Apr-Jun 89 issue. As a non-naval army 'Pongo', I wish to strengthen Adml Mookerjee's views, from a layman's Commonsense point of view, on this obsession of the Navy with the aircraft carrier. Strange as it may seem, all these champions of the carrier were naval aviators, who were at the helm of affairs to influence decisions on flexing their naval wings.

Unfortunately, there is no system with us today, which can help the Defence Minister to get an analytical and unbiased appreciation of resources allotment to be made to each of the three Services, so as to ensure optimum use being made of our meager sources towards achieving the overall defence objectives, even if this means spending all the available money only on the service(s) that is(are) effective at the expense of the others being left out of the race completely. In this respect, the clout of a particular Service seems to count more than its value as an effective defence machine, and as such our resources seem to be allotted in direct proportion to the colour of the uniform. The present blue-water concept of the Navy based on the aircraft carrier, is a typical example of this. The aim of this paper is not just to analyse whether the Indian navy needs three or more carriers, but whether it needs any at all.

In the prevailing super-charged geopolitical scenario of the South Asian land mass and the islands of the Indian Ocean (including Sri Lanka), there is no denying that the Indian navy has a very significant role to play - in conjunction with the Indian army and air force. This role, however, should be clearly within the parameters of our national objectives. Armaments and weapon systems sought to be inducted can no longer be seen from the restricted viewpoint that "only the navy knows what is best at sea."

Judging by the numerous articles that have appeared in foreign military journals against the carrier concept, the purchase of this world's most expensive weapon system - that too, of doubtful military value - will prove the most uneconomical method ever of giving the navy the teeth it requires. Even as recently as September 88, US naval expert Ashley T Tellis, reported in *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, on the utter futility of the purchase by India of a second, leave alone a third, aircraft carrier. The *Viraat* has since joined the fleet, and its acquisition is now a fait accompli; soon, a third carrier is likely to beef up the navy's might, not counting a fourth to replace the ageing *Vikrant*. Perhaps on the lines of the USA's Pacific, Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets, India, too, wants to have its Western, Eastern and Southern fleets, corresponding to the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. But can we afford this grand naval concept of three blue-water fleets built round the carrier base? The cost apart, what role can the carrier be expected to play in the Indian defence context?

The foremost question which needs a clear-cut answer is, who is the perceived enemy against whom the navy would seek to build up and deploy a carrier task force? Is it visualised that our navy should seek to dominate the two choke points, the Gulf of Hormuz and the Malacca Straits, and the key triangulation point, viz, the US nuclear force and Rapid Deployment

Force base at Diego Garcia? Surely, it is not visualised that we will also stretch upto Antarctica to defend our station there ? On the other hand, if our carriers are sought to be deployed against a perceived nearby enemy for protection of our long coastline, vital shipping lanes, and the islands of Andaman and Nicobar, and perhaps Sri Lanka, then the carrier fleets are not only cost-benefit distortions, but have serious built-in flaws.

In order to view the whole thing in its proper perspective, it is necessary to examine the main role of an aircraft carrier. To put it in a non-naval layman's language, the aim of a carrier is to present a floating airstrip away from the mainland in situations where it is not possible to provide air cover from the land. Thus, the aircraft carrier has an attacking role in waters far away from the mainland. But India has always been wedded to the policy of a defensive role, and has no intention of fighting an enemy in its (the enemy's) own territory or entering the territorial limits of its waters - unless, of course, forced to do so in a defensive role, as in Sri Lanka or the Maldives. Even in that case, the locations of our airfields are such that, we are today in a position to give more than adequate air cover with land-based aircraft to our troops and ships operating anywhere around our borders - and even across these if the need should arise. To this, if we add our land and sea-based missiles capacity, then there is no area left on land or sea from where we cannot be effective with our land-based aircraft and land and sea-based missiles.

The other uses for our aircraft carriers which have been mentioned by the navy, are in the context of protecting our long coast-line and our islands in the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean. However, so far, neither the navy nor anyone else, including The Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis has ever explained clearly how aircraft carriers will fulfil these missions more effectively, or more economically, than shore-based aircraft, missile boats and submarines.

The aircraft carrier is by far the single most expensive weapon system in the world. The latest model that the US navy has acquired costs as much as Rs 3,500 crore. If, to this, is added the cost of the crew and other essential ancillaries, the cost per carrier works out to over Rs 5,000 crore. As an aircraft carrier is a sitting duck and presents a very vulnerable target, it has to be closely guarded by a number of escort vessels. Going by the Falklands experience, at least two cruisers, four destroyers, four frigates and two submarines - more than one-third of the entire Indian naval fleet - are needed for this purpose. The cost involved works out to an incredible Rs 18,000 crore per carrier group. The operating cost of approximately Rs 50 lakh a day of

the carrier alone, excluding support ships, is a relatively 'minor' added expenditure. It is no wonder, therefore, that most countries are giving up or reducing their dependence on this type of weapon system.

Apart from its enormous cost and doubtful utility in the Indian strategic concept, a very important factor tilting the balance against the aircraft carrier is the tying-up of other capital ships and the carrier's own aircraft in simply protecting this floating platform. According to US estimates, 14 ancillary ships and almost two-thirds of the aircraft on board are required to guard a carrier, thus leaving only about one-third of the total aircraft for the attack role. Perhaps this aspect was more than proved during the 1987 air strike on Libya by fighters from two of America's biggest aircraft carriers. No more than 20 aircraft could be mustered for the actual raid. This was, among others, the main reasons why British air bases had also to be used for the mission. It is estimated that as much as eight-tenths of the Rs 18,000 crore worth of assets that constitute an aircraft carrier task group, serve no other function than to protect the carrier.

Even after taking all the necessary measures for protecting an aircraft carrier, there is still no guarantee for its 100-percent safety. In the era of ready availability of cheap, efficient and accurate long-range guided missiles--like the Exocet deployed by the Argentines in the Falklands battle which nearly hit the British carrier HMS Hermes (now, INS Viraat) -- an aircraft carrier can be destroyed at will by any small nation at minimal cost. The late Admiral Rickover, the 'father' of nuclear navy, testifying before a US congressional committee shortly before he died, stated that "a modern aircraft carrier should not be expected to last for more than two days in a major war, after which it is expendable".

The last real battle at sea in which aircraft carriers were involved was during the closing months (Mar-Jun 45) of World War II, in the vicinity of Okinawa. In this engagement the US navy had deployed a score of aircraft carriers, of which as many as four were lost to Japanese Kamikaze attacks. What the fate would be of aircraft carriers in an era dominated by a prolixity of cheap, discrete, efficient and devastatingly accurate long range, precision guided missiles and bombs, is not difficult to foresee.

In the post-War period, aircraft carriers have been involved in US wars waged far away from the American main land, such as, Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada and lately Libya. What does the ubiquitous use of aircraft carriers to wage wars and terrify Third World countries prove? Nothing as far as war at sea is concerned. 'Aircraft carrier diplomacy' however does

prove that they are effective in a totally unequal and benign environment. They may have some use in America's pursuit of 'containment' particularly in the face of the growing problems in using air bases of allies and others to project airpower. The question is, whether such a context is relevant to India?

It is therefore, necessary to seriously consider, not whether the Indian navy requires three or more aircraft carriers, but whether it needs any at all. Clearly the aircraft carrier is a weapon system for the very rich, and those still under the sway of imperial ambition, who wish to wage a war far away from their main land. This is supported by the fact that, each year the total number of aircraft carriers afloat is diminishing rather than increasing; India is the rare exception. For instance, whereas in Aug 45 there were in the world 180 aircraft carriers afloat, by 1962 they were down to 68, and today it is less than even half that number, as can be seen from the following table, taken from *Janes Fighting Ships 1986* as published in IDR 1986.

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Existing</i>	<i>Under Constr.</i>	<i>GNP (US billion \$)</i>	<i>Per Capita Income (US \$)</i>
USA	14	3	3050	13160
UK	3	-	530	9580
Italy	2	-	380	6750
Spain	1	-	200	5370
France	2	-	620	11520
Brazil	1	-	275	2140
USSR	5	1	560	5790
India	2	1	180	260

It is not entirely a coincidence that, many countries with long coast lines, and much greater wealth than India, such as Japan, Australia, China, Canada, Netherlands and Germany, have no aircraft carriers at all, but have a substantial array of other warships, specially submarines which, by all accounts is a more effective weapon system of the future than is the aircraft carrier. The fact that India has only one-tenth of per capita income of the next poor aircraft carrier owning country, Brazil, is quite a different matter.

INS Viraat (formerly the 26 years old HMS Hermes scrapped by the Royal Navy) has now joined our fleet. In fairness to the carrier's dedicated complement of officers and men, now that we are saddled with it, the ship's operational role needs to be fully re-evaluated and re-defined in relation to the current South Asian geopolitical situation. However, all grand delusions

of having three blue- water fleets should be emphatically discarded. So far, due to "Security" reasons (in our country, everything and anything concerning defence is "top secret") neither the navy nor the government has been able to state in clear terms the doctrines and postures of the Indian navy's role with respect to the aircraft carrier. Nor has there been any public debate on this matter either in the media or in the Parliament. By frittering away scarce resources which could be more usefully spent on really effective defence acquisitions, we are, in fact, jeopardizing our national security.

To emphasise the obvious, as brought out by Adml Mookerjee (USI Apr-Jun 89), our navy certainly needs more teeth and advanced weapon systems in the form of guided-missile vessels, long-range ocean-surveillance aircraft and helicopters, and above all, attack and hunter-killer submarines. These must be within the parameters of fully integrated inter-service perspective. The aircraft carrier, however, does not fit into this. As it stands, the only role one can see for the INS Viraat, is to have the pride of place in leading the Indian naval fleet every two years for the Presidential review, formerly done by INS Vikrant.

In this article an army 'pongo' has thrown the gauntlet on the redundancy of the aircraft carrier in the Indian context. Will some blue water naval 'salt' like to pick it up and challenge the arguments stated herein. The USI, I am sure, would welcome such a discussion, as that is what this Institution stands for.

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National Security and Air Power: A View*

AIR MARSHAL K D CHADHA PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

Security, as commonly understood, means freedom from risk or danger and power is force that can be exerted or is capable of being exerted. Articulating a view on 'National Security and Air Power' one is not sure as to what approach could confer a rational balance to the subject. Given my Service persuasion and affiliation there was a strong temptation to talk of air power as being first among equals in the framework of the military. Given its attributes, a case as good as any could be made in this regard. In the context of ends and means, military wherewithal is really a consequence of national security and to my mind it is a fuller understanding of the contours of the latter that is of greater importance and it is on this that I am going to dwell at some length. I am also assuming that while debating the subject, we are essentially talking of external presages of harm.

At the outset I would like to draw attention to certain stereotypes which in the minds of many are inviolate as far as national security is concerned. A generally carried belief is that in the pursuit of real-politik a nation cannot feel safe or free unless there is brinkmanship, arrogance and a position where you speak from strength, in assertions. You better or else is the refrain vis-a-vis some who are not amenable. The question that I wish to pose is, does national security really represent not having to say please or sorry to anyone and not caring whether anybody likes what a nation does or feels like doing? There are many who maintain that we live in an imperfect world and in international power play the only way to be free from pressures of coercive diplomacy is to have an adequate military clout. But then how much in this context can be considered enough and sufficient beyond doubt. Experience does suggest that power does not automatically translate itself into counter-vailing force or influence. Nations also often declaim that they are living in coercive environment because there is a domestic pay off in such declamations.

There is also the commonly cited cliché that nations have only permanent interests and no permanent friend. Then can national security perspectives be built on perceptions of adversarial relations being frozen in perpetuity? I raise this issue specifically because there are any number of historical precedents where there have been reversal of antagonisms not just leading to reconciliation but even *en-tente*. The Anglo-French, the Franco-Prussian

* Text of a paper presented in a Seminar on "National Security and Air Power" organised by the Air Force Association on April 1, 1989

and inter-Scandinavian rapprochement, and even Sino-Japanese cooperation could be cited as cases in point. The sceptics of course, could advert and say that these are pious banalities far removed from the hard realities of geopolitics where nothing has changed.

Another question that comes to mind is why is there intransigence and belligerence between nations when the central assumption amongst civilised societies is that peace is the natural condition of mankind. It would appear that aggressiveness is intrinsic to human beings and that human behaviour can be as tenuous as that of animals. For an assessment we could perhaps look at the past.

In a historical continuum, the earliest needs of national security arose to keep the marauding trans-frontier barbarians at bay. Ancient states of Greece, Macedonia, Rome as well as China educated a race of soldiers and converted metals into effective weapons to ward off the onslaughts of hardy named tribes. This was also the period of great empires and what Toynbee calls the Universal state. The problem with the Universal State, as with modern-day nation states, was that it needed a professional administrative and military force for sustenance and by an inbuilt law these institutions tended to expand and their costs tended to burgeon. Several civilizations, according to Toynbee, got crushed under the weight of this state apparatus. One is not too sure whether present day events are also not conspiring towards a similar collapse for mankind's penchant to repeat past mistakes is legion. Gibbon talks of history "as a cautionary tale of human follies."

In Medieval times one saw the prosecution of national security through the Machiavellian design of vanquishing of weaker contemporaries for extension of influence and the destruction of stronger rivals through "Balance of Power". The doctrine of Balance of Power essentially signified that power should be so evenly distributed among the leading nations, that no one state or group of allied states became significantly stronger than the opposing group. Present day alliances are an expression of the same precept. The concept of Non-alignment has, in a manner of form, successfully challenged the wisdom and the need for such groupings, but as an alternative whether it will endure only time will tell.

The scourage in the context of national security has been the 'Nation State' because it is generally taken for granted that the nation and the state are synonymous. While a nation is indeed an accumulation of human beings who think they are one people with shared beliefs and convictions, several states are artificial constructs not necessarily co-extensive with the nation. The de-colonisation process after world war II further acerbated matters as

it led to the emergence of successor states with somewhat loosely defined boundaries and not altogether cohesive populace. Seeds of inter and intra state conflict were inherent in such events. It is, therefore, not surprising that a world of ever increasing independent sovereign states also became a world of perpetual injuries stemming from intense chauvinism and the dictum "My country Right or Wrong".

Today's problems in the context of security have got compounded by the fact that, while earlier conflicts were contests between professional armies involving combatants and left other people, by and large, unaffected, modern wars have become total, all pervasive and willy nilly suck every segment of society into it. With the emergence of super-power nuclear bi-polarity, the stakes have become so high as far as the developed world is concerned, that an all out war is unthinkable. Ironical as it may appear, this balance of terror has proved to be a more enduring cure against war than any earlier development.

The tragedy of course is that while the centre of public opinion in First and Second World countries no longer regards deliberate resort to conflict as an acceptable instrument of policy, it still remains a favourite pass-time of several Third World ruling elites. While one hears of conventional force cuts between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, the refrain of defence and national security analysts of several developing countries is conventional deterrence. Only by speaking from a position of strength, we are told, can the peace be kept. It is forgotten that what is perceived as essential to security interests by one side is often viewed as a hegemonistic design by some others.

It is a well established fact that arms spending gathers its own momentum because military general staffs are more comfortable building worst case scenarios and needs thereof, rather than reckon on mutual accommodation. Any step towards dismantling of military apparatuses is seen as an ominous portent. That scenarios are merely an outline of hypothetical events and that best deductions are on events that never take place, is an argument that just cannot be accepted. We are spending less as a percentage of the GNP vis-a-vis some others is the stock justification as if there is some sort of magical correlation between defence expenditure and the degree of national security you possess. In any case how can percentage of GNP be a meaningful barometer when there are such wide variations between nations in regard to this base of reference. Experience clearly suggests that you do not necessarily buy more security or influence by higher defence spending. In fact at excessive levels, the law of diminishing returns begins to operate.

There are today, especially in the third world, any number of media experts on defence for whom technology is the new religion and computer

print-outs the new testament. For them wish listing science fiction weapon systems posited by the arms manufacturers of the developed world through their glossy magazines, are the gospel. They prophesise doom if the dazzling range of these new technology weapons are not put on a nation's arms inventory. Why must these be had is often not explicit. There is therefore, a sort of Gresham's law in operation where information is tending to drive out knowlege. The point that I am making is that war has a great gift for surprises. History reveals that there have been instances where very well equipped forces have suffered defeat. In Vietnam, the United States fielded the best equipped and the best trained forces and yet it failed to prevail because, as one commentator has said, it was pitched against a dedicated adversary. In a manner of form, according to him, it was a state of art war on both sides. What Vietnam proved was that war is something more than fire power, technology and computer printouts and that military power is as important as the ability of a nation to resist it. There have to be causes to defend. Hence I suggest caution on too frequent a use of the hyphenated three word wonder term, 'staté-of-art', in the context of technology.

It is true that revanchism, irredentism and military glory are today no longer major motivations of war. In the interplay between developed and developing nations, and as manifest from the North South dialogue, one is inclined to agree with the Marxian axiom that "Wars essentially are a symptom of an underlying intolerable misallocation of economic resources within and between states and are waged either to advance this alleged state of affairs or to relieve the strain on it". It is perhaps for this reason that major powers have not altogether abjured the use of force to protect what is perceived as the national interest. The developing world can hardly view with equanimity the present distribution where the developed world with 25% of the worlds' population has command over 70% of the world's resources, 80% of all trade, 90% of shipping and 100% institutions of higher learning. Galbraith says that "a privileged segment of society would much rather accept its destruction than surrender even the smallest of its privileges". Against this sort of backdrop one wonders whether the developing world can look to the future with composure.

Interestingly, a study titled "Military Implications of a Possible World Order Crisis in the 80s" conducted by the RAND Corporation on behalf of the United States Administration predicted that the challenge to the United States in the 80's would be to protect its economic interests rather than counter any inimical foe. To contend with these developments, the questions raised were whether in the North South dialogue the US should give primacy to the promotion of a new international economic order or should it defend some narrowly defined national interests for whose protection there would be

very strong internal pressures. The study concluded that rationally the former should be the preferred option. Yet, the latter was the elected course where huge military expenditures became Reagan Administrations motive force. Questioning the wisdom of this policy a leading US Military commentator in 1986 had this to say "the meaning of national security has changed. While super powers were so busy building weapons, they did not notice that geopolitical realities were being reshaped in a way that security has to be viewed more in economic than in traditional military terms" He presciently added that "if the US and the Soviet Union don't stop the arms race they will simply sink below the 'Land of the Rising Sun' from the burden of their arsenals." We do hear of defence cutbacks in the US and Perestrioka in the USSR today.

A significant 20th century development in the context of national security has been the very strong preference of political as well as military leaders to enlist the support of science and technology towards its cause. Thus national security got spread beyond the traditional area of military expertise and today, in addition to men in uniform, a whole host of other disciplines are involved in its exercise. The impact of this interaction has been two fold. One is the realisation that development of new weapon systems is a time consuming process and hence security cannot be planned on an assumption that a nation could catch up with weaponry after the out break of conflict. Therefore, such forces, as could be maximised in war, have to be kept in being. The other effect is that with the advent of age of technological virtuosity, huge expenditures on research and development have been forced on nations wanting to remain contemporary. It is against this setting that air power has to be seen as a constituent of national security.

There is no definitional preciseness that can be given to air power but broadly speaking it could be said to be the sum total of a nation's capability to use air and aerospace systems for securing and preserving the national interest. Components of air power, apart from a nation's economic, scientific and industrial strengths are:-

- (a) aircraft, air weapons and delivery systems and operational bases;
- (b) radar and communication network;
- (c) training facilities;
- (d) Intelligence set up.

In application this power enables use of air for own purposes whilst simultaneously denying its use to the enemy.

The earliest votaries of air power asserted that direct bombing of enemy cities and production centres would be the principle means of waging and

winning a war. The theory was one of "destruction at the centre rather than an erosion at the periphery", and the belief was that the psychological effects of raining death and destruction from the air would itself bring about capitulation. The surrender of Japan, without a single Allied Forces soldier setting foot on its soil, did to an extent validate the prophecy made but it was with instruments not quite conventional. Though the central tenet of air doctrine is strategic, one can with reasonable assurance today say that it is extremely unlikely that nuclear weapons will ever be used again, notwithstanding the concerns of major powers on nuclear proliferation.

The unique characteristic of air power is that it does not have to rely on ground or sea for strategic and tactical access. In the event of sudden and unexpected aggression, with its very short reaction time, it provides a nation with immediate retaliatory capability. Its attribute of flexibility not only enables a very quick inter and intra-theatre switch over of forces but also concentration, both in time and space, on aspects and targets that are most pressing and time relevant. The strategic mobility that air power confers was perhaps the only means by which a situation like the one in Maldives could have been addressed.

In specific military terms, today's theories on future land, sea and air operations are far too generalised and do not inform satisfactorily on the impact air power will have on outcomes. There are some who suggest that future wars, even the limited ones, would not have continuous fronts but widely scattered combat zones and here mobility rather than concentration would be the key to operations since tanks and mechanized infantry would become fleeting targets of opportunity. Notwithstanding the hypotheses on future wars, one thing is certain that air power would be devastating in open country and against surface forces at sea and would be decisive over a whole range of possibilities. A US study revealed that if the big naval battles of World War II were to be re-enacted with the present array of air power weapons, then most of the aircraft carriers involved would certainly have had a hard time surviving.

The size and qualitative composition of air power elements, would obviously depend on the environment that a nation perceives it would have to contend with. In a predictive sense it could be said that if an air force has to be kept in being, then for it to remain contemporary, there are certain imperatives that cannot be ignored, of course, what one has to say in this regard has been repeated so often that it is almost a stereotype. I am not sure whether it deserves another hearing but considering the vital importance of issues I do wish to remind.

The first area of import relates to low level air defence, surface to air missiles (SAMs) and much talked of airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS). Increasing effectiveness of SAMs has for all practical purposes disposed of the conventional high and medium level air threat. The task of countering the low level threat, despite the denseness and lethality of the low level air defence environment, does remain formidable. Present day appraisal suggests that the low level threat could perhaps best be negated through airborne platforms with adequate look down capability and these could include even balloons. There has undoubtedly been a quantum jump in low level air defence capability with the emergence of "Beyond Visual Range" (BVR) look down shoot down and look up shoot up air defence fighters. The acquisition and engagement of targets by BVR air defence aircraft would be from exceptionally long ranges and therefore, one could say that air to air duels may well become a thing of the past. An adequate number of such systems have indeed become a must in the airpower inventory.

AWACS are being perceived by many as the ultimate in air defence management as these systems would enable tracking of numerous targets simultaneously and by providing real time complete picture of the air situation could assist in directing air defence elements against threats that are most pressing. However, integration of AWACS with the ground air defence network, especially in the area of distinguishing friend from foe, is not likely to be an easy task and would pose some technological challenges.

The second area I wish to draw attention to is Electronic Warfare (EW). The entire spectrum of military activity, whether it concerns movement, communications, concealment, deception or fire power is today wholly and completely dependent on electro magnetic emissions. Hence availability of active and passive airborne and ground systems which could deceive, jam or blind an enemy's command and control and lethal systems would certainly assure success in operations. Electronic Warfare is on the acceleration path of the sigmoid or 'S' curve and successive overlaps of development in this realm will indeed lead to momentous changes which could run well into the next century. And airpower, more than any other element, is likely to be most influenced by these changes.

The third area I wish to mention relates to reconnaissance. Air power has been, and will continue to remain, the single most important source of information and intelligence in war. Recce systems of the future would have to perform under the most stringent conditions. Not only will they have to contend with an increasingly hostile environment, but will also have to relay

back real time information expeditiously and reliably. While systems like side looking air borne radars (SLAR), forward looking infra red (FLIR) and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) could all have their place it is now becoming increasingly clear that it is only satellites, equipped with suitable sensors, that will be able to fill the bill. In this domain telemetry would perhaps be the most critical constituent.

Finally a look at weapons per se. Here, for accuracy and lethality reliance would be on Precision Guided Munitions (PGM). The demand would be for guided bombs and cluster weapons with fire and forget capability. While the stand off weapons could be interlinked with mid course guidance and lock on by the pilot, the cluster-PGM combinations would have to detect, recognise and lock on to the target autonomously. Such systems obviously would need some terminally guided sub-munitions. To remain out of harms way attacking aircraft would also need on board ECM systems and anti-radiation missiles. All this may appear to be a tall order, but given the trend of research and development, such items are very much within the realm of reality and no longer just flights of fantasy.

So, much of the futuristic needs of air power in sensitive areas. These systems will have to be designed, developed and produced indigenously because they are indeed prized possessions with which developed countries would not readily part. And even if they were to it is more than likely that the systems would have stood compromised, because these may have also been offered to possible adversaries. Defence R&D in India has a special responsibility in fulfilling these vital air power needs. We have been talking of self reliance and non dependence for a long time. What better opportunity in confidence building than the hi-tech challenge posed by the above mentioned special areas.

In conclusion all I wish to say is that National Security cannot be viewed, as it is often wont to, in the Napoleonic refrain of 'How many divisions does the Pope have'. Demonstrative and discrete use of military strength for political objectives should normally not be an option because experience does suggest that, when exercised, it more often than not creates the very problems that may have been sought to be resolved. Conventional wisdom also suggests that, use of military force as a viable substitute for the more fundamental art of diplomacy should be a course only under the most exceptional circumstances. Containment and control of conflicts is a very difficult and delicate political task because of the rigid stance adversaries often take on questions of power and prestige. The sad duty of politics, it is often said, "is to establish justice in a sinful world."

Fortunately there is less conflict in the world today than at any other time since World War II. So now is the time to find a way of coming down the hill towards de-escalation and de-fusing of situations. As one commentator has very aptly said "let us not have more arms for security, but more security so that we need less arms". The road to safety does not necessarily have to be through the road of danger. For if war became a central institution in human civilisations a long time ago, its legitimacy is certainly being questioned today.

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The great age of discovery was essentially the adventure to discover sea routes to ancient lands. The Sumerian expeditions to the Persian Gulf, the flowering of the Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro civilisations and the efforts of Queen Hatsheput of Egypt to connect the Nile to the Red Sea were possibly the earliest strategies of utilising the seas for the movement of merchandise and men.

The Greeks spoke of the application of naval resources to political purposes as early as 430 B.C. and coined the term 'Thalassocracy' which Thucydides defined as 'the use of the seas for military purposes'. The overseas expeditions of Alexander the Great, the exploration to the Red Sea during the reign of Ptolemy I and the commercial treaty between Seleucus Nicator and Chandragupta Maurya extended the use of the seas to cover commerce, conversion and conquest.

During the Tang, Sung and Ming dynasties, the Chinese traded with East Africa and their oceanic activities reached their zenith during the seven expeditions of the Court eunuch, Cheng-Ho whose motives were, however, restricted to glorifying Emperor Yung-Lo than for any predetermined strategy for colonisation or establishing commercial outposts. But suddenly in the mid-15th century, they prohibited all ocean activities as they felt that it was a drain on their coffers with no real benefit to China. Hence, the knowledge and expertise of Shipbuilding and navigation, so assiduously built up over centuries were deliberately extinguished and paradoxically China became the victim and not the exponent of sea power in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Indikon continued to be the Eldorado of the ancient world, which the book of Genesis described as the 'Garden of Eden' lying eastwards. Therefore, it was the Europeans who energetically searched for the Orient. In 1485,

Bartolameu Dias rounded the Cape of Good Hope thus freeing the dependency on Arab middlemen to transit the overland route to the Red Sea. Christopher Columbus discovered America and Henry Cabot made a land fall in Newfoundland. Magellan completed a round the world voyage. As was prophesied, "an age was coming when Tiphys will disclose a new world and Thule will no more be the ultimate"! The carriage of goods in the Indian Ocean passed to Arab navigators who transported merchandise from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and thence to the exotic Orient. Along with trade, Islam also went leapfrogging along the coast and soon the 'Crescent' stretched from Mauritania to Manila.

This movement by sea was further encouraged by the Islamic tenet of 'Haj' whereby all Muslims were enjoined to visit Mecca at least once in their life time. The English, by their navigation Acts, also insisted on the transport of goods in British ships and encouraged the eating of fish on Fridays thereby promoting a reservoir of ships and sailors. But the Hindus, on the other hand, believed that even crossing the Kalapani (seas) would result in the ostracism from their faith! Such factors were the genesis for the evolution of maritime strategy which Alfred Mahan, the evangelist of sea power in the colonial era, attributed to six ingredients:

The first ingredient was Geography which was a country's location astride sea lanes and in the proximity of important trade routes and also close to profitable fishing grounds.

The second ingredient was the physical conformation of the country with well located harbours, the lack of which was one of the reasons for the defeat of the Russian Fleet after their long voyage from their western ports at the decisive battle of Tsushima off their east coast. It was similarly enunciated by the 'Lancaster equation' that regional powers had a 3:1 advantage over external power as shortening of the arcs of operations was an inbuilt force multiplier.

The third ingredient was possessing adequate territory to act as a strong economic base for a nation's sea power.

The fourth and fifth ingredients were in today's parlance, human resource development for manning the ships in the hostile environment of the high seas.

The last ingredient was the comprehension of the Government to utilise sea power to achieve their national aims.

THE PORTUGUESE AS CENDENCY

In 1494, Pope Calixtus III, by the Treaty of Tordesillas, divided the undiscovered world between Portugal and Spain by a line from the North Pole to the South Pole passing West of the Azores. Portugal was accordingly granted the Papal exclusivity to the Indian Ocean. Vasco-de-Gama in his second voyage to India, bombarded the major entrepots, looted Arab vessels and returned to Lisbon with a large booty. The voyage of Francisco de Almeida which followed resulted in the defeat of the Mameluk-Gujrati fleet off Diu and the conclusion of trading treaties without capturing territory. It was however, Alfonso de Albuquerque who captured the choke points of Socotra, Aden, Hormuz, Goa and Malacca and imposed 'Res Nullius' in the Indian Ocean. This pattern of maritime strategy of winning decisive naval battles in the Atlantic for establishing colonies in the Indian Ocean continued throughout the colonial era.

However, the Papal Bulls dividing the Oceans in favour of Spain and Portugal thwarted the oceanic ambitions of other rising maritime powers such as Holland, France and England. The Dutch East India Company therefore commissioned in 1601, Hugo Grotius, the father of international law, to publish his book 'Mare Liberum' (freedom of the seas) in which he contested the Portuguese claim to exclusivity by reasoning that the open seas were the common heritage of mankind.

Twenty five years later, an Englishman, John Seldon in his book 'Mare Clausum' (Closed seas) however, sought to uphold the concept of 'Res Nullius' (exclusivity) in view of Britain's growing interest in harvesting the seas around their small island. Although basically the two doctrines appeared to be opposites, yet in retrospect there was less conflict as 'Res Communis' (belonging to all) broadly applied to the High seas and 'Res Nullius' to the territorial water which was in a way the forerunner of the present ocean regime.

PAX BRITANNICA AND INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER

The island nation of Britain had perforce to depend on her navy from the Elizabethan age of sail where the burning issue of maritime strategy was whether to seek out the Spanish Armada or remain in the English Channel to repel a Spanish invasion. Hawkins suggested an attack on their assembly point at Carthagen while Drake, who alternated between being 'free booter' and a servant of the Crown, carried out a successful raid on Cadiz. The defeat of the Spanish Armada in turn heralded the advent of sea power which became the lynch pin of British maritime strategy primarily due to the excellence

of the Royal Navy's ship borne gunnery' as demonstrated time and again during the Anglo-French wars by Nelson's decisive victories on the Nile and at Trafalgar which enabled Clive to defeat Dupleix in India.

Pax Britannica was based on the strategy of capturing the choke points of Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Colombo, Singapore, Hong Kong and Freemantle which, with the advent of steam, became the 'Imperial Coaling Stations' and armament depots over which the sun never set.

These 'strategic keys of the Empire' in turn enabled Britain to impose their 'Res Nullius' in the Indian Ocean just as the Portuguese had done a century earlier. It was only with the liberation of 44 maritime states at the end of the Second World War that this exclusivity was demolished and Britain withdrew whatever token naval forces that were located in this region.

It is also of interest to note that the Government of India, until as late as 1939, continued to pay £ 1,35,000 to the British Admiralty for the maritime defence of India and even the small supportive Bombay Marine which later became the Indian Navy was controlled by the British Admiralty and not by the Viceroy. One will further observe that no decisive naval battles were fought in the Indian Ocean and therefore no worthwhile ship-of-the-line was based in this region. Hence the German armed merchantmen Emden and Karlsruhe were successful commerce raiders with the former even bombarding the Presidency city of Madras! On the other hand, it was the British Indian Army that conquered territory from Mesopotamia to Singapore and provided the 'two edged sword' that held the Empire together for nearly a century.

THE HEARTLAND STRATEGISTS

Sir Halford Makinder, the noted British geographer and one time Director of the London School of Economics enunciated the thesis in 1904 that in view of the fast developing network of communications such as roads and railways, a continental power with a large land base was a 'Pivot State' which could dominate the world. He added that with an effective railway system, a continental nation was less immune to blockade. For example, the opening of the Mount Cenis and St. Gotthard tunnels in Europe transformed the market flow of Mediterranean fruits and vegetables. Again the Trans-Siberian railroad revolutionized world trade. Further the Prussian General Staff turned railway

* It is of interest to mention that Britain appropriately named their gunnery training establishment at Portsmouth, HMS. Excellent, through whose portals have passed out Chiefs of Naval Staff in contemporary navies as also Indian naval officers who have since become Governors and Industrialists.

time tabling into a work of art by transporting over a million men to both the Austrian and French frontiers. The Indian Railways and road transport also built up an impressive track record during the Indo-Pakistan conflicts. Mackinder, further predicted that as there was very little of the world to conquer, every explosion of social forces would in future take place in an enclosed environment which in turn would neutralize the advantages of sea power.

This logic was highlighted by the German Professor of Geography and Military Sciences, Dr. Carl Haushofer who lent support to the 'Heartland' logic, albeit to popularise Nazi Germany's ideology of 'Lebensraum' or 'living space' for invading Europe, which unfortunately partly discredited Mackinder's prophetic prognosis that a land power with a strong industrial and technical base would be able to defeat a sea power unless it was also supported by a credible resource infrastructure. The two strategies of 'Heartland' and 'Rimland' or rather 'Continental' and 'Maritime' were therefore commonly likened to the Elephant and the Whale. Hence, military thinkers such as Sir Julian Corbett defined maritime strategy 'as the principle of governing a war in which the sea played a substantive part' but added that 'as man will continue to live on land, this is where the final decision will be made'. Corbett also emphasised that in land warfare the object is the seizure and holding of enemy territory while in naval warfare, it is to gain and secure the use of the seas in order to maximise pressure on the enemy.

Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, who incidently was the first Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, London challenged the more extreme 'blue water' navalists who were pre-occupied with winning a decisive victory and hence tended to neglect the more vital requirements of war at sea such as defence of shipping, blockade, mining, harassment, amphibious operations and submarine warfare.

The French Admiral, Raoul Castex also emphasised the eternal struggle of the sea against land and opined that it would not be Hitler's Germany as prophesised by Haushofer but Russia and the Asian heartland, with their vast land resources, that would determine the future course of history. Hence Mackinder, who advocated demography and geography as major factors for big power status proved to be a more clairvoyant prophet than Mahan who was perhaps so engrossed with the colonial past that he failed to visualise or comprehended the future trends in naval warfare.

THE EMERGING OCEAN REGIME

Further, the new laws of the seas accepted by the majority of the nations as late as 1982, after nine years of acrimonious negotiations, extended

the Territorial waters to 12 miles from the earlier 'cannon shot rule' of 3 miles; the contiguous zone to 24 miles and the Exclusive Economic Zone to 200 miles for the exploration and exploitation of living the non-living resources which included fishing, hydrocarbons and polymetallic nodules. This brought nearly 37% of the world's ocean area, which is roughly equivalent to the total land mass of our planet, into some sort of national jurisdiction which further blurred the boundaries between maritime nations.

In turn, this also ushered in a de-facto arms control and deprived the larger maritime countries from utilising the indivisibility and earlier pervasiveness of the seas for extending their own self-appointed role as world policemen by exercising gun-boat diplomacy to influence both their clients and adversaries. Maritime strategy therefore continued to encompass an enlarging spectrum of additional responsibilities such as the protection of off-shore assets, the delineation of maritime boundaries, control of international straits, jurisdiction over the sea bed, dumping of nuclear wastes, oil spillage, the rights of submarines to transit submerged, zone of peace etc.

FUSION OF CONTINENTAL AND MARITIME STRATEGIES

The fusion of sea and land strategies became even more pronounced in the arena of conflict as maritime strategy had wider and far reaching international ramifications. Further, in the management of conflict, the aircraft carrier and nuclear submarine became the major arbitrators for sightless wars. Hence, naval engagements, as Admiral Gorshkov pointed out, became associated with land operations and for ensuring trans-oceanic communications. A fusion of land and maritime strategies in view of the increasing radius of action of aircraft also became inevitable and this was accelerated by the revolutionary technology of 'fire and forget' tactical, cruise and ballistic missiles.

Consequently, both strategies were effected by the technological revolution in the management of conflict which in scope and depth changed not only war at sea but also the very nature of war itself. Conflict containment was transformed from 'chess' to 'poker' to use a descriptive metaphor as bids were doubled and re-doubled even before the hand was dealt! Further, mind boggling technology and the emerging international order resulted in a new bidding convention where the four aces were land and ocean resources, hitech, industrial infrastructure and financial strength. These trumps in turn galvanized the hitherto dormant states with heartland resources to challenge the rimland nations which for four hundred years had used the seas to their advantage for commerce and colonisation.

Secondly, this marrying of technology and finance to exploit the sea

bed, which is largely weighted in favour of developed nations has resulted in the creation of an International Sea Bed Authority with a 36 member council and an Economic Planning Commission to analyse the supply and demand of raw material from the sea bed; a Technical Commission for the transfer of technology and scientific data; a Rules and Regulation Commission and a Tribunal for settling disputes.

Thirdly, the emerging pulls and new tension points have led to international groupism such as the Land Locked and Geographically Disadvantaged group; the Coastal states, the Strait states, Archipelagic states, Oceanic states, the Great Powers etc., who all continuously utilize the power of the sea to display, deter, and persuade others to fall into line with their policies and perceptions.

Fourthly, weapons have accelerated from chemical explosion to nuclear fission; propulsion has changed, from oil to gas and enriched uranium; warheads have advanced to computerised imaging and nuclear detonation and human sensory organs have been vastly augmented by electronics, superconductors and satellites. Mobile platforms in international waters can now launch weapons with a 'one shot-kill' to destroy targets far inland. Similarly, land based inter-continental missiles in hardened silos can obliterate whole cities thousands of miles away. Above all, Star Wars cannot differentiate between land or sea boundaries. And finally, fission has catapulted nuclear strategy into yet another league.

Therefore, maritime and continental strategies have fused as they are invariably part of a three dimensional envelope as seen in Korea, Vietnam, Falklands, Gulf, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Lebanon. Hence, there is perforce more cooperation than competition between the 'Heartland' and the 'Rimland' as only big countries with large Gross National Products can afford to maintain effective Defence forces. The 'heartland' has literally taken to the sea and the whale in turn has been exhibiting preponderant mammal characteristics! Hence, this synthesis in contemporary strategy will perforce be national or regional where the forces of development, defense and diplomacy will play significant roles for nations to achieve their economic, geopolitical and sociological goals.

Routes and Tracks from Central Asia to Kashmir

SHRI SAHDEV VOHRA, ICS

The vast mountain systems of the Pamirs, the Hindukush, the Karakoram, and the Kuen-Lun, form a seemingly impenetrable barrier between Central Asia and the sub-continent of India. Yet from time immemorial, armies and people have moved across from the Central Asian hinterlands to India and to the West. In historical times, Alexander the Great, the Scythians and Yueh-Chih, and later the Huns and the Mongols have traversed these conglomerates of glaciers, peaks and mountain country along tracks and routes used by the sparse populations of these regions, bounded on the west by the Iranian plateau and on the east by China. Descending from the Pamirs the arc of the Hindukush has offered the easier passage, and the branch of the Silk Route by which Indian merchants transhipped silks from China to take them to the ports on the Indian western coast, went across Balkh or Wakhan to India¹.

We are concerned in this article, however, with the routes across the Karakoram and the Kuen Lun leading into Kashmir.

Beginning at the eastern end, we may take note of the Keriya route from Khotan to Western Tibet. This route was used by the Chinese traveller Fa-Hien in the 5th Century AD. The famous explorer Aurel Stein was keen to use this route for his journey from Khotan to Aksai Chin in 1908. He knew that Kishan Singh of the Survey of India used it in the '70s of the 19th Century for his return to India after being with the Forsyth mission to Yakub Beg, the then ruler of Yarkand. A number of English explorers followed up Kishan Singh's feat and Carey confirms the accuracy of Kishan Singh's record of the journey. But thereafter the Chinese authority stepped in to keep the route closed, and it was not till 1950 that China is supposed to have used it to send their force from Sinkiang to supplement the main forces which occupied Tibet, marching from Chinese mainland in the east.

Kishan Singh had reported that he had returned "via Polu, Noh, and the Pangong Lake. It (the route) ran from 1½ to 2 degrees to the east of the most easternly route, namely, that which W.H. Johnson discovered on his journey to Khotan². In 1956 Lionel Davidson was the first western journalist to visit Yarkand where he was told that the Chinese were going to develop

the Keriya route to Western Tibet³. Why the Chinese developed the alternative route via Aksai Chin and whether the Keriya route has again been used or closed is not clear.

The route via Aksai Chin which also passes through Khotan is supposed to have been used by the Northern Zungar Mongols in the early 18th century when they invaded Tibet to oust the Mongols of the South who were holding the Dalai Lama in custody in Lhasa. The Zungar Mongols used the route in winter and in the present day, the Chinese forces claim to have used it in winter for the advance of their supplementary force into Western Tibet in 1950. We know that the Khan of Khotan had helped to re-discover this route in 1866 when Yakub Beg held the Karakoram Pass, and the Khan of Khotan wanted to reach the British in India for help to retain his independence. His emissary could not use the Karakoram Pass and found his way to Kashmir crossing the Kuen Lun by the Yangi Dawann Pass, and then via Aksai Chin. The cairns and huts along this route constructed by the emissary Habibullah, were found in position by Johnson who used this route for his journey to Khotan soon after, and also by Sir Qurel Stein in 1908 in his unsuccessful attempt to reach Aksai Chin from Khotan via the Keriya route.

The English were keen to find an alternative to the Leh route via the Karakoram Pass, as they wished to develop a route from Kanga, Bushahr and other territories under their direct rule in preference to the route via Kashmir dominion. In 1870 they had entered into a treaty with the Maharaja to explore such a route. But they already had some information about the route. In 1857, Adolf, one of the three Schlagintweit brothers engaged by the East Indian Company to explore the trans-Himalayan region, had crossed Lingzi-tang and Aksai Chin plateaux. He was on his way to Kashgar, where he was murdered on August 26, 1857. Thereafter, Shaw, the uncle of Francis Younghusband and a tea planter in Kangra, as well as Hayward, had also used the route on their way to Sinkiang. Some English merchants, like Thomas Russel, used this route to transport their goods to Eastern Turkistan. But after the death of Yakub Beg in 1869, the Chinese did not encourage these aspirations and the Russians were more successful in obtaining concessions for the import of their goods and merchandise into Sinkiang.

At the same time, the British found that the Karakoram Pass route was after all a more reliable way to use for their purpose. The quest for an alternative route avoiding Leh, Ladakh, and Kashmir altogether, and the imports and petty harassment of the frontier posts of the Kashmir Darbar, was not found feasible. And yet the Chinese have not found this to be so, Not having found it possible to rely on the route via Keriya, they determined to

use the route via Aksai Chin to get to Tibet from Sinkiang, even though it involved advancing into an area where there had been no Chinese or Tibetan presence hitherto.

The above mentioned routes lead across the Kuen-Lun mountains west of them, the Karakoram mountains furnish the main access to Kashmir from the north. The Karakoram region extends upto the Ishkoman and Karumbar rivers on the west, beginning in the east with the upper Shyok river. This is a region of towering mountain peaks and vast glacial deposits second only to those in the Polar regions. There are nineteen mountain peaks higher than 25,000 feet. In the Eastern Karakorams, the main glaciers are the Rimo, north-west of the Karakoram Pass, and the Shyok river going south to join the Indus. The Siachen glacier is the largest in the region and is 75km long. From its "Sprout" rises the Nubra river which joins the Shyok. The Siachen glacier reaches right upto the peaks of K₂, the Gashebrum and the Apsarasas.

The most important route across is the Karakoram Pass, which is at a height of 18,500 feet. This was the main caravan route between Yarkand and Leh. On the Ladakh side, the caravans passed through the Depsang plains into the valley of the Nubra river to Panamik and thence to Leh. On the northern side of the Karakoram the Chinese had their posts at the foothills of the Kuen Lun mountains, at Sanju, Kilian and Kuguja. Under the British instigation, the Chinese advanced their customs port to Suget Karoul, on the northern descent from the Karakoram Pass. The Kashmir Darbar had their outpost at Shahidulla on the northern side of the Pass, but the British dissuaded the Maharaja from maintaining it.

Mirza Haidar, a cousin of Babur, invaded Kashmir by the Karakoram Pass from Turkestan in the 16th century. The British had learnt of this route from Vigne, a traveller in the Punjab & Kashmir in 1839 who had mapped their centuries-old caravan route and it was just crossed by Thomson. Although used regularly by the merchant caravans, the British were inclined to find a substitute for it, and tried to explore many routes across Aksai Chin. They gave up this quest ultimately, and the latter routes remain dead till the Chinese invasion of Tibet in the 1950s. In the meanwhile, the route via Karakoram remained the main route for caravans till 1950. Then the Chinese discontinued it.

North of the Karakorams and running parallel to them is the Aghil range which was discovered by Francis Younghusband in his journey from Peking to India in 1887, through the Gobi Desert to Kashgar. Instead of the

well known Karakoram Pass route, Younghusband was advised by his senior, Bell, to try to cross the Karakoram by a new route, the so-called Muztagh route. The Muztagh Pass lay on the direct route from Yarkand to Kashmir. "Was it practicable? This is what I had to discover", wrote Younghusband in "The heart of a Continent". Wali, his trusted guide warned him that raiders from Hunza infested the route, on their way to the villages of Turkistan. But Younghusband left marching down the Yarkand on September 18 determined to try this route. In the first week or more they passed through the inhabited, outlying ranges and crossed comparatively low passes. Then they approached the higher trackless mountains. They came to a side valley with a smaller river called the Surakwat. Some way up at about 15,000 feet, they came in sight of the last pass, the Aghil, before they ascended the Muztagh Pass itself. "The very existence of the Aghil Pass had not been known We descended into the valley of the Shaksgam river a new discovery..... followed it down for a day and then descended a side valley at the back of which Wali said was the Muztagh Pass". When Younghusband saw the peaks of the Karakoram he says "he was thrilled with delight viewed from that stand point they made a far more imposing array than the Everest group". After crossing the Shaksgam (called the Oprang) river, the party ascended the Sarpo Laggo river valley. In Younghusband's words "we descended into the valley of the shaksgam river, followed it down for a day and then descended a side valley on my left". The pass was closed by a glacier, and although a new pass was in use for sometime instead of the closed old one, Younghusband decided to try the old one. "I had to join the mess on the sheer perpendicular face of the glacier, but they reached the top. "The other side was grand enough in all conscience", he wrote, "just a sea of Matter-horns on a huge scale we were on a fairly level ice-field Next day we followed the glacier down to its junction with the Boltoro (glacier).....For two more days we plodded..... at last we reached Askol".

Younghusband's achievement was that he was able to fix the main features of this region, discovered the Aghil range, the Shaksgam(Oprang), river, and the Boltoro glacier route to Askol in Baltistan. All this was done without any modern aids or training in climbing. What we have to realize is that the Chinese are now surveying this area which was surrendered to them by Pakistan after the border agreement of 1963. With Pakistan, they can develop the Skardu route from Baltistan to the Yarkand river.

Younghusband passed to the west of the Siachen glacier. The Baltis use not only the Skardu route to the north but also an old route from Khapalu to Kufelong along the Yarkand river. The route goes across the Siachen

glacier which it enters via the SiaLa and leaves on the north by Turkestan La. Khapalu is the base for all explorations by the British to the north and east Baltistan, but there has been no survey by them of this old track. The Baltis say that this track was used for going to Yarkand as well as to Khotan.

The Siachen glacier had remained undiscovered "because of difficulties of penetrating the upper Nubra in summer and the narrow gorge of the lower Siachen glacier"⁴. In June 1909 Longstaff had set out from Khapalu to search for the Soltoro Pass. He reached it at the head of the Bilafond glacier. He could see from here the group of peaks to the north of the Siachen and gave them the local name of Feram Kangri. Next he approached the Siachen glacier from the Panamik route to the Karakoram Pass. Later the Workmans, (husband and wife) visited and surveyed the Siachen glacier in 1911- 1912.

We get an inkling of the route across the Siachen from Wood who in 1914 accompanied the de Fillippi expedition to the Rimo glacier, on behalf of the Survey of India. He explored the tributories of the Yarkand river on the upper Shaksgam watershed. In one of the valleys, his men found a dead body presumably of a merchant. In a detailed note annexed to his report Wood gave all previous references to a track across the Siachen. Later when K Mason of the Survey of India surveyed the Shaksgam Valley, he also discovered a dead body in another tributary valley to the Yarkand river. He concluded that the man was a Baltis who had strayed from the track.

The Western Karakorams are in occupation of Pakistan which ousted the Jammu & Kashmir troops from Gilgit in 1947 and also took over Baltistan. The routes from Chinese Turkestan or Sinkiang to Hunza and to Chitral are among the most important. The one used by the British frequently for journeys to Central Asia is the western-most over the comparatively low Mintaka Pass to Tashkurghan in the Sankol region of Sinkiang adjoining the Russian Pamirs. The main axis of the Karakorams west of the Karakoram Pass is also called the Muztagh range. The mighty peaks north of the Himalayas dominate the glaciers and valleys on the route from Rawalpindi. Here is a description by Wilfred Noyce⁵, "As one flies from Rawalpindi northward up the Indus Valley to Gilgit, one is struck by the ugly great mass of the Nanga Parbat (of the Himalaya) 26,620 feet, towering up on the right, Haramosh (24,270 feet) rears icy walls, stands splendidly alone in the Gilgit Agency. Further north still, the great jumble of peaks culminate in Rakaposhi (25,550 feet) which dominates Gilgit". Gilgit is a central point for routes from the north-west. It commands the route via Dorah Pass through Chitral, as well as the route via Darkot Pass through Yasin. It also commands the Hunza valley to the east, with Irshad Wakhjar, Kilik and Mintaka Passes.

This rugged country of peaks and glaciers is inhabited by Dards, Baltis, and Kirgiz who survive by their sparse agriculture and their flocks. Agriculture is possible from glacial waters, and the flocks are grazed in narrow, high pastures. The main glaciers in the Western Karakoram are the Balura and the Hispar combining with the Biafo; and the Baltoro which furnishes a route to the Siachen. The rivers in the region are the Hunza and its tributaries. These furnish the routes for descending from the Jaghdumbash Pamir and the Sarikol region. The two main passes along these river routes are the Khunjerab and the Shamshal Passes.

East of the Hunza basin, the Shigon collects the waters of the Biafo, Panmak and Baltoro glaciers. The Masherbrum range (directly north-west of the Saltoro range) forms the southern barrier of the Baltoro glacier. No detailed survey has been made of the glaciers which feed the southward flowing torrents, the Hushe and the Kondus. These join and pour into the right bank of the Shyok a few miles above Khapalu.

The Mintaka pass is "the extremest boundary of 'China'"⁶ Meaning "A thousand ibex", it is 15,600 feet high and formed the main route from Tashkurgham to Hunza, used by travellers through the ages. However, the China-Pakistan "Friendship Highway" opened on 16 May 1983 is via the Khunjerab Pass. This highway is fit for heavy vehicle traffic, although the deep gorges and the friable nature of the mountain formations, renders it difficult to maintain the highway. It is stated that another road connecting the "Friendship Highway" with the road to Tibet via Aksai Chin has been built through Sinkiang.

Next we come to the Hindukush mountains which stretch in a south-westerly direction from the Knot of the Great Pamirs, through Afghanistan. Starting from Wakhan, a wedge of territory thrust between the Russian Pamirs and the Indian Sub-continent, the Hindukush slide down horizontally towards Herat, losing height as they move west-ward. The most feasible routes from Russia to the Indian sub-continent were considered to be those across the Hindukush into Balkh and the route via Wakhan. Hieun Tsang the Chinese pilgrim travelled to India in the 7th century AD. He passed through Balkh and Wakhan on his return journey. In the 13th century Marco Polo travelled to China via Wakhan. As regards Balkh, the Dorah Pass lies on the route from India. It led through the fertile Kokcha Valley in Balkh. To the east of the Dorah Pass is the Baroghil Pass which is approached from Chitral or Gilgit. Apprehending Russian advance, the British safeguarded themselves in the 19th century by contacts with the local rulers. They opened agencies in

Kafistan (part of Afghanistan), Gilgit, Chitral and Hunza from time to time, and gave subsidies to the rulers. They also strengthened their position by agreements with Maharaja of Kashmir in respect of these regions. In 1876, the Viceroy Lord Lytton signed an agreement with the Maharaja at Madhopur regarding Gilgit and obtained his agreement to the posting of Biddulph at Gilgit, and the Maharaja was to extend his rule into Yasin.

The valley of the Gilgit river which joins the Indus where the latter takes the great southward bend down to the Punjab, affords the most likely route for invasion. From the Baroghil pass, the route lies south via Yasin and Darkot to Chitral and Gilgit. The more westerly Dorab pass leads through Balkh to Kafiristan. These routes have in the past been used for such invasion. Alexander the Great crossed the Hindukush to invade Sigdrana (Somarkand). After staying there a couple of years, he re-crossed the Hindukush into India. In AD 747, a Chinese force used the Darkot Pass with 30,000 men. They went directly across the glacial Darkot Pass into the Valley of Yasin. They destroyed the bridge over the Gilgit river near Gupis to stop the Tibetans from sending help to their components in the Oxus⁷.

The British sent several exploratory missions across the Hindukush into the Pamirs. Colonel Gordon and Colonel Lockhart led the two most important survey parties in the 1870s. They reported that Dorah and Baroghil passes were possible points for entry of the Russians from the Pamirs. Ultimately, the British and Russians demarcated the Afghan border south of the Pamirs in 1895 in such a way that the area of Wakhan served as a buffer between Russia and the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This peace lasted till 1979 when Russia occupied Wakhan as part of its invasion of Afghanistan.

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¹(See Aurel Stein "On Ancient Tracks Past the Pamirs" in *Himalayan Journal*, April 1932. But Schalter in "Stones of Silence", Andre Deutsch, 1980 states p.82 that the route used the Mintaka Pass).

²"Himalayan Frontiers", Dorothy Woodman (1966)

³"Turkestan Alive!" Lionel Davidson - Jonathan Cape (1956)

⁴K.Mason, "Abode" of Snow DUP, p 137

⁵Wilfred Noyce, "The Survived," 1962

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⁷Schalter, "Stones of Silence," Andre Deutsch, 1980 p.68

Selection and Training of Infantry Officers

BRIG N K MAYNE, AVSM*

INTRODUCTION

The aim of training is to make a trainee fit to carry out the task of appointment to be entrusted to him. Like all simple truisms, this is also self evident but in practice, more often than not, this is completely forgotten or neglected. All of us have gone through the experience of undergoing a course of instruction for a job and most probably have never been employed on it thereafter. The other side of this experience being equally probable that many of us were employed on this very job prior to undergoing a course of instruction and afterwards.

The weapons and equipment of the Army are becoming progressively more and more complicated. Though the present generation of officers in the selection grade have had a general education and have been able to cope with this increase in complexity of weapons and equipment, our eyes should now be focussed on the 21st Century and the challenges its technical progress will pose to the General Staff Officers laying down qualitative requirements for Research and Development and other regimental officers carrying out user trials. The validity of this statement is borne out by the kind of user trials being presently carried out by various arms in which their officers do not fully comprehend the technical aspects of the equipment under trial and the report is more or less left in the hands of the technical staff. Keeping in mind this requirement, I will be touching upon the standard of education and the training of an officer (particularly Infantry) from the very beginning i.e. from selection onwards.

TASKS TO BE PERFORMED BY OFFICERS

And infantry officer can be employed on regimental duties, on the staff or on extra regimental employment.

REGIMENTAL DUTIES

As a Subaltern an officer can be employed as an Intelligence Officer,

* Brigadier NK Mayne who died on July 3, 1989 was awarded the AVSM for his outstanding services in rescue and relief operations during the Bhopal Gas Tragedy in which he himself suffered severe disability.

Mechanical Transport Officer, and Signal^{*}Platoon Commander in a battalion or as a physical Training Officer and a Weapon Training Officer at the Regimental Centre.

As a Captain an officer can be employed as a platoon commander of one of the support weapons platoons like the Medium Machine guns, 81 mm Mortar and the Recoilless Guns platoon or as a Rifle Company second in Command, Adjutant or as Quartermaster. (If no special List officer is posted.) He can also be employed as an Administration Company Commander.

As a Major an officer can be employed as a Rifle Company Commander or Support Company Commander in a battalion or as a Training Company Commander at Regimental Centre.

As a Lt Col an officer will be employed as a Second-in-Command in a battalion or in appointments at Regimental Centre of training and administrative nature. In certain cases a Lt Col may be appointed to command a battalion and in others officiate in that capacity.

OTHER REGIMENTAL DUTIES

In addition to the jobs mentioned above, which are strictly according to the War/peace Establishment of an infantry battalion, Regimental Centre, the following jobs have also to be performed in a unit, either as a part of the job requirement of an existing appointment, or on being given an additional charge, the manner and method being variable according to the choice of the Commanding Officer, e.g. a Commanding Officer can detail any one officer to supervise physical training and games for the whole battalion or expect all sub-unit commanders to look after their own commands. Such additional jobs are as follows:-

- (a) Accounts Officer. (under the Second-in-Command)
- (b) Physical Training Officer.
- (c) Weapon Training Officer.
- (d) Officers Mess Committee
- (e) Liaison Officer to senior visiting VIPs.
- (f) Legal duties - prosecutor, defending officer or a friend of the accused in courts martial. Recording of courts of inquiry and summaries of evidence, preparation of charge sheets and offence reports and membership of station boards.

DUTIES ON STAFF

Grades 1,2, and 3 Staff officers at various formation Headquarters in G, A and Q Branches.

Grades 1,2 and 3 staff officers at Army Headquarters. (The staff duties and method of working is entirely different at Army Headquarters because it is basically a department of the Government of India and not a formation Headquarters controlling troops.).

EXTRA REGIMENTAL EMPLOYMENT

Instructors Class A,B and C at Category A establishments, Movement Control Organisations, National Cadet Corps, Ground Liaison Officers at formation HQ. Air Photo Interpretation Officers at formation HQ or in other miscellaneous duties like military police, field cashier, resettlement projects and so on.

REQUIREMENT OF TECHNICAL EXPERTISE

Advanced armies of the World have started realising that it is no longer sufficient to have generalist officers in command of troops because the army's equipment is becoming progressively more and more technical. Therefore, they have accepted the fact that it is obligatory for all officers particularly those in higher command and staff appointments to have a high degree of technical comprehension of weapons and equipment. Therefore, it has now become necessary in advanced armies to be an Engineering Graduate before one becomes a General Officer. Whereas it is necessary for a signaller or an engineer or an EME officer to be technically competent in handling and or repair of equipment on charge, it is imperative for an officer in command of troops at any level to have technical comprehension of the weapons and equipment he is handling and to be adept at materials management. To this end, the exposure at the Institute of Armament Technology, before attending the staff course is not sufficient. A combined Technical and Tactical Command and Staff Course would be more appropriate and should be introduced as soon as possible. Similarly training in materials and other management techniques should be imparted at the beginning of the service to young officers. The extra emphasis on knowledge of Science and Technical comprehension, that I am suggesting, *does not* mean that knowledge of humanities is not essential. What I do wish to state is that BOTH are required. It is also suggested that we should restructure the educational standards of the officer cadre as follows:-

- (a) Only Science stream candidates should be selected for training as officers at the NDA.

(b) At the NDA, the course should be expanded, if necessary so that a full degree course in engineering in the following concurrent or alternative streams can be organised:-

(i) Armament technology.

(ii) Electronics technology.

(iii) Mechanical technology.

(iv) An exposure to Chemical and Biological engineering as related to weapons.

(c) Candidates for direct entry training at the IMA should already be engineering graduates in one of the disciplines mentioned above.

(d) The ACC entry, by virtue of its source of material, is not likely to provide science stream cadet in any respectable numbers. Therefore, all arts stream cadets from the ACC should be commissioned into the non technical services. As they are usually late entrants, it will also help their career prospects. Cadets in the science stream from the ACC should have the option to join non technical services.

The officers commissioned in technical arms and services should later on specialise in their own fields-Field Engineering, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering or Electronics to get a post-graduate degree from their respective colleges.

It is necessary that on passing out from the IMA a subaltern is fully qualified and competent to hold the appointments indicated earlier. But at present, as these officers are not fully competent to carry out the above mentioned jobs on grant of commission, they have to be given post commission training courses for these jobs. It is, therefore, obvious that the fault lies in the concept of training of officers at the Academy. The GCs at IMA at present are exposed to the following activities

(a) *Academics.* Since the intake is all graduates, the aim of academic studies here is obscure.

(b) *Military subjects* Elementary knowledge of organisation and administration and military history, map reading, platoon tactics, elementary signal training and some training in driving of B vehicles. An exposure to platoon weapons and to physical training. A very high standard of ceremonial drill is also achieved but at a tremendous cost of time. It

will be seen that the whole gamut of military activities, with varying emphasis on each aspect, is covered over a period of $1\frac{1}{2}$ years in which two camps are also held for outdoor practical training.

Despite the above experience, the end product on joining the battalion, is found to be such as to require another 6 months of further training at a YO's course in platoon weapons which he should have been taught at the IMA. Then he is trained as a platoon commander where in fact officers are not authorised as platoon commanders in a Battalion. Finally, he is trained as commando when again there is no such organisation in an infantry battalion. This raises the question regarding the necessity of this post-commission training. Similarly, the knowledge of intelligence duties, mechanical transport and Signals of a freshly commissioned officer is also of such a rudimentary standard as to require further special courses. However, he is found to be quite good at saluting, general drill and at ceremonial drill (eighteenth century vintage) but he is not good enough in modern tactical battle drill and procedures or in physical training (otherwise why are PT course and the YO course, as at present constituted, necessary?). The question is WHY is this so? The pre-commission training of officers for four years at the NDA and $1\frac{1}{2}$ years at the IMA in an elite public school atmosphere, is an expensive affair. The least one would expect from these institutions is that they turn out officers who are *fit* to carry out their duties laid down for them in the war establishments as young subalterns without requiring further training.

SUGGESTED SCHEDULE - PRE COMMISSION TRAINING

In order to ensure that an officer on completion of his course at the IMA is fully trained to carry out the duties expected of him when he joins an infantry battalion as a Subalterns, it is essential that the training at the IMA is restructured on the following lines.

For officers posted to the Infantry, the aim of training, should be to produce an officer who is fit to carry out the duties of an Intelligence Officer, Mechanical Transport Officer and Signal Platoon Commander. He should also be fully conversant with and proficient in section leading and platoon tactics; imparting instructions in all rifle company weapons and in organising and conducting physical training and games. After joining the unit he should require further training only to be able to perform the duties of Captains and above. Similarly, the young officers of other arms and services should also be fit to perform the duties of subalterns before being granted a commission.

In view of the above, I suggest that the general distribution of time and effort at the IMA should be as follows:

a) *Academic*. Since GCs are already graduates, all academic *teaching* should stop altogether. If they have so far not been *Educated* this is not the time to do so. On the other hand, the selection system should be tightened up to select "Educated" candidates. The exposure to humanities etc is best given in colleges and not here. Here we should concentrate on history of the art of warfare as the basic reading, with a view to inculcating a habit of reading; a love for the art of war and its history; and for improving the GC's expression both verbal and written.

(b) *Military Subjects* (Six semesters of three month each).

(i) *First Semester*. Basic recruit training i.e. in drill, PT, map reading and in addition Military History. Pass promotion cadre to NK

(ii) *2nd Semester*. To pass a standard similar to map reading standard I and promotion cadre upto Havildar. Training as a MT Driver, signal operator in radio and line equipment authorised to an infantry battalion and to pass the classification test.

(iii) *Third Semester*. To Pass promotion cadre for promotion of JCO. Be able to instruct a class in signals (radio and line); MT driving and maintenance; map reading and field sketching.

(iv) *Fourth Semester*. Learn the organisations of all arms and services upto sub-unit level; be efficient in handling a rifle platoon in barracks and on manoeuvres (administration and tactical handling).

(v) Commissioning Board to be held on completion of the fourth semester.

(iv) *Fifth Semester*. Be proficient in regimental accounts, framing of charges and charge sheets, duties of an officer recording S of E and C of I, conduct of courts martial and duties of prosecutor and defending officer (including practical training). Be proficient in supervision of the interior economy of a sub unit, care and maintenance of weapons and equipment and other stores. Be proficient in the theoretical knowledge of regimental duties.

(viii) *Sixth Semester*. Officers of all arms, specialised training in driving of a tank, handling and firing of a field gun and 81 mm Mortars,

MMG, and RCLs (106 mm and 57 mm). Officers commissioned in the services should be exposed to their duties during this period.

c) *Passing Out*. The present emphasis on a passing out parade in Eighteenth Century battle formations and on unnecessary spit and polish, for which GCs practise for 2 to 3 months for about 2 hours a day should be marked by a demonstration of the tactical/technical skill of the future officers in the form of a field firing exercise or realistic battle inoculation. The ceremonial aspect of commissioning can be looked after by holding the prize distribution ceremony separately in the Chetwode Hall during the Commissioning ceremony or even at a Ceremonial Guest Night function in the Mess.

SUGGESTED SCHEME - POST COMMISSION TRAINING

If the pattern of pre-commission training is modified as suggested, a young officer, on being commissioned, can now be expected to command, administer and train an infantry platoon in peace and in war because he has been given adequate training in doing so and is mentally ready to handle a rifle company as its second in command. The change in the pre-commission training will enable a young officer to effectively discharge the duties assigned to him by the Government according to the War Establishment and for which he has been fully trained at the IMA. He should do so for about six months during which he will be using the experience gained at the IMA and will be learning the characteristics of the men with whom he will be serving for the next 16 to 18 years.

A practice is in vogue to put a young officer through promotion cadre(s) alongwith other ranks and later on placing the young officer in command of an infantry platoon in barracks and in exercise to let him get the feel of commanding troops. The *thought* behind this practice is eminently sound, but it should be done without displacing the permanent incumbent JCO from this job. This can be easily done by giving the subaltern the command of a platoon in a leave vacancy so that the permanent incumbent does not continue to oversee the work of a raw hand.

Some of the courses of instruction also need to be made task oriented. For instance the war establishment of a battalion says that a Signal Platoon Commander is a Captain/subaltern. However, such stroke appointments carry the lower rank. According to existing orders, an officer, who is to be trained for this appointment, can only be sent on this course with a minimum of a year and half service and maximum of 6 years service. If an officer is to discharge his duties as Signal Platoon Commander, he can do so till about

3 to 4 years of service only. Therefore, it is fruitless sending an officer on this course if he has more than 3 years service. At present officers who do the Signal Course, come back much too senior to hold the appointment of Signal Platoon Commander and are then employed in some other appointment. Such is the case with most courses. This results in infructuous expenditure of time, effort and money spent on running Army courses to train officers for jobs which they do not do. This needs to be eliminated.

I feel that the requirement of courses and their capacity vis-a-vis the number of officers available in an unit and the service requirement of trained personnel can be resolved if we draw up a capability profile that we expect our officers to possess in various brackets of service. Depending upon the jobs to be performed by them in a particular service span, the capability profile expected of them should be worked out. We should then send the officers on only those courses which train them to perform these jobs.

CONCLUSION

As the weapons and equipment are becoming more and more technically complex, we should select only the science stream as officer material for the Infantry and other arms and technical services. We should train the NDA entry upto a BE standard in Armament, Electronics and Mechanical technologies with an exposure to Chemical and Biological technology related to weapons and equipment.

The direct entry to IMA should be BEs in above disciplines. The ACC entry should provide the officers for non technical services, with an option available to those from the Science Stream among them to obtain a BE and join the Arms or technical services.

A young officer on commissioning should be fully capable of carrying out the duties expected of him on the War establishment. The passing out parade at the IMA should no longer be based on 18th century battle drills but should be replaced by a Demonstrations of tactical skill/battle inoculation by the passing out Cadets, the infrastructure being provided by the other Cadets.

It is high time that we ensured that not only are our officers fully trained to do a job before being entrusted with it but that there is no infructuous training imparted in optional subjects whereby trained officers keep waiting in vain for jobs for which they have been trained. The type of courses required and their syllabus should be planned according to needs. This will help to reduce expenditure on unnecessary courses and at the same time increase the availability of officers to units.

Does India Need a Rapid Deployment Force?

MAJ GEN B D KAPUR (RETD)

India's experience in Sri Lanka and recently in Maldives proves the need for an integrated Force of the three services, Army, Navy and Air Force to be trained for short-notice quick deployment in the Region. President Reagan's intervention in the GRENADA Island (East Caribbean), when the writer was in that area, did not surprise us in the light of dithering stance taken by Britain, who had an implied responsibility towards their erstwhile colonies of the West Indies. The continuing bloodshed and political murders were brought to a halt and the fear of Communism spreading in the Caribbean was stalled. Although the world criticised his action, those of us in the Region, felt that his move was justifiable, launched in time and proved effective.

Already India has been called upon to play a protective role in South Asia: from Bangladesh to Sri Lanka and recently Maldives. In Sri Lanka, whether we have gained or lost, we have certainly demonstrated India's willingness to assist the neighbours in an emergency, although in this case the cost to the Nation has proved to be heavy, both in material and manpower. Only time will tell whether we acted wisely in pushing in one go a major defence component, untrained and unprepared for such a venture.

Some of us live to see the faulty decisions by Soldiers and Statesmen: In 1950 General Maharaj Rajindrasinhji, the Army Commander of Southern Command, was directed by Army Headquarters to evaluate the strategic importance of the chain of islands, the Laccadives and Maldives, stretched along the West coast of India. The Army Commander nominated me (I was then CSO Southern Command) as the Leader of an inter-service Team comprising a Wing Commander of the Air Force and a Lt Commander of the Navy, with a Frigate under the latter's command to be also our means of transportation, and, in addition, a war-seasoned British Lt Colonel was appointed my Advisor and Chief Staff Officer. After a two week's spree round the islands, we submitted our recommendations to Army Headquarters, fully supported by the Army Commander: (I am writing from memory):

- a) An air landing strip may be constructed at each of the group of islands, Laccadives and Maldives

(b) from these islands high-powered communication links should be established with New Delhi; and,

(c) a small garrison comprising an infantry company group, with essential support elements from the air force and the navy, may be stationed at the capital of each group; the garrison should have a strong component of INTELLIGENCE personnel to function as "the eyes and ears" of India. These garrisons may come under the command of Western Commands of Army, Navy and Air Force, under the cooperation of the Army Commander.

The suggestion in this paper goes beyond that recommendation in that a Mobile Inter-Service Force may be formed in addition. Whilst the composition of such a force is in the domain of Chiefs of Staff, the writer wishes to express some ideas which may be given consideration:

(a) The TV Doordarshan documentary on Maldivian operation "CACTUS" gave an event by event account of the "invasion" by an inter-service cooperative effort leading to the capture of MV Progress Light, the hijacked Maldivian ship and its adventurous group of mercenaries. Whilst the success of the operation redounds to the credit of Services, a detailed examination would reveal that a "sledgehammer was used to drive a nail". Why? For two simple reasons: (i) for lack of intelligence, the Planners were obliged to commit a large Force out of proportion to the need, and, (ii) even after past experiences, we had not given thought to having a "small, mobile, hard-hitting Task Force, which was trained as such and located at a suitable place in India to be launched at the behest of the Chiefs of Staff.

(b) History has shown that time and again lessons are seldom drawn from the past. Take the Central Intelligence system of the Government; we discovered its weakness in the 1962 Army debacle, when I directed the DRDO Soldier-Scientists Team on the instructions of the then Chief of Army Staff, General J.N. Chaudhuri, to carry out an assessment of the reasons for the debacle. Among the various shortcomings we had highlighted were: (i) the need for an integrated central intelligence system, and, (ii) the need to train troops for sudden operations in new *unfamiliar* environments. The same shortcoming appeared to have become evident in the Forces assigned to Sri Lanka; we lacked intelligence before launch and even afterwards, the field intelligence did not prove to be effective either. The British from whom we inherited

the pattern of intelligence organisation, miserably failed in the Falkland Islands due to a disastrous lack of information of the happenings, which led to their occupation by Argentina. One fact brought home to us is that we have to think afresh for ourselves so that in planning a mobile force, feeding intelligence before and after the operation is launched, is an essential factor for the initial success and for the follow up momentum to be maintained.

Invited to Egypt at the request of President Nasser to Prime Minister Nehru, I asked for a briefing (as I was cleared for confidential information to discuss a defence project as CC R&D) on the UNIFIED Intelligence System of the Egyptian Government. Housed in one multi-storey building were all the intelligence services of the Government: Army, Navy and Air Force, and the civil services, both external and internal intelligence, under the command of a Major General, who reported regularly to the President. Strategically placed, and after the 1958 War, Egypt had realised the need for ONE AGENCY to coordinate all intelligence work. On my return to Delhi, I wrote a separate chapter about this in my Report to the Government. The gnawing reality is that the gaps showed up in our intelligence system in the assassination of the very popular and able Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. I believe we have made a few changes. Has the subject been examined in depth? Why do we still continue to separate civil intelligence from military intelligence? Why do we still believe in Committees to coordinate the work of the agencies concerned? There are, of course, plausible answers to these questions.

After the Grenada operation, President Reagan conceived the idea of a "Mobile Rapid Deployment Force". As emphasised by the President at that time such a Force would function as ONE UNIT. Inevitably there would be ONE Commander of the Force, who would take his orders from the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Whether it is Maldives today, Laccadives tomorrow or Andamans the day after, it is from such strategic points that we have to guard our 6000 km coast line. Thus in addition to the Garrisons, which would have among the most sophisticated gadgetry for gathering intelligence, a Rapid Deployment Mobile Force may be formed and suitably placed, to be launched at short notice. Among the essential requirements is the need to TRAIN as an integrated Force.

Apropos the deployment of small forces, I would like to quote from the

SIGNAL Journal* of the USA, wherein Admiral Boyes has done some crystal-gazing into the future structure of the armed services:

"... the large conventional forces would be replaced by fluid offensive and defensive strike Teams.... Brigades will, in most cases, replace divisions as major maneuver groups although divisions will remain as resource centres. These attack or defence units will be rapidly deployable and will ride to fight on high speed, low flying transport aircraft and helicopters....

"Tactical air units will be reduced significantly in numbers and will be increasingly robotlike, being controlled from ground centres. Large navies gradually will decline to be replaced by 60 mile per hour surface ships and deep diving submarines, all equipped with missiles. Weapons will be longer ranged, self-guiding and seeking and more lethal... use of lasers and X-rays will come into use along with radio millimeter wavelength weapons....

"By the year 2013, there will be FOUR major powers: China, INDIA, the United States and the Soviet Union..... The Asia-Pacific economy and markets will be the most important on this globe.....".

Whereas the above gives a good look into the future by a military writer of fame in the USA, it is not out of place to our local theme for a rapid deployment force. With an alert Government and an alert Parliament, the latter having members who have been eminent military commanders, right answers for such contingencies could be found, which have so far been tackled on an *ad hoc* basis.

NOTE

* Jon L. Boyes, Vice Adm, USN (Retd),

"The Future Influence of C³ Technologies" in *Signal-Journal of the Armed Forces Communication and Electronic Association of USA*, June 1988.

When Tshombe Led the UN Troops

SITU MULICK

We publish this article by Situ Mullick, who left us on September 5, 1989, for good, after a brave and long battle with cancer. After retirement from active service as the Chief Public Relation Officer in the Ministry of Defence, Situ became an active member of the Sponsoring Committee of the Indian Mountaineering Federation. He also edited the 'Air Force Association News' - a bi-annual until his last days. Though pressed for time, he devoted a great deal of effort in furthering the interests of the USI and wrote a number of articles about the USI and its Library in various journals. He made a major contribution to the Centenary Exhibition of the USI in 1971 by producing and arranging a large number of excellent photographs. All those who knew him will deeply miss him.

The following article, shows the Indian Army under UN Command, in a peace-keeping role in the Congo, a forerunner of the IPKF in Sri Lanka.

Operation Grand Slam had made an incredible headway under Brigadier (later Lt General and Vice Army Chief but, sadly, no longer with us) Reggie Noronha's command. His trained and disciplined, professional Indian soldiers serving the United Nations in the Congo, had neutralised all resistance stiffly put up by well-equipped white mercenaries-led Katangese gendarmerie who were, at last, on the run. Moise Tshombe, a past master in guile and perfidy, had sued for peace for the n'th time. But no longer anyone chose to take him seriously. But at the UN headquarters in Elisabethville, E'ville for short', he even "pledged" to lead a 'peace-drive' to Mokambo down the Sakania road in token of permitting complete freedom of movement to the UN forces.'

On the night of January 9, 1963, the UN Katanga force commander, Maj.-General Dewan Prem Chand, tipped me off in confidence that the UN troops were now poised to clear all road-blocks and smoothen the way right upto the northern Rhodesian border early next morning. "You better be near the Union Miniere at the break of dawn tomorrow", he advised, adding: "I leave it to your discretion to sound your press friends as well".

The international mediamen, whom we had nicknamed the 'Katanga Press', were, instinctively, anti-UN and rabidly so where the Indian and the Ethiopian troops were concerned. But our Indian PR team, which I had the honour of leading, had somehow managed to 'convert' them gradually and the measure of their past hostility had, seemingly shrunk. By now they

were, in fact, a friendly crowd and no longer out and out pro-Tshombe on account principally of his well-gearred, European managed PR set-up.

At least two meetings at our office for an 'off-the-record-'Briefing' had come to be a daily routine, and the Press relished it just as much as we did in sharing 'newsy' gossip with them relating to 'both the camps'. In the evening session, excited by the commander's tip but maintaining PR blank facade, I casually mentioned if they were mobile and interested in a long drive. "If you are and if you want to take a chance be near the 'ash-hill' before the sun rises", I suggested. And dictated by a hunch, added: "Better come prepared for an outing the whole day". And sure enough, they were all there before the first light, in their borrowed, hired and, even, stolen cars, big and small and of every vintage. They saw my UN jeep and were all restive to meet me and know more about what was in the offing. My stupid smile betrayed all that needs to be divulged by a cautious PRO in a somewhat oblique and mute language which, luckily, pressmen readily and gratefully understand.

Thus, we started off the day famously, talking of men, matters and memories and munching sandwiches and gulping them down with rum diluted with coffee.

The Zero hour given me by General Prem Chand was fast approaching but there was no sign yet of any troops. The uncanny eyes of the newsmen immediately spotted my uneasiness and 'forced' me to talk. It was good half hour past the crucial time when the Ethiopian troops were to pass that way with the supporting Indian artillery and armoured units. I knew of an Ethiopian outpost some five km from the Union Miniere. My driver, Naik Harnarain, and I left the, by now, somewhat restive company of the news hounds and sped off, to gather some more reliable intelligence than the Katanga Force commander had been pleased to pass on to me the previous night. The Ethiopian vanguard troops had already struck their camp and were as surprised as I was baffled by having had no sign yet of their main force which had been due good 45 minutes earlier. The advance troops themselves should, by now, have moved further forward a few kilometres towards the Rhodesian border, probably already encountering resistance and engaged in a bloody battle...

It didn't take me long to decide that I should best be with my own Press friends, however devastatingly curious they might be. And sure enough: As I returned to the Union Miniere site the police sirens were hooting away madly, and a big black limousine seemed to be the all important centre of universal interest very close to the rendezvous point. The Pressmen's cars were all a flutter, turning and reversing and getting into positions in, by now, an extended motorcade as near the black big car as possible.

It was Tshombe in this big black car.

How come. He was supposed to be under house arrest ever since the 'Grand Slam' had started. The mystery was solved after my highly competent and intelligent driver, Harnarain, and I, the two solitary UN personnel in a solitary UN jeep and in our conspicuous UN blue berets, managed to get into the motorcade, and with a hooting police scout-car ahead, set out on an unknown journey...

Hereafter, it is best to quote a Reuter's report carried on front page by almost all Indian national dailies, on Friday, January II, 1963. It was dated 'Mokambo (Katanga) January 10, and it said: Mr. Tshombe made a fantastic peace drive to the northern Rhodesian border as an armoured UN rolled down the road some miles behind, determined to open the key supply route from Elisabethville to Rhodesia. Driving down the dusty 174-mile road from Elisabethville to this border post, he told the cheering crowd of villagers not to attack the UN forces. He said he wished to save his people from a "massacre".... Before the peace drive started at dawn, the UN withdrew an order to place Mr. Tshombe under house arrest after he offered to permit UN forces freedom of movement down the Sakania road and agreed to go ahead of Indian and Ethiopian UN troops down the road to prevent any clashes... Reuter added: "The only UN personnel to travel with Mr. Tshombe were Wing Commander Situ Mullick, Press officer of the Indian Brigade in Elisabethville, and Cpl. Harnarain of the Rajputana Rifles. The two, both in full uniform, travelled in a white UN jeep. They drove with great courage through African villages extremely hostile to the UN, and were watched incredulously by armed Katangese gendarmerie. There were no incidents. The Indian and Ethiopian column was led by General Premchand, the Indian commander of the Katanga operations, and Col. Worku, an Ethiopian...."

John Ridley of the Daily Telegraph, who too was with us during the Mokambo March (it sounds better than 'drive') quite aptly observed that Tshombe had always been the man 'who could charm birds out of trees'. To this observation I would like to add that Tshombe was the man who drew the Press as would the rare flower the most festidious of nectar-sucking bees. He had, quite unexpectedly, but not surprisingly, provided a lead story that day to every journalist and broadcaster, to every TV and newsreel cameraman that followed him to Mokambo. Even the Indian papers (which provided the solitary exception by not positioning their foreign correspondents in the Congo where the Indian troops were playing the premier role) front-paged the day's story. Of course, I had quite the most severe of reprimands from my UN bosses the next day "for having undertaken an unauthorised temporary duty without having first obtained a movement order". The stiff letter

that came some days later from home with a paper-cutting was a matter purely of a serious domestic quarrel....

There was no champagne for the Press at Mokambo. But minister Munongo (who is believed to have killed Lumumba) had, thoughtfully provided Simba beer for the thirsty Pressmen, but never so much as once did anyone ask if someone wanted to have a bite....

I did meet Tshombe again once or twice. But for the purpose of this story, I might recall my meeting him at Kolwezi where he was giving an exclusive interview to a few chosen foreign correspondents a day following the triumphal entry of the UN Indian troops into Kolwezi - the last stronghold of the Katangese army and one of the major industrial centres of Katanga. After he had talked to other correspondent, in French of course, I thought of having a word with him myself. And I had a handy excuse for starting the conversation by inquiring after his 'bandaged eye'. Through an interpreter I expressed my concern and expressed the hope that the trouble was not serious. Mr. Tshombe promptly replied: "Of course I have met you before, not long ago at Elisabethville during my last visit and indeed soon thereafter at Mokambo, though I didn't meet your driver there". Then, after a pause, he added, "I know you have seen the world and, therefore you must know what these doctors are like. For no earthly reason and in complete defiance of my protests, they have insisted upon my being made to appear as if gravely sick. This bandage which you see blinding my one eye is an unkind handicraft of my unkind doctor".

It was not necessary to have any real clairvoyant powers or be assured that the bandage which Mr. Tshombe donned that morning following his final collapse as head of the secessionist Katanga province, was only to regain universal sympathies, particularly of the genuinely concerned press whom he was meeting that morning perhaps for the last time while still not legally unseated from his presidential gaddi. Accepting good-humouredly his softly hitting witty reply, I remarked: "Sir, the whole trouble starts from pampering the family doctor too often and too much, and by letting him have a free hand in devising ways and means which are not always medically necessary. However, one cannot possibly take a risk with a delicate thing such as an eye and the best course, I suppose, should be to submit to the doc's way". He nodded benignly and accepted my expression of good wishes and speedy recovery with a beguiling smile.

Obviously, Moise Tshombe had, at last, accepted me as a Press-man in spite of my UN uniform.

Wavell and his Accomplishments in the Middle East 1939-41-Part III

(A Bibliographical Review)

CAPTAIN HAROLD E. RAUGH JR. US ARMY

The majority of the books written about the British expedition to Greece include accounts of the defense of Crete, since in many respects it was the second phase of the Greek campaign, although a few complete studies of this episode have been written. Again, some aspects of Wavell's role are controversial.

Perhaps the most complete, detailed, and analytical one-volume study of Crete is I.McD.G. Stewart's *The Struggle for Crete: 20 May- 1 June 1941* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966). Stewart's biggest indictment of Wavell is that "a few simple measures, taken during the six months of occupation before the battle, could have deprived the enemy of any hope of success" (p.479) - these measures included roads, landing strip, and defensive construction. It is doubtful, though, if Stewart places the importance of Crete within the proper context of all the activities and campaigns being conducted by Wavell during the six previous months, and appears to treat it as an isolated situation. Of course, it was Wavell who made the recommendation to evacuate Crete, realizing the futility of sending additional reinforcements to the beleaguered island. Stewart adds, after criticizing Wavell, that "Certainly no general of the Second World War can be more sure of his [Wavell's] reputation as a fine soldier and honourable [sic] man". (p. 479).

Another fine study, placing Crete within its strategical context in the eastern Mediterranean, is Alan Clark's *The Fall of Crete* (London: Anthony Blond, 1962). The noted American military history writer Hanson W.Baldwin included a chapter entitled "Crete- The Winged Invasion" in his *Battles Lost and Won* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). This chapter provides a cursory overview of the defense of Crete.

Wavell's campaigns in Iraq and Syria in 1941 were, though intense, overshadowed by the Greek debacle, the defense and evacuation of Crete, and Rommel's offensive in the Western Desert. Similarly, in the literary arena, studies of the Iraq and Syrian campaigns are vastly overshadowed by books on Wavell's other concurrently-conducted campaigns.

Geoffrey Warner, in his *Iraq and Syria 1941* (London: Davis-Poynter, 1974), makes excellent use of a multitude of Allied and Axis documents, both previously published and unpublished, in his narrative. In his Prologue, he

discusses "Arab Nationalism to 1939", knowledge of which is essential in understanding the reasons for and contexts of these two imbroglios. After chronicling the events leading up to and causes for these two campaigns, he includes a chapter on each, then concludes with "The Strategic Implications." Wavell was originally reluctant to engage in these operations on the outermost limits of his command, and in retrospect, Warner contends "Both (Iraq and Syria) could therefore have been left to stew in their own juice until Rommel's army in North Africa had been destroyed, rather as Wavell had appeared to favour (sic)." (p.159). This book is recommended to one desiring to know primarily about the diplomatic aspects of these campaigns.

Major-General Sir Edward Spears, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., served as Head of the British Mission to the Free French, and became Head of the British Mission to Syria and Lebanon in July 1941. He wrote *Fulfilment of a Mission* shortly after World War II, but it was not published until fairly recently (London: Seeley, Service and Cooper, 1977). Spears, in describing Wavell's character and attributes, is quite complimentary, though the two were often at loggerheads over policy with the Free French. Spears believes Wavell was incorrect not to accept the "co-operation [sic] of the French Forces in the Levant (three Divisions)" (p.15), after General Mittelhauser, the French Commander-in-Chief in Syria, refused to accept Marshal Petain's armistice in June 1940. Wavell also, according to Spears, underrated the Axis threat to Syria. Spears states that Wavell was undoubtedly exasperated at having "in Cairo a person (myself) [Spears] who had the ear of the Prime Minister and never ceased putting to him a policy urged by de Gaulle of which he [Wavell] disapproved". (p. 92). Wavell was so perturbed by de Gaulle and Spears being able to bypass him, the Commander-in-Chief, and communicate directly with the Prime Minister, that he "begged to tender his resignation" in May 1941. Unfortunately, Wavell gave Churchill the blank check the latter must have wanted and which he used the following month in "transferring" Wavell to India. This is quite an interesting book, indispensable to a knowledge of understanding the evolution of the Syrian campaign, though it is expectedly tainted with Francophilic sentiments.

There were a number of leading personalities, civilians as well as soldiers, who held positions of great importance and were able to place Wavell's campaigns in the larger context of the world-wide conflagration. These autobiographies/memoirs/reminiscences cast a great deal of light on Wavell himself as well as on his Middle East campaigns. Foremost among these writings is the monumental six-volume narrative *The Second World War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, various dates), by Winston S. Churchill, who served as Prime Minister as well as Minister of Defense, 1940-45. Of particular interest are Volume II, *Their Finest Hour* (1949) and Volume III, *The Grand Alli-*

ance (1950), which both cover Wavell's Middle East campaigns in superlative detail. They are supplemented by "the memoranda, directives, personal telegrams, and minutes" issued by Churchill as Prime Minister. Churchill believed Wavell to have been "tired" and under a great deal of strain, the latter of which was undoubtably true. In explaining Wavell's transfer to India to United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Churchill stated:

....Wavell has a glorious record, having completely destroyed the Italian Army and conquered the Italian Empire in Africa. He has also borne up well against German attacks and has conducted war and policy in three or four directions simultaneously since the beginning of the struggle. I must regard him as our most distinguished General. (Vol.III, p. 350).

Churchill won the Nobel Prize for Literature for *The Second World War*.

Other outstanding primary accounts are the war diaries, edited by Sir Arthur Bryant, of Field-Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, who, as General Sir Alan Brooke, served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1941 to 1946. His edited war diaries were published as *The Turn of the Tide* and *Triumph in the West* (London: Collins, 1957 and 1959, respectively). Major-General Sir John Kennedy served in privileged and responsible positions only one echelon below that of the CIGS: he was Director of Military Operations from 1940 to 1943, and thereafter Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff until December 1944. Kennedy's "war narrative", very evenly-written and critical when necessary, was edited by Bernard Fergusson and published as *The Business of War* (London: Hutchinson, 1957).

General Hastings Ismay became Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense (Churchill) in 1940, serving in that position until 1946. He also served as Deputy Secretary to the War Cabinet. From this vantage point Ismay was intimately involved with all aspects of the central direction of the War. In *The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay* (New York: Viking, 1960), the Churchill-Wavell relationship is commented upon in great detail, as are the strategic facets of all of Wavell's Middle East campaigns. In paying tribute to Wavell, Ismay wrote, in part:

.... He had shown strategic genius of a high order. His withdrawal of the Fourth Indian Division from a battle still raging in the Western Desert, and their despatch to the Sudan, a distance of over 1,000 miles, was a master stroke. Rommel rated him as the most redoubtable of the commanders who were pitted against him. He had gained the complete confidence of his troops. He had the happy knack of turning up at the

critical moments of a battle; and the flying risks he took to get there nearly cost him his life on several occasions. (pp. 211-212).

Ismay concludes this section by stating Wavell's relief was justified, since Churchill had lost confidence in him.

"Jumbo" Wilson-later Field-Marshal Lord Wilson of Libya, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.S.O., served as Wavell's right-hand man in many of the Middle East campaigns. Wilson, at the outbreak of the war, was commanding in Egypt and oversaw Wavell's early campaign in the desert and Cunningham's in Ethiopia. In the next few months he commanded the expedition to and evacuation from Greece, commanded the force that occupied Iraq after a pro-Axis coup, and led the sensitive operation that resulted in the occupation of Syria which had been held by Vichy French forces.³⁰ Wilson's direct participation in many of Wavell's Middle East campaigns, as the commander of the ground forces involved, makes his book of World War II experiences, *Eight Years Overseas* (London: Hutchinson, n.d. (1948)), indispensable reading.

"Battleaxe" was the excuse Churchill had been looking for to remove Wavell, in whom Churchill had lost confidence and believed to be tired. However, the majority of knowledgeable and authoritative sources question, if not condemn, Churchill's action:

The reasons for relieving Wavell of his former command are obscure. Heavily handicapped by inferiority of numbers and equipment, he has conducted campaigns simultaneously on four fronts and has displayed, by the just timing, strength and range of his strokes, not only ability of a high order, but, also and distinctly, the spark of genius. He has the confidence of his troops and the confidence of the nation. His known toughness of fibre [sic] and his transfer to another command together preclude any doubt as to his health, though the appointment of a triumvirate to replace him is an indication that he must have been subjected to a colossal strain... Whatever the cause, the public, and, in particular, the army will be unhappy until the truth is revealed.³¹

As the above account was written shortly after Wavell's transfer, it is highly possible that it is tinged with emotionalism and is not totally objective.

However, almost two decades later, Correlli Barnett, after exhaustive research and analysis of primary sources, published and unpublished, came to the same conclusion:

There was no valid case for relieving Wavell. In his two years in the

Middle East he had built a base and a command structure from nothing. He had conquered the whole of Italian East Africa, had captured two hundred thousand prisoners, including the Duke of Aosta, Viceroy of Ethiopia. Under his strategic aegis, O' Connor had taken Cyrenaica and another two hundred thousand prisoners. Between February and June 1941 he had conducted six major campaigns, never less than three at a time, and in May five at a time. No other British soldier of the day had the strategic grasp, the sagacity, and cool nerves and the immense powers of leadership to do all these things and steer a course free of total disaster. Certainly Wavell's career had been latterly clouded by defeat- Greece, Cyrenaica, Crete. Yet Greece and Cyrenaica, the most serious of the three, were the Prime Minister's responsibility.³²

By sending Wavell to India, Churchill wanted him to relax, "sitting under the pagoda tree."³³ This position turned out to be no sinecure, but Wavell's valiant actions against the onslaught of the Japanese and his Supreme Command of ABDACOM, in addition to his service as Viceroy of India (1943-1947), are outside the scope of this review. Wavell is the only man to have served as both a Field-Marshal and as Viceroy of India.

The first full-length biography of Wavell was R.H. Kiernan's *Wavell* (London: George G. Harrap, 1945). Kiernan was relatively well-known as a biographer of contemporary subjects, and his other books include *General Smuts* and *T.E. Lawrence*, among others. As the first biographer of Wavell, the author writes a very complete, interesting, and intriguing history of the Wavell family. Over the centuries there have been two common threads- attendance at Winchester and service in the army- in the tapestry of the Wavell family history. Falling into the latter category was Wavell's grandfather, Arthur Goodall Wavell, who served in the Bengal Army, Spanish Army (1810-1818, to include service in the Peninsular War and the receipt of a Spanish kingship, Chilean Army (Deputy Commander-in-Chief), and Mexican Army. Wavell's father achieved the rank of major-general in the British Army.

Wavell's life is covered in a very detailed and complete manner, and Kiernan gives "a spirited account" of his Middle East campaigns, emphasizing Wavell's boldness and audacity in defeating the Italians. The Greek campaign is covered rather superficially, however. The author gives credit to Wavell's subordinates when due, and "makes it clear that in his exceptional situation at the hub Lord Wavell was always the coordinator and strategist and never had the opportunity to fight the battle himself,"³⁴ which in no way detracts from the magnitude of Wavell's achievements. This is a well-written, thoroughly readable book, as complete as one could expect in 1945.

Major-General R.J. Collins wrote *Lord Wavell (1883-1941): A Military Biography* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1947), which covers Wavell's life up to his transfer to India in 1941. Collins and Wavell were old friends, having first served together in the same staff office as captains during the Great War. In fact, Collins dedicated this book "To our many mutual friends, without whose help this biography could not have been written".

This superlative book is exceedingly well written by a discerning author. The fact that Collins and Wavell were friends does not stifle the author's objectivity. Collins assesses items critically when judgements call for it. One distinguished reviewer of this book highlighted the significance of Wavell's first campaigns:

'The early African campaigns,' remarks Field Marshal Smuts [of South Africa], 'were the first rays of sunlight to pierce the gloom of those early years of the war.' That is something which ought never to be forgotten of Lord Wavell.³⁵ and remarks that "It is doubtful whether any commander-in-chief has borne greater responsibilities than those of Lord Wavell in the month of May 1941."³⁶

Collins writes extensively of Wavell's characteristics and attributes:

Lord Wavell had done much by his writings to explain the extraordinary mental as well as physical stress to which the commander in war is likely to be subjected, and few have revealed the temperament better suited to withstand them. He combined moral and muscular strength; he proved himself tireless and unflinching; he maintained his optimism without painting fancifully optimistic pictures; he met reverses and disappointments without undue perturbation, he preserved a steady good temper; he made allowance for failure in subordinates not due to slackness or stupidity. Few British commanders have been able to take on so many tasks at the same time, and to do them all justice.³⁷

The author's concluding chapter assesses "Wavell the Man" and "Wavell the General" with a great deal of percipience. The former emphasizes Wavell's "capacity for making friends, and for keeping them once made; his kindness and thoughtfulness for others; his courtesy and unfailing good temper; his modesty and even temperament," (p. 440) and comments upon his taciturnity and legendary "silences". Of "Wavell the General", Collins states "Of Wavell's great ability and sagacity there is no need to enlarge. His reputation in this respect increases with the years" (p. 443), and comments upon Wavell's elephantine memory, his capacity for doing two things at once, his literary

capacity, perfect loyalty to his superiors, first-rate tactical eye for ground, unorthodoxy, and undaunted optimism. A number of interesting appendices are included, the most important being "The Pros and Cons of Intervention in Greece". This is an exceedingly well-written book with a great deal of detail, benefitting from the author's intimate knowledge of his subject. Collins concludes that "It is doubtful if the British Army has produced a better soldier-statesman since the days of Marlborough. (p. 451).

Bernard Fergusson (later Brigadier The Lord Ballantrae, K.T., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., O.B.E., D.S.O.) became Wavell's first aid-de-camp in 1934 and served on Wavell's staff on five separate occasions. Fergusson wrote *Wavell: Portrait of a Soldier* (London: Collins, 1961), "to do no more than to present a personal portrait of that great soldier as he appeared to an officer of his own Regiment". This slim volume does not pretend to be a biography, but is, rather, a fascinating and charming collection of anecdotes and recollections of Fergusson about his mentor, Wavell. An example remembered by Fergusson, which Wavell himself recorded in a foreword to one of his protegee's books, pertains to their dialogue when Fergusson was interviewing to be Wavell's aide-de-camp. Fergusson apparently said:

"I've never been an A.D.C. before, and I may make an awful mess of it." And he [Wavell] said:

"Well, I've never had an A.D.C. before; I may make an awful mess of you."

So began a happy friendship which was to last more than fifteen years. (p.16-17).

This tome illuminates the lesser-known side of Wavell's life, and superbly complements the other biographies of Wavell. To be sure, Wavell "bequeathed to us an example of integrity and of the soldierly virtues which is unlikely ever to be surpassed". (p. 12).

Fergusson also wrote the superb biographical sketch entitled "Field-Marshal The Earl Wavell," a chapter in *The War Lords: Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century*, edited by Field Marshal Sir Michael Carver (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), pp. 213-230.

The first biography of Wavell to make use of the Field-Marshal's voluminous papers was John Connell's *Wavell: Scholar and Soldier* (London: Collins, 1964). Connell was eminently well-qualified to write this biography, since he had served on Wavell's staff both in the Middle East and in India,

and possessed "an unrivalled knowledge of the military and political ramifications of those momentous years."³⁸

Wavell's papers, which Connell had total access to, are

.... as voluminous as they are historically significant. They consist of, first, folders and bound volumes of almost all the letters and telegrams he wrote and received in the course of his duties after his promotion to Major-General [1933]; second, a wide and varied range of his private correspondence over many years; and third, his 'Recollections,' forming a detailed narrative of his life, from his earliest childhood until 1941, compiled for his family's sake and dictated during such short leisure hours as he could snatch while he was Viceroy of India from 1943 to 1946 [sic]. (p.11).

With access to this veritable treasure trove, Connell sets out to correct the deficiency that "there had never been a full or fair assessment of what he [Wavell] achieved as a fighting commander in the first two years of the Second World War..." (p. 16). Connell succeeds admirably, and "handles it [his assessment of what Wavell achieved as a fighting commander] with a blend of sympathy and integrity which is wholly convincing."³⁹ His account is balanced and fair. Connell adroitly narrates each of Wavell's campaigns and places it within the diplomatic and strategic context of the theater of operations and the war as a whole. The issue of military intervention in Greece is covered in great detail, impartial in every regard. The reader of this book will be awestruck by the enormous and complex magnitude of Wavell's responsibilities in the Middle East, and equally impressed by Wavell's heroic and herculean responses to these challenges. Many consider Wavell an "Arthurian" figure, and few will disagree with Connell that "Wavell is worthy of his place in history as one of the greatest soldiers and noblest characters of his age." (p.19).

Even though Connell died shortly after *Wavell: Scholar and Soldier* was published, he had written the greater part of a second volume on Wavell's life, covering his service as Commander-in-Chief, India, 1941-1943. This volume was completed and edited by Brigadier Michael Roberts, D.S.O., and published as *Wavell: Supreme Commander* (London: Collins, 1969). Like its predecessor, this volume is also written "in Connell's vein with an intense sympathy for his subject which does not blur his judgment nor encroach on historical fact."⁴⁰

The most recent book about Wavell is *The Chief*, subtitled *Field Marshal*

Lord Wavell, Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy, 1939-1947, by Ronald Lewin (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1980). The dustjacket asserts this book is "the definitive treatment of the subject Wavell", but this book fails to live up to that claim. Lewin portrays the enigmatic facets of Wavell's personality, but fails to provide information on how and why these traits or characteristics were developed. This book sheds a great deal of light on the Churchill-Wavell relationship, though it tends to be disjointed and lacks continuity at times. It could also have been much better researched, with greater information and more detailed attributions given for his sources of information; there are, on the average, only eight endnotes for each chapter of the text. Indeed, "Instead of analysis, Lewin too often gives us unsupported, contradictory statements that provide a superficial picture of his protagonist."⁴¹

There have been a number of additional attempts to evaluate Wavell's generalship. The first substantial assessment was in *On their Shoulders. British Generalship in the Lean years, 1939-1942* (London: Faber and Faber; 1964), by Brigadier C.N. Barclay's C.B.E., D.S.O. Barclay's theme is that British people have

... almost entirely ignored the small company of generals who served them so well during the two or three years of our greatest peril. The generals of the early years of the Second World War - 1939 to 1942 - are mostly forgotten' yet, these men performed splendid service in difficult times. With their forces out-numbered, out-gunned, out-tanked, and inadequately-supported from the air, they suffered many defeats. But they also won very substantial victories and kept the flag flying while more men were trained, more guns, tanks and aircraft produced and powerful Allies gathered to the cause. (p. 11).

It is Barclay's goal to "rehabilitate" these earlier generals "whose exploits saved us from defeat and made possible the victories of the latter years of World War II." The eight senior officers, all of whom held operational command early in the war, in Barclay's study are Gort, Wavell, O'Connor, Wilson, Auchinleck, Cunningham, Percival, and Hutton.

The assessment of Wavell is conducted quite objectively. The author concedes that Wavell made a few errors, and Wavell is criticized for not pointing out more emphatically the dangers of the Greek "venture", and that his direction of Operation "Battleaxe" in mid-June 1941 "may have been faulty". (p. 64). Barclay states that Wavell's mission in the Middle East was literally "to make bricks out of straw", and even though mistakes were made,

... the fact remains that against massive odds Wavell held the Middle East for the British Commonwealth during the year we stood alone and, *what is not generally realized, directed two of the most resounding military victories in history- that in the Western Desert in the winter of 1940-41 and that in East Africa - with a tally of some 400,000 prisoners.* (p. 65).

Barclay is confident that "well-informed public opinion would place Lord Wavell at the top of any list of Generals who served their country with distinction in World War II." (p. 65).

Major-General E.K.G. Sixsmith's *British Generalship in the Twentieth Century* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1970), is quite disappointing in its assessment of Wavell. This is not because the author is overly-critical of Wavell, but because Wavell, who held unparalleled responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, is mentioned, (as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East) on only twelve pages. On the majority of those pages there is only a single, passing reference to Wavell. The assessment of Wavell is totally superficial and incomplete; even Wavell's subordinate, O'Connor, who was a prisoner of war during Wavell's last three, most hectic months in the Middle East, is mentioned in this book more than Wavell himself. Sixsmith offers no new insight, information, or theories about Wavell's generalship, but mentions in his Epilogue that in the early years of the war - "the dark day" - ... "the men in authority bore an even heavier burden than those that were to come; then the exploits of Wavell and O'Connor stood out to light the future." (p. 295).

Brigadier The Right Honorable Sir John Smyth, Bt., V.C., M.C., is much more thorough in his evaluation of Wavell's generalship in *Leadership in War, 1939-1945* (London: David & Charles, 1974). Though trying to be objective, Smyth continually notes that Wavell underestimated Rommel and the Germans just as he later underestimated the fighting abilities of the Japanese. Smyth seems to make a large issue out of the allegation that Wavell was "completely exhausted" at the end of his tour as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East (refer to pages 7, 95, 97, and 98), yet totally contradicts himself by stating that

Opinions may differ as to his [Wavell's] place amongst the top British commanders of World War II, but I very much doubt whether any of them were superior to him in sheer toughness of body, mind and spirit. (p. 65).

Smyth opines that the top five British generals of World War II were Wavell, Auchinleck, Alexander, Montgomery, and Slim. In attempting to

rationalize his choices, the author adds that "if Wavell could have retired after his early victories, his place amongst the topmost generals would have been assured". (p. 231). This is truly an incredible assertion, since it would appear much more difficult for a general, with one being required to exert greater displays of generalship under adverse conditions with (numerically or qualitatively) inferior forces, than it would be for a general with a preponderance of material and manpower over that of the enemy. Smyth commanded the 17th Indian Division and was responsible for making the decision in the incident that became known as the "Sittang Bridge disaster". Since this incident occurred while Wavell was Commander-in-Chief, India, one must read the author's assessments of Wavell conscious of a possible lack of objectivity.

Wavell, as mentioned earlier, served as Commander-in-Chief, India, from 1941 to 1943. During that time he also served as Supreme Commander of ABDACOM, a hastily-organized and illfated command given the then-impossible mission of stemming the tide of Japanese aggression.

Wavell eschewed his Army uniform in October 1943, becoming Viceroy and Governor-General of India in an era when he had to fight not only the Japanese but also radical independence-minded Indians. In spite of numerous obstacles, to include a lack of guidance and lack of support from a Home Government that would not commit itself to a policy of eventual self-rule for India, Wavell paved the way for the independence of India. When this achievement was almost within his grasp, after almost three and a half arduous years of incessant toil, Wavell was shabbily dismissed. He was superseded by the more flamboyant and youthful Mountbatten, who was armed with a government policy as well as plenipotentiary powers. This basically marked the end of Wavell's near half-century career of public service as a soldier and consul of the British Empire. He died three years later.

As has been shown in detail, Wavell served as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, 1939-1941, at a time when the British Empire had to hold its own, with a marked inferiority in resources and manpower, against the Axis onslaught. That Wavell was able to avoid decisive defeats, and at the same time achieve two of the greatest military victories in history - in the Western Desert and East Africa - while involved in operations in Greece, Crete, Cyrenaica, Syria, and Iraq, is an indication that he was a general of the highest caliber.

Wavell possessed a strategic insight and breadth of vision beyond compare. His intellectual abilities and memory helped reduce any problem to its simplest form, which was then decisively acted upon. Wavell's loyalty, to subordinates as well as superiors, was total. He never uttered a word or

wrote a sentence to defend himself or his actions, and never attempted to cast aspersions upon his superiors or anyone else. Wavell was the pillar of integrity, virtue, and self-discipline, and was a gentleman in the true sense of the word.

This bibliographical survey has included the works written about Wavell, his Middle East campaigns, and his generalship. More research needs to be conducted on the British grand strategy in the Middle East, 1939-1941, as well as Rommel's first North African offensive, Wavell's Operations "Brevity" and "Battleaxe", and the campaigns in Syria and Iraq. It would also be worthwhile to learn the actual impact of Ultra on Wavell's Middle East campaigns. A study of Wavell's role in developing tactics and strategy during the interwar years, plus his relationship with Liddell Hart, is also recommended.

Though Connell's two volumes are the closest that have been done to a "full and fair assessment" of Wavell's life and his accomplishments, I believe that much more remains to be discovered about the enigmatic Wavell.⁴² If we knew everything there was to know about Wavell, it is doubtful that the Wavell family would be so protective of the contents of Wavell's papers, and the Field-Marshal's papers would surely be in a public document repository by now. It is believed that the opening of Wavell's papers to researchers and historians could only result in absolving Wavell of false accusations, in such items as the decision to send the British expedition to Greece, and would cast a much more positive light on his personality as well as his accomplishments.

The secondary intent of this bibliographical review has been to achieve a consensus on an evaluation of Wavell the man and Wavell the general. Wavell was, to be sure, a soldier's soldier, the epitome of the magnanimous warrior. His outstanding achievements as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, will insure Wavell a place among the Great Captains of History.

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³⁵Cyril Falls, "Aftermath of War: The Career of Field Marshal Lord Wavell", review of *Lord Wavell (1883-1941), A Military Biography*, by Major-General R.J. Collins, *The Illustrated London News*, 31 January 1948, p. 122.

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³⁸Fergusson, *Wavell: Portrait of a Soldier*, p. 5.

³⁹"Wavell The Professional Soldier", review of *Wavell: Scholar and Soldier*, by John Connell, (London) *Times Literary Supplement*, 26 November 1964, p. 1054.

⁴⁰"Disaster in the Far East", review of *Wavell: Supreme Commander*, by John Connell, edited by Michael Roberts, (London) *Times Literary Supplement*, 8 May 1969, p. 482.

⁴¹D.E. Schowalter, review of *The Chief*, by Ronald Lewin, *Library Journal*, 1 November 1980, p. 2322.

⁴²The suggestion that even Connell may not have had total and unrestricted access to the Wavell papers is deduced from the comments that appear in the catalogue describing the contents of the Connell papers: "(XII) A group of 16 folders of material relating to the preparation, publication, and reception of the Wavell biography, c. 1957-1965. These papers document Connell's researches very fully and throw light on certain difficulties thrown in his path. Much material concerns disputes over the Wavell papers". (p.5), and "12 'Contracts and extracts of correspondence ...' approx. 19 letters from Countess Wavell, the biography requested by Wavell's widow and daughters ..." (pp. 5-6). Kenneth Blackwell, ed., "The John Connell Papers", *Library Research News*, Mills Memorial Library, McMaster University, I (Spring 1969), pp. 4-6.

A REQUEST FROM THE AUTHOR

Captain Raugh, the author of this article, is writing a doctoral dissertation on "Wavell in the Middle East, 1939 - 1941: A Study in Generalship". Our readers with memories, reminiscences, or photographs of Wavell, or who served in the Middle East, including East Africa, during 1939 - 1941 (especially those who served in the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions), are requested to contact him at the Department of History, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York 10996 - 1793 USA. All contributions will be punctually acknowledged and returned upon request.

The Bravest and Best Military Leader

The Tragedy of The Rani of Jhansi

LT GEN S L MENEZES PVSM, SC (RETD)

Manu Tambe, the future Rani of Jhansi, was born in Varanasi of noble Maratha stock, probably in 1827, which made her thirty years old in 1857. Her biographer, D. V. Tahmankar, states that she was an unusual maiden for her era: not only could she read and write, but she was athletic, riding and fencing well, and she showed early powers of leadership. In 1842 the first step towards those events that were to culminate in her falling on the field of battle occurred: she was married to Gangadhar Rao, the Raja of Jhansi, being named Lakshmi Bai.

Jhansi, in those days, with its broken, hilly country and tracts of jungle, was a traditional outpost protecting the Deccan; to the north and east lay the open plains of the Ganga, and to the west the semi-arid areas of Rajputana. It became noted for its fort which towered over the city, and which had been built by one of its incumbents, the Raja of Orchha, in 1615. In 1759, it came under the suzerainty of the Marathas, but in 1804 its then ruler signed a treaty with the British. By 1838 when Gangadhar Rao succeeded, though he maintained his own small army, the British had two battalions stationed at Jhansi. Gangadhar Rao appears to have been an able administrator who suppressed thugs and cleared bands of bandits from his territory.

The young girl from Varanasi was his second wife, the first having died childless. She startled the priests and guests at the wedding ceremony, by crying out: "Make the knot very firm". In 1851, after a pilgrimage to Varanasi, a child was born, but tragically died some three months later. With the child's death, Gangadhar Rao went into a decline. Finally he began to suffer from pernicious dysentery, and on 17th November, 1853, he lost consciousness. However, on the 19th, it would appear that he had recovered slightly for he adopted, amid religious ceremonies, a five-year-old, Damodar, as his heir, and was able to dictate his will. The adoption ceremony and the will-making were attended by witnesses, including Major Ellis, the Assistant Political Agent at Jhansi, and, pointedly, the will was handed to him. On the 21st, Gangadhar died. The question now was: what would the British do? With the onset of Gangadhar's long illness, this had brooded heavily over the Jhansi Court, for the record of the British was clear in its pattern. After destroying the great Maratha confederacy by 1818 and settling its administrative head, the Peshwa of Pune, at Bithur near Kanpur as a mere pensioner, the British under the thrusting policies of Dalhousie, began their encroachments else-

where. With their instrument the notorious doctrine of lapse, where by the demise of a ruler without a lineal heir caused his state to revert to the direct administration of the paramount power, the British took over, firstly, Sambhalpur, a small state in the then Bengal; next Satara, which had great prestige in the Maratha country as the base of their old power; followed by Nagpur, one of the five large states of the old Maratha Confederacy; and Karauli, a small but ancient Rajput state. The Mughals and Marathas had also used the doctrine of lapse, but it was customary to permit recognition of an adopted son as heir.

Of this period, Tahmankar says: "Widows were not only forbidden to marry again, but made to feel as ashamed of their position as if they had been to blame for the death of their husbands. Religious customs demanded that a widow must shave off her hair, wear a coarse one-colour sari, sleep without a mattress, and spend the rest of her life as a menial servant to her husband's family, despised and insulted by all, her very existence resented as that of an unwanted and useless survivor. No wonder many widows chose to commit suttee and die on their husbands' pyres. A royal widow was not exempt." The hand of British officialdom interposed; it forbade her journey to Varanasi where the haircutting ceremony was to happen. Soon after the Rani's assumptions as Regent, the Political Agent for Gwalior and Bundelkhand, Major Malcolm, was writing appreciatively of her administration to Calcutta. An early indication came with her setting aside purdah (except when dealing with the British), and in the business of government she began to show her real worth, necessarily played down during the marriage; though she maintained the traditional role expected of her, she was clearly an intelligent, articulate, and forceful ruler.

Her duel with the British for the fate of Jhansi ensued soon after Gangadhar's death. She wrote and argued her case herself, quoting the treaties of 1817 and 1842 and the adoption ceremony itself, and to reinforce the validity of an adopted heir, Hindu scriptures acknowledging this. Ellis supported her deposition and forwarded it to his superior, Malcolm, who, though he personally had a high opinion of the Rani, did not specifically add his recommendation when he sent it on to Calcutta. On the 16th February, 1854, the Rani drew up another petition, again with a fully supporting covering despatch by Ellis, and, at this stage, Malcolm changed his mind and endorsed this second petition. However, on 27th February, Dalhousie rejected the Rani's first plea and ordered the annexation of Jhansi, the following day, the second petition, bearing Malcolm's positive recommendation, arrived. The last act in this unhappy business came on 15th March, when it fell to the unfortunate Ellis, as Dalhousie's representative, to pass on formally his decision to the Rani. She received him "most courteously, separated by a purdah."

After he had expounded the whole ruling, she replied, I will never give up Jhansi!"

At the then cost of some 60,000 rupees, she sent a British and Indian legal delegation to London to represent her appeal to the court of Directors, but the answer of that omnipotent body was: No. Malcolm, to give him his belated due, now tried to get the best possible treatment for her, a generous lumpsum settlement and retention of some of her privileges, but the ultimate parsimonious result was a monthly pension of 5,000 rupees, out of which she was expected to pay her late husband's debts. Sir Robert Hamilton, the Agent for Central India, protested to Calcutta about this shabby treatment, but to no avail. The Rani moved out of the palace by the Fort to a private residence in the city, and there for the next three years she stayed discreetly in the background, her relations with British officials distantly correct. She is described at this stage by several who knew her, such as John Lang, her legal adviser for the abortive London appeal, as being a handsome woman with obvious personality.

When the historic chain of events occurred in 1857, the Jhansi garrison, part of the 12th Infantry and the 14th Irregular Cavalry, killed most of their officers on 6th June, and seized the Star Fort in the cantonment which contained the magazine and treasure. The British community fled to the Fort in the city, and the next day the sepoys laid siege to it. She offered the sanctuary of her own house for the women and children but this was rejected; she sent 100 matchlockmen to assist the besieged but these were sent away; more she could not do. Inevitably, the siege of the city Fort ground to its conclusion. On 8th June, the sepoys declared the Rani ruler again and marched off to Delhi.

While fortunes swayed about Delhi and the Ganga valley, at Jhansi the Rani dealt with her domestic problems; she crushed one usurper and also the armed incursions of two covetous neighbouring rajas; finally, in August, she faced a more serious threat, the army of another warlike lady, the Rani of Orcha, whose general she defeated, and then Jhansi was at peace until early 1858. After the departure of the sepoys in June, she had sent a despatch to the Commissioner at Sagar (Saugor) giving an account of the events and stating she had assumed the Regency again, but she soon became aware that in British eyes she was prejudged and a marked enemy. She set about improving Jhansi's defences and the training of her forces with considerable energy.

It was not the least of the Rani's misfortunes that the British would come in the person of the ablest British professional soldier to emerge during

1857, Major - General Sir Hugh Rose, who had arrived in India only in September, 1857. About this time, a force of two brigades and a siege train, later to be called the Central India Field Force, was assembling in the Bombay Presidency and Rose, a Queen's officer who had seen service in the Near East and the Crimea, was given command. Later in 1860, as Lord Strathnairn, he was to become the British Commander-in-Chief in India.

On 6th January, 1858, the Central India Field Force left Mhow for Saugor, which it relieved on the 3rd February. The next major objective was Jhansi itself, some 125 miles through three defiles held in strength by both the sepoys and the Bundelkhand chiefs, such as the Nawab of Banda (the son of the late Peshwa and Mastani, whom he had wanted to marry), and the Rajas of Banpur and Shahgarh. Rose selected Madanpur Pass as his point of attack, and with a wide, outflanking march, turned the positions of the 58th Infantry and the Bundelas dug in there. However, orders now came from the British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, that Rose was to cooperate with Major-General Whitlock's column from the Madras Army in the relief of Charkari, where it was deemed politically important to hasten to the aid of the Raja there. Rose resisted the Charkari diversion. As it was, due to the opposition and the terrain, it had taken him some six weeks to move from Saugor to Jhansi; however at 7 a.m. on 20th March, his leading elements reached there and his cavalry moved around the city to invest it. The siege of Jhansi, with the Rani's standard flying defiantly from a tower of the Fort, had begun.

By the 25th, the British batteries had closed up, and began a sustained bombardment. After silencing the Rani's guns on the Bastion, in the Military parlance of the day they "played on" selected points of the city wall, attempting to open up a breach, and by the 31st, a very small breach had been made near the Bastion. That evening the redoubtable Tantya Tope was reported to be approaching down the Kalpi road with a force of 22,000 and 28 guns. He had defeated Brigadier-General Wyndham at the Battle of the Brick Kilns outside Kanpur, and though he in turn had been defeated by Campbell, he had skilfully re-grouped his forces with his usual resilience and had recently overcome the Raja of Charkari and had captured his stronghold.

One can imagine the Rani's elation as she stood in her armour with her chiefs on the battlements of the beleaguered city and saw the huge bonfire Tantya had lit on a hill on the Jhansi side of the River Betwa to herald his nearness. Leaving 1,500, which included 500 British, and the siege artillery to continue the investment, Rose marched off with 2,500 to meet Tantya. With his cavalry and horse artillery threatening on the flanks, Rose launched the infantry in the centre which broke Tantya's first line. Tantya was personally

commanding the second line in a sound defensive position in broken ground, but the pell-mell withdrawal of the first line with the British-Indian infantry men intermingled among them prevented any second stand. In desperation, he fired the grass and withdrew.

Tantya's withdrawal had naturally a crushing effect on the defenders of Jhansi; depression and tiredness brought on by the incessant cannonade day and night of the siege took over again which not even the exhortations of the Rani, who was constantly moving among the firing line, gun crews, and working parties, could dispel. It is strange that she did not organize a sortie on the tenuous siege lines, but though the defenders maintained a fierce fire, they remained within. One surmise is that the Rani was apprehensive of traitors among her chiefs.

Rose now turned his full attention again to the city and he decided to attack as soon as possible, on the morning of 3rd April, concentrating on the breach by the Bastion and using scaling ladders. The silent approach of the assault troops, carrying their ladders and fascines, in the dark early hours of the morning was detected near the walls, and most savage hand-to-hand fighting, to which the Rani rushed with her Afghan bodyguard, developed about the breach and the south wall. By nightfall, street-fighting was raging in most parts of the city and the Palace had fallen, though not before fifty of the Rani's Afghan bodyguard who had barricaded themselves in the stables, fell to the last man; the Rani herself had retreated into the Fort. That night, while explosions rocked the city and fires burned in many places, she rode out of a postern gate with the ten-year-old Damodar strapped to her and attended by a small escort; she slipped through the very sparse British cavalry line still holding the ring about the city, though not without belated detection and a running fight which only fell away when the subaltern leading the pursuing troopers became severely wounded. Eventually, the Rani and her party reached the sanctuary of Kalpi.

Kalpi was Rose's next obvious objective. Apart from the fact that the Rani's trail led there, it was the only large town remaining, now that Campbell had recaptured Lucknow. It was also the base of Rao Sahib and contained a sizeable arsenal. A fresh army, under Tantya and with the Rani in the van, marched down the Jhansi road 40 miles to Kunch to meet the advance of Rose. It was not until 1st May that Rose's advanced guard, brushed up against the Kunch position, and not until the 7th that the whole force had closed up ready to deploy and attack. The success at Kunch was achieved by Rose by another flanking march; the sepoy's falling back on Kalpi. Tantya conducted a masterly withdrawal. There were to be bitter recriminations;

outcries against Tantya as a commander in that he was alleged to have left the field too precipitately, that the Jhansi soldiers had defended the person of the Rani without regard to the overall battle plan, and inevitably the infantry said that the cavalry had let them down.

After the loss of Kalpi, the leaders collected at Gopalpur, about 46 miles from Gwalior. A gloomy and seemingly hopeless situation confronted them at this very sobering council of war: their last arsenal had just been lost, and the British were closing in on three sides. Then germinated an idea of genius: what about the Fourth side of the net, held shakily for the British by the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior? Scindia had adhered to the British as he felt, whatever his personal leaning, that they would win through in the end. It is almost certain that this brilliant idea, of revitalization with the riches and resources of Gwalior, came from the Rani. Agents were duly sent ahead to Gwalior, and when the leaders with their force of 7,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and 12 guns met the Maharaja's army outside his city, all the Gwalior troops deserted except his personal bodyguard. Scindia left for Agra and the protection of the British garrison there.

To the British, the news of the Gwalior master-stroke came as a thunderclap. At the Central India Field Force, resting at Kalpi, Rose had actually handed over command and was about to proceed on sick leave to Bombay (he had collapsed three times during that day in the soaring heat at Kunch), but, realizing the gravity of the move, he at once reassumed command, and marched on Gwalior. On 16th June, he made contact with the screen near Gwalior, moved around the left flank to cut and seize the road to Agra, and prepared for a major assault on the city.

Meanwhile, one of the additional columns that Campbell had directed to this final area of operations was that of Brigadier-General Smith's. At 7.30 a.m., on 17th June, 1858, he was advancing towards the plain four miles south-west of Gwalior when he came up against sepoys holding a range of low hills barring his path. Smith attacked; as his infantry moved forward, the attacking lines were charged by a body of red-uniformed Gwalior cavalry. Smith was not unprepared for such a development for he had in hand a squadron of the 8th Royal Irish Hussars. The shock of the Hussars' charge shattered the riposte and made it recoil; a hectic fight ensued. Near the end of this skirmish, one horse refused to take a stream and a Hussar rode hard at the near-exhausted rider and cut 'him' down with his sabre. The 'cavalryman' who crashed to the ground hacked, bloody and dying, was the tragic Rani of Jhansi.

At least, that is one version of her death. Like so many aspects of her tragic story, there is conflicting evidence about how she really did die; another is that she was struck in the breast with a carbine ball. However, it is fairly certain that she was mortally wounded, whatever the means, fighting as a soldier in that foray with the Gwalior cavalry which turned into a desperate melee. When the tide of the action had swept by, oblivious of the identity of this particular casualty, her body was retrieved and borne away by her servants to a nearby temple, and there, in her male warrior's attire, bleeding freely, she died. The last words of this childless lady, whose fate was bound to the roll of drums and the boom of cannon, were to entrust her young adopted son to a faithful courtier.

With her death and cremation, all the remaining spirit departed from the army. Tantya and Rao Sahib, against whom the Rani had been storming for their complacency, were able to make their escape, and, two days later, Rose and Scindia entered Gwalior together. Tantya was to redeem his seeming defects as a field commander to become a hit-and-run guerrilla for many long months. Rao Sahib disappeared until the relentless vengeance of the British unearthed him in the guise of a holy man four years later, and he was sent to the gallows in August, 1862. Nana Sahib of Bithur vanished without trace and eventually died in Nepal. However, whatever the confused chronicles of either side, it is clear that the only real leader was a brave and intelligent woman whose simple but realistic military philosophy is typified by a quotation she was fond of: "If you are killed on the battlefield doing your duty you attain deliverance, and if you win victory you enjoy the earth". While her courage is not in doubt, nor her martial ability, what of her as a person? Sir Hugh Rose, her opponent, perhaps gives her the most eloquent contemporary epitaph: "The bravest and best military leader of the 'rebels'." G. B. Halleson in "History of the Indian Mutiny 1857-58" Vol. V (1897) records that "she was driven by ill treatment into rebellion; that her cause was a righteous cause; and that the treatment she received at the hands of Lord Dalhousie was one of the main causes of the disaffection in Bundelkhand and Central India in 1857". S.N. Sinha in "Rani Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi" (1980) concludes that she "was a victim of the rapacious policy of the British Government. The annexation of Jhansi was improper and the treatment meted out to her afterwards by the British authorities was most undesirable". Charles Miller's summation (1977), though considered a little naive by some, is nevertheless striking and evocative, and therefore worth quoting, "a dainty young woman, who may have been braver than Nicholson, a smarter politician than Palmerston, and a greater patriot than Gandhi".

Gorbachev in Historical Perspective*

MAJ GEN S C SINHA, PVSM (RETD)

On March 11, 1985, for the first time in Soviet history, people were expected not only to mourn the death of their leaders, but at the same time to congratulate the new leader. After a decade of gerontocracy, during which the USSR was ruled by a succession of sick, ailing and aged leaders, who died while in office, Gorbachev emerged as the new General Secretary of the Communist Party and the undisputed ruler of the country. "On the surface it looked as though the succession had been smooth and easy. In fact, as the author claims, it was far from being so easy and the speed of the announcement only showed that the decision had been made in a hurry probably to pre-empt other claimants to power. It is this story of behind the scene power struggle, the personal equations between the well known personalities in the Politburo, the influence exerted by various pressure groups at different levels and machinations of the Political System that Zhores Medvedev is so well qualified to tell, and does so with a great amount of clarity and insight.

The author states that for the first time in Soviet history the leadership succession has meant more than the arrival of a new leader and the possibility of the implementation of new policies. The Gorbachev succession marks the appearance of a new political generation, which differs from the old guard in style, knowledge and historical vision. Krushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko began their career during the Stalin era. Their Stalinist past was the most essential qualification for further promotion. Gorbachev, on the other hand, represents a younger post-war political generation which started its professional Party or State career during the more liberal Krushchev period.

Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev (pronounced Gorbacheoff), the eighth leader of the Soviet Union, was born on March 2, 1931 in the village of Privol'noye of the Stavropol krai into a peasant family. Naturally, little is accurately known of his early upbringing but the author makes good this deficiency by giving a good account of the circumstances that obtained in the area and the various important, if some what tragic, events that occurred and would have undoubtedly influenced the growing child in his formative years.

* *Gorbachev* by Zhores Medvedev, published by Basil Blackwell Ltd, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1FJ, UK 1986, Pages 272, Price not given.

The relevance of these historical events, the author states, is in the fact that Russian rural families have strong links. Their children know the tragedies and problems suffered by their native villages and village boys, and those who later become prominent, do not lose these links.

Although Gorbachev was too young to take part in the Great patriotic war, as World War II is termed in the Soviet Union, his schooling was interrupted by the German invasion and occupation. He graduated from School a year late in June 1950. During this period he worked each summer as a temporary employee of the local Machine Tractor Station and won at the age of 18 the award of the Order of the Red Banner of Labour. With this award and a candidate membership of the Party in 1950 to his credit, young Gorbachev succeeded in entering the law faculty of the Moscow University, rather an unusual choice for a rural boy.

Life at Moscow University must have been a quantum jump towards greater sophistication for the simple village youth. This process was further helped by his sharing a room with a bright Czech student Zdenek Mlynar, who later rose high in the Czech party hierarchy but had to in the end emigrate to Austria. In Mlynar's account of his student life in Moscow from 1950-51 he described how he and Gorbachev, not only shared a room, but were in the same study group, took the same examinations and were awarded the same good degrees. According to him Gorbachev was intellectually able, without being arrogant. He was also loyal and honest and he possessed a natural air of authority.

The biography traces Gorbachev's career and upward mobility from Komsomol work, to second secretary and then his election as secretary of Stavropol Kraikom in April 1970. At each stage the author gives detailed and interesting details of the organisational set up and functioning of the Party and State Organisations along with their inter-relations and their inter-relation with the central organisation in Moscow. With all this and the historical background given in the book the reader gets an understanding of how the Party and State organisations function in the Soviet Union.

At the beginning of December 1978 Gorbachev moved to Moscow on his appointment as Secretary of the Central Committee and was made responsible for agriculture because of his practical experience in Stavropol Kraikom, which was mainly an agricultural district, and also because of being a qualified agronomist, a qualification obtained earlier through a five year correspondence course. Although during his tenure the performance of Soviet agriculture failed to meet the laid down plan targets, Gorbachev kept moving up and was soon made a full member of the Politburo. When Andropov

succeeded Brezhnev, Gorbachev found himself to be virtually the second-in-command in the hierarchy. From this position was a short, but, perhaps, a very slippery step to the position of General Secretary after Chernenko's death.

This biography, which was published just a year after Gorbachev had established himself as the undisputed leader, sees him as belonging to the generation of communist leaders, who have not experienced of suffering and fear. From the beginning of their political careers they have been amongst the privileged. But they are seen as being better educated and having better administrative skills than their predecessors. Yet, being the products of the system, not its creators, the author feels that, they will tend to prefer improvement and continuity rather than bold reform. Although within a year Gorbachev had become the most celebrated and best known political leader in the world, the author concludes that he was neither a liberal nor a bold reformist.

This book throws a great deal of light on the remarkable new Soviet leader and the process by which he rose to become the General Secretary. It provides an even more valuable historical background, insight and understanding of the present day Soviet Society and the functioning of its political system. But it is a great pity that, with all his clarity, insight and logic, Medvedev should have gone so grossly wrong with his estimate of Gorbachev. It appears that he has missed the wood for the trees or how else can one explain his failure to see Gorbachev in his true likeness as the bold innovator and courageous author of *Prestroika* and *Glasnost*. To survive in a close society and to rise in a dogmatic party hierarchy, would undoubtedly have left Gorbachev little room for deviation from the laid down party line or prematurely show any liberal and reformist zeal. But once he had risen to the top and was sure of his position, quite contrary to the author's expectation, Gorbachev has turned out to be a remarkable phenomenon in Soviet history and has brought to its society an unthinkable measure of openness and liberal thought.

Book Reviews

Gorbachev - The Path to Power

BY CHRISTIAN SCHMIDT-HAUER

Published by - IB Tauris & Co Ltd 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden,
London WEC2E 8, PW ENGLAND, 1986, Pages 218 Price £12.95.

Christian Schmidt-Hauer, Moscow correspondent of the highly acclaimed West German political weekly 'Die Zeit', was the first to realise the tremendous potential of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1978 when the latter was only a provincial leader. In this book, the author examines the present Soviet President's career from his youth in the Caucasus, his student days and to his rise to power assisted by formidable heavy weights of the Russian hierarchy like Mikhail Suslov and Yuri Andropov. Gorbachev's steady rise to prominence is dealt with in the first few chapters. With a single mindedness of purpose and unshakeable courage of personal conviction, Gorbachev, exploiting the conventions of both the East and the West, carefully designs the ouster of veteran ideologies ruthlessly, in the grim and tense power struggle, which ultimately throws up a bevy of non-ideological technocrats. With the help of such people, Gorbachev is now calling the shots in the USSR, which earlier was politically and socially, reported to be a world of inefficiency and corruption.

Whilst not underplaying the need for overhauling the political system, the author, with deep insight, brings out the difference between Stalin's dark obsessions and Gorbachev's urging for more political openness. With equal ease, Christian Schmidt assesses Gorbachev's views on modernisation thus -

'Clearly modernisation is in part dependent on reduced arms expenditure and reduction in military costs themselves are only possible with improved relations with America.'

The author's political acumen, and his rare ability to predict the course of policies has been borne out by the subsequent signing and ratification of the INF Treaty and the recent cuts in Soviet forces and the dismantling of SS-20 missiles. Though this has been run down by the American military brass on the grounds that the Russians had excess military punch, much more than actual requirement, it has, undoubtedly, reduced tensions between the super powers. Apart from this Gorbachev's credibility in the Western media has been established. 'Glasnost' and 'Perestroika' have come to become the corner stones in his endeavours to reshape the Russian psyche. Whereas at the micro-level openness and restructuring of the Soviet society would be

much appreciated by the individual, it is any body's guess, whether at the macro-level, the firmly entrenched hard-core conservatives will find favour with the Perestroika as far as it is expected to recast the economy. Gorbachev will have his way, as he has been having, possibly at the expense of putting a lid on the Glasnost for a while which he can afford to do now, having become more invincible after being elected President too. Way to socialism, may after all, be constricted through a totalitarian tunnel, for maintaining the stability in society, negative votes in the Politburo not withstanding!

'Gorbachev - Path to Power' - is a well researched book which, apart from bringing the personality of the person in sharp focus, also contains life sketches of the 18 men who are in the centre of Soviet affairs. These are described in an appendix towards the end. In another appendix, Maria Huser, a research fellow at the University of Heidelberg, and also a specialist in the economics of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union) summarises the 'prospects of economic reforms'.

All in all this book should appeal both to the serious scholar-statesman as well as the intellectually awake common man.

--Lt Col A K Sharma

The Soviet Union And Syria: The Asad Years

BY EFRAIM KARSH

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Alien as it is to Marxist-Leninist ideology, geopolitical thinking has played a focal role in the shaping of Soviet policy towards the Middle East. Their main aim is the attainment of a stable and safer frontier in order to minimise potential threats emanating from all these contiguous territories.

Syria by contrast was driven in the direction of the USSR by mainly defensive considerations. Notorious for its domestic instability and surrounded by hostile countries, Syria's sense of insecurity rose sharply in 1966, following Israel's raids on the Arab countries. This led to USSR signing the first arms deal in 1955 and on 29 Oct 57, large scale economic and technical agreement at a cost of 579 million dollars.

Soviet-Syrian relations underwent a qualitative leap in February 1966 following the rise to power of the left wing faction of the Baath Party.

To Syria, Lebanon is not just a neighbouring country but an indivisible part of Greater Syria. In 1976, Syrians supported the Christian Coup. From

1978, onwards, it became increasingly clear that Syria sought with the USSR a more binding pact, particularly in the field of defense.

Neither USSR nor Syria were taken by surprise by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon; and Syria and Israel were reluctant to see a leftist-Palestinian victory.

Syria's external position was no more enviable. Having brought about the withdrawal of external forces from Lebanon by the summer of 1985, Israel completed its pull back from Lebanon with the exception of limited forces left within a 'security zone'. Asad discovered once again the problem of imposing law and order on this fractious country. A Syrian engineered tripartite agreement, signed on 28 Dec 1985 collapsed within a fortnight.

As far as the USSR is concerned, Soviet-Syrian relations should provide a major operational lesson for the West, in particular the US. Since the Soviet Union having inescapable Middle Eastern interests, cannot and will not distance itself from the affairs of this region. the only certain way to reduce its interference in the Middle East is to solve the Arab-Israel conflict. More than anything this policy reflects a clear recognition that the Arab-Israel conflict has long outlived its usefulness to Soviet Middle Eastern interests.

Gorbachev has recognised the legitimacy of American interests in the Middle East and the present Soviet policy is to take the interests of all sides into consideration.

--Major Gen B D Kale

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*Published by Brassey's Defence Publishers, 24, Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X
8HR (U.K.), 1988. Pages 431, Price \$ 33.00*

The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies was established in 1831, and is the oldest Institute of its kind in the World. Ever since, it has pursued the aims of its Royal Charter, namely 'the Promotion and Advancement of the Military Sciences and Literature'. In its independent studies, the Institute has sought to set the military sciences in their wider context of international security. Brassey's Year book is now approaching its century of publication, and has an established reputation as one of the most authoritative sources in the defence field. The pooling of their joint experience and resources in the production of this work, has earned them the support of contributors of high qualifications and prestige.

The 1988 yearbook offers the same high quality of content and production, as its predecessors in the preceding years. The menu is rich and varied. Understandably, it dwells more on the issues affecting the Superpowers; the problems, economic and military, of Western and Eastern Europe; the impact of Mikhail Gorbachev on the international scene; and a review of British defence policy. There are chapters on the implications of arms control on Military Strategy and future concepts; high technology and its influence on military capabilities; there is an examination of the conflict of interests in the Middle East, and there are articles on China, Japan, Soviet Japanese relations; and an interesting study of reforms in the Chinese Army. India finds mention in a contribution entitled 'Soviet-Indian Defence Cooperation'. Finally, there are items for use as references: Tank types and their characteristics, characteristics of offensive air support aircraft, current field artillery systems and chronologies of steps taken towards arms control and the downward slide to conflict in Sri Lanka.

It would be invidious to select articles for special mention. They are written either by scholars, who have carried out a great deal of research; or by professional Servicemen, serving and retired, who have held top appointments in NATO or their own countries. What they have to say, therefore, carries the weight of reason, experience and authority. Their contributions, certainly, are informative and carry much food for thought. A contributor who has spent several years in the Soviet Union, describes with comment" a Krokodil cartoon-one of the most transparent window on the Soviet Scene - shows an office where a clerk is sleeping, another drinking, the cashier is selling the factory product under the counter, the typists are knitting or filing their finger nails. The manager is announcing that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has commanded everything to be done differently henceforth. The picture below shows the changes that result. A clerk still sleeps, another still drinks, the cashier still sells the factory product under the counter, the typists still knit or file their finger nails. The only difference is that they have done a general post and changed desks. This Soviet comment explains all or most of the socio-economic state of the nation " One may not agree with the contributor's mild cynicism of glasnost and perestroika - he is sympathetic in the main - but one cannot help applying the Krokodil picture to our own public sector scene. It could not be more apposite.

If one desires an inside view of French security policies and force structures, one cannot do better than to read the lecture given by an Admiral of France, at the RUSI, which is reproduced in the year book. There is a fascinating description of the impact of General de Gaulle on the formulation of policy for French National Defence.

The Gorbachev challenge to Eastern Europe is another topic discussed in this book, which subject is of absorbing interest. It is obviously not practicable to summarise all what Brassey's Year Book contains, in a review of this nature. Suffice it to say that the student, who is interested in the study of defence matters in depth, will find a great deal to hold his attention here.

An excellent reference acquisition for the United Service Institution Library.

--Lt Gen M L Thapan, PVSM (Retd)

Wages down the ages

BY COLONEL SURJIT SINGH, VSM,

Assisted by Wg Cdr J Thomas, VM.

Published by Lancer International. Post Box No. 3802; New Delhi - 110 049. 1989. Pages 169, Price Rs. 200/-

Professional soldiers, when they write for their own fraternity, or for the lay reader, seldom dwell on topics as mundane as pay and allowances, or on the manner of their evolution; leadership, strategy, tactics, or military organisation, are their more preferred topics. It is refreshing to find Colonel Surjit Singh, a soldier and an Electronics Engineer, entering the field of wages, in relation to employment, with particular reference to the Armed forces, in this easy to read study. The motivation for this exercise came from his five year association with the Army Pay Commission Cell, which was set up to prepare the Army's case for presentation to the Fourth Pay Commission.

By nature, human beings are seldom satisfied; the Army in this country, perhaps less so, since its unique service in the cause of the country has never received the recognition it deserves. For the first time since Independence, the recommendations of the fourth Pay Commission gave some acknowledgement of the role of the Defence Forces, in relation to those of others engaged in the Service of the nation.

This is a fascinating book, which sets out, in simple terms, how work has been rewarded by wages; not merely in the Army, but in other sectors of civilian economy. Researching back some five hundred years, when costs and wages were reasonably well documented in India, the author states that during the period 1526 to 1914, the prices of essential commodities as also the population and the overall production of foodgrains, remained very nearly constant. From the figures contained in the "Economic History of India 1600 - 1800" and the famous "Ain-e-Akbari", prices of food, clothing and shelter

moved up only 6 to 8 times during the 400 years period from 1540 to 1939. The price rise between 1960 and 1985 is nearly of the same order. Thus, during the last quarter of a century, the prices have risen more than the aggregate rise which took place in four whole centuries. There are several reasons for this, as the author explains, with the aid of tables and diagrams; which require of the reader only an elementary knowledge of economics and which studiously avoids the use of modern economic jargon. By his own admission, Colonel Surjit Singh is a born story-teller and his book is studded with simple tales, which help to embellish his theme.

The evolution of the Army's pays and pensions is, naturally enough, covered in some detail. It is worth study as, too often, the average, uninformed Service Officer tends to feel he is the victim of an organised conspiracy to defraud him. He is fortunate that he had in the author, an erudite, articulate advocate, to press his suit for better terms, before the fourth Pay Commission.

In the concluding chapters of his book, Colonel Surjit Singh attempts to gaze into the crystal ball, to forecast future trends in price rises, and the manner of their compensation thereof, and also gives sage advice to young officers as to how they may best manage their finances.

A stimulating book, well worth reading, but perhaps priced beyond the means of the individual Service Officer. Unless the publishers can be persuaded otherwise, this book should be acquired by Unit and Formation libraries, and circulated for study. I, for one enjoyed it greatly.

--Lt Gen M L Thapan, PVSM (Retd)

Terrorism: How the West Can Win

BY BENJAMIN NETANYAHU

*Pub. by Farrar, Straus and Giroux 19, Union Square West, New York 10003
1986, Pages 254, Price \$ 18.95.*

The book is a compilation of contributions from as many as 39 authors of eminence including persons like George P Shultz, the US Secretary of State, Patric Moynihan, a senior senator and an ex US Ambassador to India, Jeane Fitzpatric, a former US ambassador at the UN, Arthur Goldberg, a former Justice of the US Supreme Court, Lord Chalfont, a former British Cabinet Minister, Alan Cranston, a US senator and a host of other distinguished Israeli and Western writers, professors, and politicians. The opening and closing definitive statements are by the Editor, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's permanent representative at the UN.

The book puts out the formal Western view of terrorism and the theme is that the West can and must initiate a number of measures, political, economic and military to fight terrorism. It makes no attempt to assess the reasons for the virulent resurgence of terrorism in the last two decades nor does it examine the problems of the Palestinians which triggered the evolution of the PLO.

Describing terrorism as the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends, it rejects the claim that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter". Terrorism is a variant of organised crime and should not be confused with freedom fighters engaged in guerrilla war. The former is not a sporadic phenomenon born of social misery and frustration; it is rooted in the political ambitions and designs of expansionist states and groups that serve them without compunction. Equally, the attempts to explain away terrorist outrages as the result of the desperation of individuals or groups are not only based on a simplistic fallacy; they also echo neatly the terrorists own assertions which are meant to legitimise their criminal actions and divert public attention, from the real forces behind terrorism. Such manipulations are in fact central to the terrorist strategy. 'Guerrillas' are not terrorists. They are regular soldiers who wage wars on superior military forces and not on civilians. It is true that terrorists want to be classified as guerrillas; they even claim prisoner of war status. Terrorism's most pernicious effort is to blur the distinction between combatants and non combatants; they seldom confront regular armed forces. Babies, women, anyone is their target. A terrorist declares total war on society.

The articles are interesting and educative and are of special relevance to us in India where we are facing a serious situation in some of our border areas. Mao's dictum that the terrorist is like a fish in water, and that without water the fish will perish, would suggest that terrorism has to be fought politically by winning over the populace and thus isolating terrorists. We are seeking a dialogue with the extremists/terrorists and thus giving them credibility. What is the solution? This should engage the attention of our policy makers urgently.

--Lt Gen P E Menon, PVSM (Retd)

Pure Logistics: The Science of War Preparation

BY GEORGE C. THORPE

Pub by National Defence University Press, Washington DC 1986, Pages 117.

Price not given.

The book was originally published in 1917. It is a mile-stone between Jomini's seminal writings and the later treaties on Logistics. Clausewitz, a

contemporary of Jomini has neither used the word nor considered logistical matters to be of major concern. He was obsessed with the importance of operational over logistical considerations, and of moral forces over the material.

The meaning of logistics is some what in-exact. It is essentially moving, supplying and maintaining military forces. Thorpe may well have been one of the few military thinkers to employ the term prominently.

In its earliest form, logistics was simply a matter of individual soldier carrying sufficient food and weapons to support a battle. As the warfare became more extended elaborated methods of provisioning and sustaining forces emerged. However, not until the Second World War did armed forces become anywhere near self-sustaining or Logistics develop into anything like the science that Col Thorpe had advocated.

'Pure' logistics is a scientific inquiry into the theory of logistics while 'Applied' Logistics embraces a large number of subjects in preparation for war and in maintaining war through its duration.

The Prussian Army in its War with France had been more fore-sighted. Von Moltke had made a careful estimate and organised proper logistical support to implement strategy and tactics. Napoleon's campaigns in Russia and Spain had failed due to lack of matching logistic support as the emperor had counted heavily on swift campaigns. During the American Civil War, strategy and tactics were minor problems in comparison with those presented by logistics. Logistic organisation was evolved by both sides as the war proceeded. Had there been an organised logistic system, the cost in men and material would have been less and results more decisive.

The political authority signifies what is to be done and the military experts decide how it shall be accomplished. The system is based on centralization of control for economy and cooperation and on decentralization of education, and training of forces and execution of the assigned tasks. Decentralisation also leads to development of initiative therefore, each man must understand fundamental laws and his knowledge must be accurate within its scope. The instructed youth will be as efficient at the beginning of his practical career as the man with experience at the end of his life. Education takes into account the experience gained in various fields so that research work is related to solving of practical problems.

Modern wars are 'competitions' in mobilization. That belligerent will win who makes the more economical effort—who gains the maximum result out of a given input. It is said that the last resources and the last credit wins.

In planning and employment of military forces under present day environment it has become all the more important to decide not only what is desirable but what is possible. However, of late, no Jomini and Thorpe has emerged to offer a modern theory of Logistics.

Forward looking military thought always carries a premium, however, a reflective look from the past can be useful. The publication of this book makes this minor classic available to the modern reader.

--Brig K Narendra Singh I A (Retd)

**AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC STUDIES:
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BY BARRY BUZAN**

Published by Macmillan Press in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS. 1987, Pages 325, Price not given.

Strategic Studies stem from their focus on military strategy. Strategy can be broadly defined as 'the art or science of shaping means so as to promote ends in any field of conflict, whereas strategic studies can be defined as 'the branch of political studies with the political implications of the war-making capacity available to nations'. As such this field contains a diverse set of topics, and is embedded within the broader field of International Relations. In the beginning of the book itself, the author has brought out the major questions that govern both International relations and human survival.

The book explains the base concepts of contemporary strategic thinking and links them up together into a coherent framework. It argues that strategic studies are about the impact of military technology on relations between states, and that its specialised contribution must always be seen within the broader context of international economic and political relations. The book, however, does not attempt to cover military operations branch of strategy - the actual art of using armed forces in combat - in any systematic way.

The book has four main parts. Since military technology plays a central theme, Part 1 lays the necessary foundations with an extensive discussion of it. This discussion covers the revolution and Global spread in Military Technology and the special case of Nuclear Proliferation. The History of the technological revolution discusses development in fire power, protection, mobility, communication and Intelligence and the process by which military and political impact of that revolution has spread 'including Arms Trade and its controversies'.

Considering Strategic rivalry between nations in relation to quantity and quality of military technology and also about the pace and direction of change in these variables, in Part II, the author examines the controversies of Arms Race within the broader terms of various models of arms dynamic. Part III unravels the origin, logic and problems of the principal strategic theory; Deterrence. Part IV examines the main concepts that have arisen in response to military technology seen not primarily as a problem in the hands of others, but more as a problem in itself. It assesses three main ideas - Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-provocative Defence. Each is examined in terms of its political, economic, and military logic.

The concluding chapter considers various approaches to international military relations and examines in what way, the developments in military technology have transformed international relations.

--Maj Gen K B Narang (Retd)

War Annual 2: A guide to contemporary wars and conflicts.

BY JOHN LAFFIN

Pub. by Brassey's Defence Publishers 24 Gray's Inn Road, London WC IX 8HR(UK), 1987, Pages 246 Price £ 16.95.

Such Annuals seem to be a very good idea as a compendium of contemporary wars and conflicts in the world. This Annual covers the wars in 1986-1987. The author seems well conversant with war-like activities in various countries and has written a number of books on military subjects. Such Annuals would be immensely valuable to students of war and of the military. The author appears to have many contacts and good sources in the various countries. He covers almost all wars and conflicts, both small and large, in the world. The smallest conflict, the United States' raid on Libya which lasted 11-12 minutes, gives very useful information.

The conclusions from this Annual can be that war is now a normal way of life. The Afghanistan Resistance War is well covered and includes the information that Kabul permitted USSR to annex the Wakhan corridor, a strategic finger of Afghanistan which reaches the border of China. The author has slipped up in the India-Pakistan War (Page 100) where he has stated "Chicken neck Area of Khem Karan". The book includes a good summary of the Iran-Iraq War including the attack on USS warship Stark.

A summary of happenings in 1985 in the various wars is useful. A very useful book for students of current and recent military affairs.

-- Brig R N Bhargava

THE IRAN - IRAQ WAR AND WESTERN SECURITY

BY ANTHONY H. CORDSEMAN

Pub. by Jane's Publishing Co. Ltd, 238 City Road, London EC.V2

PU(UK), 1987, Pages 185, Price £16.00

This is perhaps one of the few books which provide a comprehensive and objective view of the Iran-Iraq War. It is a lucid analysis with a forthright assertion of the vital strategic interest of the Western World in the Gulf region, primarily due to vast oil resources and strategic Geo-political configuration of the Gulf countries.

This book was published at a stage when the end of Iran-Iraq War was no where in sight, it was therefore highly creditable that the author was able to piece together, a cogent picture of the war inspite of a highly fluid situation and severe restrictions on reporting. Regardless of these handicaps we have here a highly accurate and convincing account of various battles, description of equipment and weapons, and an incisive analysis of the strength and weaknesses of the opponents.

The focus of this book is on the strategic implications of the war and the economic realities rather than on the conduct of battles. This is therefore not a book of military history but a critical analysis of the war and its wider ramifications for the West in particular and the world in general. The author convincingly establishes that the West must ensure a speedy end of the war because "the war is far too dangerous to western interests to be treated as a means of paralysing Iranian and Iraqi regional ambitions".

Mr Cordseman is also of the view that "the West cannot hope to make Iran or Iraq military allies. Neither state is likely to act as any kind of proxy for Western Security interests in the Gulf".

The overall analysis still holds good although the Iran-Iraq War has come to an end and an un-easy truce prevails. It may, however, be worthwhile for the military analysts to note that the task of visualising the course of battles is perhaps much simpler than to predict the political and strategic fall out of a war.

The book also brings out some major lessons regarding the nature of a modern war, between two under developed countries, which stretched to a point where it became dangerously counter-productive not only for the main contenders but also for the Western World. It is an important work in the RUSI Military Power Series and from an author, whose principal area of research has been the Gulf region.

--Maj Gen Afsir Karim, AVSM
(Retd)

To change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British armoured doctrine, 1927-1938.

By HAROLD WINTON

Pub. by Brassey's Defence Publishers 24 Gray's Inn Road, London WC 1X 8HR(UK), 1988, Pages 284, Price £24.95.

The stupendous cost in men and material during The Great War of 1914-1918, and total disruption of continental economies, was a severe shock to European nations and civil & military leadership. The higher direction of war and tactical doctrines had defaulted badly. At the same time, the tank and combat aircraft had emerged as new factors in warfare.

Amongst the minds that thought deeply about these issues was that of Sir John Burnett-Stuart, who however did not get due recognition for his contributions to the process of reform in Britain. In a talk on "The process of Modernisation", at the University of London, he stated, "here is too potent a new wine to put into old bottles. We must reorganise, and not go on patching any more". Having been the Director of Military Operations & Intelligence in the War Office during 1922-24, as G.O.C of 3rd Division during the trials of the Experimental Mechanised Force, and, after some experimentation on mobile forces in the Egyptian desert, as the G.O.C. in C Southern Command-again directly involved in major trial exercises, his concepts and recommendations, though not fully accepted by the decision makers, are indeed, worth study.

In the book under review, Harold Winton has therefore, rightfully built up his research on the modernisation of the British Army during the inter-war era and its total unpreparedness to face the German Blitzkrieg, on and around Sir Burnett-Stuart, without in anyway detracting from other protagonists of change, like Gen J.F.C. Fuller and Capt Liddell Hart, and, in fact has also commended the ideas and views of many junior officers. He has not hesitated to comment on the objectionists and conservatives, who will always be there. This book, therefore, offers the reader and the scientist of change, a comprehensive treatise on the dynamics of change in response to new weapons technology, which is relevant for all times.

An interesting feature brought out in the book, is the extensive and open debate in the print media-both military and civil, like in *The Army Quarterly*, *RUSI journal*, the *'Times'*, *'The daily Telegraph'* *'Westminister Journal'* and so on. The author has also dealt, in fair details with, the progressive evolution of the official doctrine as given in *Defence Services Regulations, I, II & III-The Mechanised and Armoured Formations-1929* and *The Modern Formations-1931*, which help the reader to place the reform process in correct perspective.

In his smooth flowing, analytical style-not sans subtle humour, the author takes us through the transitional decades- the 1920's and early 1930's as progressive and the later 1930's are retrograde periods, emphasising that-

"In the final analysis, the size, form, and concepts of Britain's armoured units were the result of a complex interaction of forces--the imperial defence mission, military conservatism, organisational inertia, and rivalries, technological uncertainty, conflicting personalities, political indifference, occasional social hostility--all acted to impede mechanisation and armoured warfare. And, with a few notable exceptions the senior officers of the army neither possessed nor articulated a reasonably accurate vision of the future war. Burnett-Stuart was the most striking exception---"

Notwithstanding the personality and role of the hero of the piece, this book gains special importance in the context of the explosion of new technology that we are faced with today.

--Maj Gen S K Talwar

Seek, Strike, Destroy: The History of the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion
BY TOM SHERMAN,
Published by Tom Sherman, Route 1, Box 129, Marquette, NE 68854 (USA),
Pages 243, Price \$ 27.00

This book is in the nature of a regimental history. It narrates the story of 636 Tank Destroyer Battalion (TDB) of the United States Army from the date of its raising in December 1941 till the termination of World War II. The unique feature of this account is that it has been compiled by a non-commissioned officer who served in this Unit "not only in a peacetime environment, but also during the unit's entire twenty one months of combat".

The TDB concept, that of a defensive anti-tank unit, is of a similar piece as our later day divisional regiment armoured corps. The battalion appears to have been organised into a headquarters company, a reconnaissance company and three TD companies. It would start its 'blitzkrieg' blunting role with the 37MM light towed gun. A few months later, however, the unit would be rearmed with the 75 MM gun mounted on a half track. And finally before receiving orders for joining combat overseas, the weapon the unit would do most of its fighting with, a 3 inch (75 MM) gun mounted on a tank chassis, the fighting vehicle powered by a diesel engine and known as the M 10 in the US Army. The weapon had a crew of 3 or 4.

The unit arrived at Oran in Algeria (NW Africa) on 13 April 1943. There followed a phase of intensive training including exposure to battlefied

further East in North Africa of selected cadres from the unit. It formed part of the 36th Infantry Division, US Army, a formation with which it was to remain for most of the War.

From the Salerno beaches South of Naples (Italy) in September 1943, to Germany and Austria via Southern France, this Battalion experienced non-stop combat. When the 36th Division earned its welcome relief from front line employment the 636th TDB did not, but instead was assigned to 14th Armoured Division, with which formation they participated in the dash to the River Rhine. It ended the War again with the 36th Division and by then equipped with the M-36 TD. This fighting vehicle carried a high performance 90 MM gun, the same weapon which provided fire power to the M-46 (PERSHING), and the two PATTON tanks, the M-47 and the M-48. VE-Day found this Battalion rounding up German troops in the Alps inside Austria.

But sad is the human commentary of war. In Seargent Sherman's own words, "a shot cracked out. The infantryman alongside me collapsed on the road surface. After 30 months his number came up on VE-Day". And in the same vein the thrilling narrative is brimful with the intensely human and intimate experience of seasoned and blooded soldiers who form part of a well led, highly trained, motivated and well armed unit such as a Battalion. Naturally the 'esprit' of such fighting troops was something special, which was to enable them to overcome many handicaps. In this particular case the armour element of the Allied powers in Europe was always out-gunned by the German 'panzers'.

It goes without saying that the intrinsic appeal of such a compilation is to those who shared the bonds of camaraderie when the adrenaline flowed high. In my view though, the narrative will exert equal fascination on the general reader, especially the junior leaders in the land forces of many countries. It has a unique flavour of being a vivid, earthy and intensely human account penned by a high quality professional veteran-more worthy of praise still that the story has been recalled and compiled after a lapse of four decades and is full of wit, humour and human foibles. Some of the incidents concerning commissioned officer-enlisted man relations may amaze the junior officers in the cadres in our Armed Forces, moulded as they are in the patterns set during the British connection. It would appear that the US enlisted man has his own style of dealing with the inept, the arrogant and the lily livered. Having said all that, such rapport must have been of a high order to have sustained remarkable 'esprit de corps' of combat duties over a continuous period of 21 months.

The style of regimental histories we are used to, it is a bit disconcerting to find at the end no "Roll of Honour". But perhaps it is just as well, for it is immensely better to recall your comrades in arms who are no more, in the flesh and blood. The narrative does not make it clear but it may be presumed that this heroic Battalion was disbanded on return to the USA.

-- Brig Ramesh Chander.

We Dared: Maritime Operations in the 1971 Indo-Pak War

BY ADMIRAL S.N. KOHLI, PVSM, AVSM

Pub by Lancer International, Post Box 3802, New Delhi-49, 1989, Pages 159, Price Rs 200

First three chapters of the book are devoted to tracing the events leading upto the out-break of Indo-Pak hostilities. The next five chapters deal with the planning, preparation and account of the events pertaining to the operations on the Western Sea-board. Submarine operations, and defence of port harbours are chapters by themselves. The last chapter deals with IAF claims and comments on naval operations. The book also contains 54 pages of some very interesting extracts of various publications having a bearing on the subject.

The Author has brought out the force levels of the contending Navies, as well as the qualitative imbalances in the weaponry. Barring Pak submarines, which were reportedly of a superior quality, Pak Navy by contrast was small and lacked effective air support.

On out-break of hostilities within the first week itself, elements of Western Naval Fleet mounted two very audacious attacks on Karachi port and despite formidable harbour defences left wide spread destruction and devastation in the wake of their attacks. In anti submarine operations the Navy suffered only one casualty-INS Khukhri - possibly an avoidable loss. Fleet operations thereafter were mostly confined to efforts at sinking and destroying the Pak killer submarine. The following excerpts are relevant to the point:-

(a)"A subsequent technical enquiry also revealed certain failings and non compliance on the part of Khukhri's A/S teams with laid down A/S doctrine". P-67.

(b)"A massive hunt was launched for the killer submarine with all available A/S ships, sea kings and Alizes". P-77.

(c)"It was decided to launch yet another attack on Karachi from Bombay on the night of 10/11 December. All preparations were made and ships and missile boats moved accordingly. the unfortunate sinking of Khukhri at 2055 hrs on 9 Dec threw this attack out of gear and it had to be

postponed as all available ships and aircraft were thrown into the hunt for the Pakistani killer submarine". P-77.

(d)"Operation Falcon (the Hunt) was terminated reluctantly at 1900 hrs on 13 Dec". P-77.

A full chapter has been devoted to establish Naval claims to destruction of oil storage tanks at Karachi. Commander Kumar's account graphically describes the event at Page 61.

"At about 2345 hours when we were about 12 miles off Karachi, the shore batteries opened fire ineffectively against us. At about the same time Captain (F) 15 FS designated 4 ship targets to the Commanding Officer of the missile boat, who promptly worked out the fire control solution and launched all his missiles at the ships at anchor off Karachi harbour. The missiles found their targets and three vessels were seen ablaze soon after. The last missile was targetted and locked on to an oil storage tank"

The author recounts the same action at Page 90,

"Hence the missile boat and the escorts went in on the night 8/9 December, the boat firing all her four missiles in the direction of the cluster of ships anchored outside Karachi which was also in the same direction as the oil fuel tanks. Three missiles found their target and one locked on to the oil tanks.....".

Use of the missile boats in an offensive role was a bold concept worthy of praise and recognition.

The author was Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Western Naval Command during 1971 Indo-Pak conflict and hence is eminently qualified to provide a true and accurate account of naval operational plans, as they were formulated and executed.

The book is a welcome addition to the any military library as it provides authentic and much needed additional information on the Naval aspect of 1971 Indo-Pak War.

--Maj Gen Surinder Nath, AVSM, VSM

U 333 - The Story of a U-Boat Ace

BY PETER CREMER

Published by The Bodley Head Ltd 9 Bow Street, London, WC2E 7AL, 1984, Pages 243, Price £ 10.95

This is the story of a German U Boat commander Peter Cremer popularly known by his colleagues as "Cremer Ali" who had successfully commanded the U 333 almost throughout the 1939-45 war with a short spell on the staff

of Grand Admiral Donitz and that was the time his boat U 333 under the command of another German officer sank. For a short period, during the end of the war, he commanded the U Boat 2519.

Cremer had to his credit sinking of allied merchant shipping of about 60,000 GRT. This was all due to his fine leadership the determination and will to fight. His boat was damaged number of times with depth charges, gun fire and ramming both by merchant and war ships but inspite of being personally wounded badly, he brought the crippled boat to the base for repairs and ready again in no time for his hunt for more kills at sea. For all this, there was a saying among other ranks that Cremer is a good insurance. For his bravery, Cremer was decorated with the Knight Cross.

How right is his remark in chapter 9 (Page 109) of the book "The success and failure of a U Boat depends on the competence of a Commander". This is equally applicable today to any Commander either afloat or ashore.

The book written in a chronological order in a simple language first explains the working of a submarine and then briefly traces the U Boat operations during the war, in particular the story of U Boat 333. The author has narrated the story in such a way that a reader feels, he is part of the crew and is witness to all the actions at sea.

I would like to quote extracts of some of the observations made by Peter Cremer which in some cases are specific for a submarine crew but equally applicable to all who go to sea.

-As far as survivors of a ship which has been sunk by me, I no longer looked on them as enemies but simply seamen who must be helped at all costs.

-There can hardly be branch of the services in which a man must rely so much on others, tolerate their habits and subordinate himself to the team. Comradeship and strong feeling of solidarity characteristics of the U Boat Service are indispensable for successful operations under difficult conditions.

-And yet over the blue depths, we never felt alone but rather a tightly knit family continually connected with the great U-Boat clan ashore.

Lastly, I would like to narrate an incident of this brave leader to the readers of this review. "When his first Lieut. of the U-Boat 2519 which he was commanding rang him to ask how he would respond for a surrender in 1945, his reply was "Ali Cremer does not show a white flag and does not surrender the boat. Scuttle it."

This is a very interesting and educative book from which a number of lessons can be learnt and relearnt. It should find a place in the libraries both afloat and ashore and read by all officers and men particularly those who are in the submarine arm and those intending to join this branch of the service.

--Capt R P Khanna, AVSM I N (Retd)

China and the Bomb

BY KEN COATES

Pub by Spokeman, Bertrand Russell House, Gamble Street, Nottingham, England, 1986, Pages 111, Price £2.95.

The editor has credited the Chinese with splitting the Bi-polar nuclear superpower dominance, thus according to the editor offering 'opportunities which could be more encouraging' for avoiding a nuclear conflict'. The editor goes on to point out two facts which must be borne in mind while trying to understand Chinese ideological confrontation; firstly that China has been the most threatened nation - having received repeated nuclear threats from both the Soviet Union and the United States of America. (The editor points out that preparation of extensive underground shelters in major Chinese cities is a concrete evidence of how seriously Chinese took these threats) Secondly, Chinese have maintained the most steadfast commitment to rational responses in the field of actual nuclear preparations, and in this there has been considerable continuity despite changes in the Chinese Governments.

Repeated Gun boat attacks against the main-land and over flights by U-2 spy planes, launched from Taiwan; thwarting Chinese 'legitimate claims' to occupy Tachen, Matsu & Quemoy Islands by US assistance; Russian illegal occupation of Chinese territory in Ussuri region; all these were viewed as grave provocations by China. Russian justification of Czechoslovak invasion as 'limited sovereignty' and US inaction in the matter, further convinced China that superpowers would continue to impose their will through Nuclear black-mail unless China developed its own nuclear capability.

After establishing Chinese compulsions to 'go nuclear', the editor has collated statements of the Chinese Government issued after first Chinese nuclear explosion, the cable sent by Premier Chou En-Lai to Heads of Government on the occasion, and Chinese communique on the occasion of second Atomic explosion. These documents propound "Chinese commitments to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, peace and disarmament."

During the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982, China tabled a six point programme which is briefly as follows:-

- (a) Disarmament cannot be divorced from international security, both should be integrated with efforts for maintaining world peace.
- (b) States possessing the largest arsenals should take the lead in reducing their armament.
- (c) To lessen the danger of war nuclear as well as conventional disarmament should be carried out simultaneously.
- (d) Disarmament be carried out without prejudice or threat to independence, sovereignty and security of any State.
- (e) Disarmament agreements should provide for effective international verifications.
- (f) All states be entitled to participate on equal footing in the deliberations, negotiations and settlement of disarmament issues.

In a later speech indicating basic position of China on disarmament, Premier Zhao-Ziyang while more or less reiterating the above stated points, included the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes and destruction of all chemical weapons as well as stopping their production.

This book represents basically the Chinese view on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on disarmament. As the Editor himself admits the work is not exhaustive, however, it is helpful in understanding the Chinese view point when examining the problem of Disarmament in the global context.

--Maj Gen Surinder Nath

China and Arms Control: Emerging Issues and Interests in the 1980s
(Aurora Papers 3)

BY ALASTAIR I JOHNSTON

Pub. by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 151 Slater Street, Suite 710, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1P 5H3. 1986, Pages 85, Price US \$ 12.00.

Aurora Papers: No.3 is a study for the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament by Alastair I. Johnston which analyses the changing Chinese attitudes and approaches to arms control and disarmament in the 1980s.

The study indicates that in the recent past there has been some room for flexibility on arms control and disarmament (ACD) in Chinese approaches to the issue. In recent years, the Chinese have shown sensitivity to the potentially destabilising impact on their neighbours of their nuclear weapons programme, and have developed an unambiguously minimum deterrent vis-

a-vis the Soviet Union. More recently, on Key ACD issues such as Intermediate - Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), Chinese analysts have recognised the dangers that unrestricted arms races pose specifically to Chinese nuclear deterrent and more generally to the stable international environment that is deemed essential for long-term economic modernisation.

The final part of the study emphasises the factors which have contributed in the 1980s to a closer and more serious look at the value of ACD for Chinese security. This change in approach has been accompanied by a significant increase in Chinese participation in ACD fora, especially in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. China's increased exposure to ACD processes has in the past five years or so brought about a significant change in its arms control policy. Positions on a number of issues discussed at the CD, for instance, have evolved in greater awareness of China's interest in the matters as well as to exchanges with foreign ACD policy-makers and technical experts.

As a result, Chinese policy on some ACD issues has undergone important and constructive changes in the 1980s. On nuclear test ban, for instance, the Chinese have gradually eased their opposition to any discussion of the topic in multi-lateral fora to offer instead formal participation in deliberations on the matter in the CD. While the Chinese have not yet endorsed a five-power Comprehensive Test Ban, Beijing has recently announced that China would stop atmospheric testing.

However, in the final analysis, the study warns that the positive directions in the evolution of China's arms control and disarmament policy are by no means assured. But it recommends that these trends should be encouraged and strengthened to the extent possible through increased mutual efforts to explore and illuminate ACD issues that are relevant to Chinese Security.

Alastair I. Johnston, a graduate student in the World Politics Programme at the University of Michigan and a specialist in Chinese political and foreign policy has covered in great detail the evolution of Chinese arms control and disarmament policies through the last two decades under Mao-Zedong and then Deng Xiaoping.

The study completed in 1986 is rather dated but contains a critical analysis of the emerging approaches of China to arms control and disarmament and would be of great interest to Indian readers concerned with Chinese nuclear strategy today.

--NBS

What are Generals made of?**BY MAJ. GEN. AUBREY S. "RED" NEWMAN, US ARMY (RETD)***Published by Presidio Press, 31 Pamaron Way, Novato, CA 94947, USA. Pages 314, 1987, Price \$18.95)*

"What are Generals Made of" is a chronicle of the author's experiences gained during his long and distinguished service career, which saw him in action in various theatres, in varying capacities, both in command and on staff. The book, comprising sixty six chapters hinges on the author's career and goes on to draw attention to the different facets of personality that need to be developed by an officer, if he is to qualify for higher command. The most routine and the most trivial as also the most important and the most difficult aspects of decision making that a commander may face, and the challenges of command and leadership are discussed in an informal style, almost like a face to face chat, and with subtle humour.

Claiming that military organisation and operating principles and procedures are based on the fundamental precept that, 'Ten good soldiers, wisely led, will beat a hundred without a head', 'Red' Newman illustrates its validity with anecdotes drawn from the lowest sub-unit level to the highest command level in the Army. The narration is divided into three parts: Company Grade Officers, Field Grade Officers and General Officers. Chapters are titled thoughtfully; captions include such engaging headings as 'The Spirit That Drives The Infantry', 'Bonaparte Knew His Maxims', 'In Command, Key Can Be Empathy', 'When Chips Are Down, The Will To Dare Is Not Enough', 'Character is The Arbiter' and 'Care And Feeding Of VIPs'. There are numerous references to some of the greatest American Generals as also to some of the lesser known who led successful armies during the American Civil War and the two world wars, bringing out their strong character traits and highly personalised styles of command. The book closes with a chapter on 'Stepping Out Of The Active Ranks', where the author lists some useful tips for personnel nearing retirement. In the words of the author, 'For every Serviceman the day will come when he retires. The day you leave the Army, like the day you entered it, means stepping through a one-way door into a new life'.

While the phraseology used is typically American, some of which may not be quite familiar to the average Indian Officer, the situations and challenges enumerated are universally true and are, therefore, typical of those our junior and senior commanders will need to face. The unexceptionable values on which the author builds up the attributes of effective leadership would apply with equal relevance to any professional army, irrespective of its level of sophistication. This book will, therefore, form useful reading for our budding commanders.

-- Lt Gen P E Menon, PVSM (Retd)

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
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